Civilians and military supply in early modern Finland

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

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Military Maintenance in Early Modern Europe

The Northern Exposure

Petri Talvitie and Juha-Matti Granqvist
University of Helsinki

Military and civil spheres are more or less isolated enclaves in our present-day Western world. Soldiers live and operate separate from the rest of the society, and, besides the annual parades and the possible compulsory military service, these two worlds have little contact. Wars are even more remote incidents, as they are mostly fought in far-away countries.

In early modern Europe, the situation was different. Not only was the continent war-torn, but the civil and military spheres were also closely interwoven during peacetime. The period from the 16th century onwards has been characterised as the age of military revolution: warfare was modernised, the size of armies grew rapidly, and more and more state revenues were needed to construct fortresses and navies, as well as to fund and provision the troops. Scholars like Geoffrey Parker have even attributed the

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birth of the modern bureaucratic state to the military revolution, as nations had to collect their taxes and manage their resources more efficiently than before to sustain their growing armies.[1]

Pre-19th-century armies were not public institutions to the same extent that they are today – or at least were during the 19th and 20th centuries. European rulers delegated the construction of warships and fortresses to private contractors, and their services were also used for arms and munitions manufacturing, clothing, army transportation and the provisioning of armies and navies. Furthermore, intermittent warfare was often funded by wealthy merchants and other private individuals, who became important financiers and subcontractors for the crown.

In the past few decades, there has been a marked global trend towards privatisation in national services and an increased use of contractors in military supply and operations. Arguably, all Western armies have become more or less dependent on private suppliers and security services. To understand this development, it is worth looking back at how armies were sustained before the French Revolution. Early modern states could not have managed without resorting to civilians – national or foreign – specialised in bridging the gap between supply and demand.

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The prevalence of private contracting and the army's dependence on civilian maintenance has been highlighted by several historians discussing the nature of early modern warfare. One of the early major examples is Fritz Redlich's 1960s study *The German Military Enterpriser and His Work Force*, which traces the evolution of mercenary troops in Germany between 1450 and 1650.[2] Also, the importance of the billeting system has been recognised in the earlier research.[3] It is justified to argue, however, that, during

[1] Parker 1988.

[2] Redlich 1966; also, Géza Perjés refers to contractors in his comparative article on army provisioning in Europe: Perjés 1970, pp. 49–51.

[3] See, e.g. van Creveld 1977, p. 7.

the past 20 years or so, the theme has received much more systematic attention in historical research than before, and, as a result of this renewed interest in non-state actors' involvement, some of the established conceptions of civil–military relations have been challenged.

Most recent studies concentrate on the outsourcing of military activities, which was a common practice throughout Europe in the early modern period and particularly in France, Spain, Britain and the Netherlands, as well as in several German principalities. According to David Parrott, 17th-century military commanders were basically proprietors of their regiments, acting relatively independently through their own networks of arms producers, merchants, transport operatives and creditors.

The level of outsourcing was probably highest in Britain, where responsibility for most war supplies and manufacturing was assumed by private entrepreneurs rather than by government establishments during the 18th century. Uniforms, equipment, provisions, and horse fodder were purchased on contract, and large fortifications in England were built by contractors. Also, the vast majority of British warships were provided by merchant shipyards. Traditionally, merchants operating in the military business have been accused of rent-seeking at the expense of the crown, but recent studies have found that the level of corruption was actually quite low. In reality, the British military supply system worked in a highly efficient manner, which partly explains Britain's naval and military success in the Seven Years War and in the Napoleonic Wars.[4]

What is common to all the studies mentioned above is their desire to re-examine established conceptions about the impact of war and military organisation in state formation. According to the older standard narrative, put forward especially by Charles Tilly, the nearly constant and resource-demanding nature of warfare between the late 15th and early 19th centuries forced European rulers to centralise their administration and to develop efficient and meritocratic administrative machineries to collect resources – land, labour and capital – from the territories they ruled. As

[4] Lynn 1997; Bannerman 2008; Knight & Wilcox 2010; Parrott 2012; Goossens 2014; Torres-Sánchez 2016; Torres-Sánchez et al. 2018.

regards the armed forces, they had also been absorbed directly into the state's administrative structure by the 18th century, drastically curtailing the involvement of independent contractors.

Historical literature on the topic has termed this new type of state the national state, the power state, the military state, or the fiscal-military state. According to Jan Glete, the lattermost term is the most useful one, because it puts equal emphasis on the income and expenditure parts of resource flows: European state budgets became enormously inflated during the early modern period, and most of the revenues were spent on war.[5]

David Parrott criticises these basic conceptions of state-capacity theorists by suggesting that 'the scale, competence and resources of early modern governments have been greatly overestimated, and their capacity to achieve objectives correspondingly exaggerated'. In France, offices were sold to the wealthy elite to raise funds for the state, not to increase the efficacy of the administration. Elsewhere, the number of employees of the crown remained small and their freedom of action was curtailed by individual, territorial and institutional prerogatives.

The extensive outsourcing of public authority to private contractors offered a solution to these restrictions; it was the most efficient means of mobilising military resources considering the limited political and administrative capabilities of early modern rulers. According to Parrott, the evolution of military enterprise created mechanisms by which rulers managed to achieve 'a more extensive and effective mobilisation of private resources than would otherwise have been possible from their own fiscal and administrative capacities'. In that sense, there is no incompatibility between the growth of the power of the state and the development of a substantial sphere of private military activity.[6]

Why, then, were the contractors willing to offer credit and other services to the state despite the fact that wars were unpredictable events and the risk of losing everything was high? According

[5] Tilly 1990; Glete 2010, p. 9.

[6] Parrott 2012, p. 316. See also Fynn-Paul et al. 2014, p. 10; Torres-Sánchez 2016.

to David Parrott, the principal motivation was profit: 'Financial reward was a driving force in explaining the attraction of military enterprise, and must be explored as a primary motive for the involvement of many commanders and colonels, as well as for those bankers and financiers who were willing to underwrite their activities, and those who provided the war goods, munitions and foodstuffs on credit against anticipated returns from military success.' Likewise, social ambitions – noble titles, enhanced social status, and reinforced political standing in relation to the ruler – were important background factors, although Parrott admits that military enterprise was not 'an easy and much-frequented route from obscure origins to high noble status'.[7]

A third model has been offered by Jan Glete, who emphasises the state's role in the market with respect to protection and the control of violence. According to him, different social groups were willing to cooperate with the state in exchange for protection for their own activities. For instance, merchants involved in foreign trade benefited from rulers' capability to control the seas. Glete's explanation accepts that, in some European states, private contracting was used because rulers did not have enough administrative skills and power to run armed forces on their own. He insists, however, that ambitious rulers had 'strong incentives to develop superior administrative capabilities of their own, and such capabilities made it easier for them to cooperate with private groups who also had competence and access to resources'. In his view, private actors preferred to cooperate with strong rulers capable of actually ruling their territories.[8]

However, the phenomenon also had a reverse – and much less researched – side. Not all civilians involved in military maintenance were wealthy merchants and 'entrepreneurial commanders' in search of profit and status. Common townspeople and rural communities were also massively involved in such maintenance operations in early modern Europe.

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[7] Parrott 2012, pp. 241–250.

[8] Glete 2002; Glete 2010, p. 663.

Giulio Ongaro's recent work *Peasants and Soldiers* explores this side of the equation by concentrating on the Republic of Venice, where rural families provided hay, wood and housing for mercenary troops, which the republic recruited almost constantly. Moreover, Venetian communities had to provide men and weapons for rural militia – a numerically substantial subject army that was used for garrison duties and defensive warfare – and to ensure that the soldiers received adequate training and compensation. The agrarian population was also needed for the construction of fortresses, saltpetre production, and other military-related work.

Ongaro's premises differ from studies devoted to military contracting in that he includes all the non-state actors in his analysis, including the rural elite, manual labourers, and peasants. Some of these groups, such as estate owners, managed to benefit financially from the militarisation of the countryside, but in many Venetian regions the increased needs for provisioning and providing lodging for troops, together with the conscription of militiamen, oarsmen and sappers, caused severe economic difficulties for rural dwellers.[9] The same kind of argument has also been made for other European regions. According to Myron Gutmann, the lodgement of troops was the real scourge for the people in the Low Countries, rather than battles and sieges.[10]

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The early modern Swedish Realm was, administration-wise, one of the most advanced countries in Europe. After emerging from the Middle Ages by cutting ties with the Danish-led Kalmar Union in the 1520s, it evolved quickly into an effective bureaucratic state under the forceful rule of the House of Vasa. A well-functioning government, efficient tax-collecting system and powerful military machine enabled the northern kingdom to become a European superpower.

[9] Ongaro 2017.
[10] Gutmann 1980.

During the so-called Swedish Age of Greatness, which more or less overlapped with the 17th century, the Swedes were in a near-constant state of war with neighbouring nations – the Russian Empire, Poland, the German states and Denmark. Exploiting the military weakness and national disunity of their neighbours, they created a multinational realm that ruled most of the coasts of the Baltic Sea (see Figure 1.1). This greatness, however, was not permanent – the large and disjointed new realm was difficult to rule and vulnerable to attacks.

Figure 1.1: The Swedish conquests in 1560–1660.
Source: Toivo 2007, p. 87. Map drawn by Petri Talvitie.

In the devastating Great Northern War (1700–1721), the neighbours, who had caught up with the Swedes through their own military revolutions, got their revenge. As the result of the war, the Swedish Realm was reduced to its pre-greatness borders and downgraded to a second-rate European power.

In the 18th century, the Swedes turned from front-runners to underdogs. Most of their military budget went to the defence of their new smaller realm, rather than to waging wars of conquest, and the few wars they partook in ended more or less catastrophically. The Finnish War (1808–1809) marked the final humiliation: the old Swedish Realm was split in half, with Finland being annexed by the Russian Empire and the remaining part of the realm continuing its existence as the new Kingdom of Sweden.

As the Swedish military evolved, so too did the ways to man and maintain the army. For most of the Age of Greatness, the Swedish army was conscripted separately for every war, with every village obliged to provide able-bodied men to the service of the crown. From the 1680s onwards, conscription was replaced by the allotment system, which allowed the realm to have a low-cost and reasonably effective standing army. The villages were now obliged to recruit soldiers and give them a cottage and a patch of land. When such soldiers were not at war or tending to military exercises, they lived the life of a smallholding farmer.

The allotment system was in effect for all of the 18th century, but enlisted troops increasingly gained in stature beside it. Rapidly developing military branches such as the navy, as well as artillery and fortifications, could not be manned by allotted troops, as they required soldiers who were in permanent service. This increased the size and importance of enlisted troops within the Swedish military machine. Unlike the allotted soldiers, who resided at the countryside, enlisted troops were a distinctively urban phenomenon, as the garrisons, naval bases and fortresses were concentrated in towns.

The early modern Swedish Realm is a well-known and often-cited case amongst international military historians. Michael

Roberts, who fathered the concept of military revolution in the 1950s, was a specialist in Swedish history and based his theoretical approach on Swedish examples.[11] Also, Swedish historians themselves have been active in reworking and refining the concept. The front-runner has been the aforementioned Jan Glete, whose works on the connections between naval history and state-building are considered international classics.[12]

The concept, however, has also been fiercely attacked. Critics of Michael Roberts, such as Jeremy Black, have accused him on relying too much on Swedish history and thus overplaying the role of military in state-building. According to these critics, the Swedish Realm, with its reasonably well-functioning and uncorrupted governmental machine, was a European anomaly rather than a representative case.[13]

In building and upkeeping their military machine, the Swedes were eager to adopt the European models of maintenance. However, those models were developed in Western and Central Europe, where the populations were dense, distances short, agriculture productive, and towns large and wealthy. The Swedish Realm was a large and scarcely populated country where distances were long and weather harsh, and most of its towns would barely have been considered villages in the wealthier parts of the continent.

Many of the problems encountered by armies throughout Europe – such as the difficulty of gathering resources and organising transportation during autumn and winter months – were much more severe in the Swedish Realm.[14] Some problems, in addition, were unique to the north – the freezing sea cut off maritime connections and made boat transportations impossible during wintertime, a problem that entrepreneurial commanders in Britain or France rarely had to consider.

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[11] Roberts 1988.
[12] See, e.g. Glete 2002; Glete 2010.
[13] Black 1991.
[14] See, e.g. Black 1991, pp. 40–42.

Although Sweden is a well-known and often-cited case, historians like Michael Roberts and Jan Glete have researched the interaction between military and civil society mainly at the upper level, analysing the impact of military evolution on state formation and the development of modern bureaucracy. The grassroots level, namely the role played by ordinary towns and rural communities in Sweden and Finland in terms of financing, feeding, accommodating and provisioning the army, has attracted less attention.

The role of civilians in army maintenance has been studied mainly during wartime. Most recently, Christer Kuvaja has studied how the Russian army utilised Finnish peasants for its maintenance operations during the occupation period of the Great Northern War (1713–1721), and Martin Hårdstedt has analysed the maintenance system of the Swedish army during the Finnish War (1808–1809).[15] Peacetime civil–military interaction has so far been best analysed by the pan-Nordic research project *Garnisonsstäder i norden* ('Garrison Towns in the North') in the 1980s. The project analysed military towns in all the Nordic countries, with a special focus on the early modern period. However, it largely omitted themes like financing and maintenance, focusing on the military impact on the visual and demographic development of towns, and the rows and disputes between the army and civilian citizens regarding management of the local government and the right to conduct business in the military towns.[16]

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The main objective of the present anthology is to analyse the role of civilians in the military supply systems in the early modern Swedish Realm, both in the towns and in the countryside. It aims to answer how the army sought to exploit

[15] Kuvaja 1999; Hårdstedt 2002.

[16] See, e.g., Artéus 1997.

civilians – burghers, peasants, entrepreneurs – in order to provision itself, and how the civil population managed to benefit from such cooperation.

David Parrott argues that typical early modern European governments were ineffective, undermanned and corrupted, but managed to effectively mobilise military resources by cooperating with private under-contractors and financiers. At first glance, the situation seems to have been the reverse for the kings of Sweden: they had one of the most effective governments in Europe, but also a vast realm scarce of people and capital. The dichotomy between market-based and governmental allocation of resources lies at the core of this book. To what extent and in what ways were the Swedish decision makers able to utilise civil society in the building and upkeeping of its military machine, and how did the special characteristics of the realm affect the said utilising?

The book does not concentrate on conscription, allotment or recruitment, which were arguably the most important ways that people in the towns and countryside subsidised the Swedish army. These themes have been actively studied by military historians both in Sweden and in Finland, and new openings have been published even in recent years. Instead, it aims to give perspective to the much less researched theme of how the army used civil society for its maintenance purposes: how did it purchase food, drink and accommodation for its soldiers and material for its needs, and how did it finance its military campaigns?

The outsourcing of military activities will be analysed in several chapters focusing on such themes as the manufacturing of saltpetre, wartime credits and the provisioning of soldiers. These chapters offer an interesting point of comparison for studies devoted to more urbanised and densely populated regions. The different chapters are relatively independent of each other in terms of their approach to the overall themes of the book, as some of them are closely connected to the above-mentioned discussions on military enterprises and state formation, while others are more related to debates on civil–military relations in the Nordic countries.

The concept of 'civilians' is understood broadly in the book. Several of its chapters discuss military officers who served as financers and providers of the Swedish army. As this financing and provisioning was not part of their official duties as officers, but a private business they ran on the side for various reasons – to gain financial profit, to look good in the eyes of the crown, or just to save their troops from starvation and slaughter – they are interpreted as civilian entrepreneurs.

The geographical focus of the book is the eastern part of the pre-1809 Swedish Realm. Referred during the Middle Ages simply as 'Eastland' (*Österlandet*), it was commonly known by the name of Finland during the early modern centuries. The eastern half of the realm was pivotal to the maintenance of the Swedish army, as it had strategic significance as a provider of raw materials, and it was Swedish Realm's frontier against its perennial competitor, Russia. Most Russo-Swedish wars were fought on Finnish soil and required the efforts of Finnish country and town people – accommodating, feeding and provisioning the troops, sometimes for their own army, and sometimes for the occupying enemy.

Furthermore, Swedish crown's peacetime plans and projects for the development of its eastern defences usually also required the efforts and services of Finnish peasants and townspeople, from the saltpetre production of the 17th century to the construction of the sea fortress of Sveaborg in the 18th century. Thus, the civilian citizens of the eastern part of the realm were affected by the needs of military maintenance, both during wartime and in times of peace, more frequently than their western neighbours.

The chapters are thematically divided into three parts, the first of which deals with the financing of wars. It is opened by Jaakko Björklund, who in Chapter 2 illustrates how the officers of the Swedish army largely financed the Ingrian War (1609–1617), in which the Swedes conquered the provinces of Ingria and Kexholm from Russia. As half a century of almost uninterrupted warfare had emptied the treasuries of the Swedish Realm, and as it was simultaneously fighting another war against the Danes, the Ingrian War became almost a private enterprise of the high officers of the army. Björklund's evidence shows that, without

the officers, their capital and connections, and their willingness to finance the warfare, the Ingrian War would have ended in catastrophe, instead of becoming one of the founding stones of Sweden's Age of Greatness.

In Chapter 3, Kasper Kepsu continues the theme by discussing the burghers of Nyen, the Swedish settlement and largest trading town in Ingria, and their role as financers of the Great Northern War (1700–1721), which marked the end of Swedish Ingria and the ceding of the area back to Russia. As the battle over Ingria and Finland prolonged, the Nyen merchants – and particularly the wealthiest of them, Johan Henrik Frisius – became indispensable for the crown as suppliers and financiers. Even though Frisius and his colleagues were refugees from their destroyed hometown, they had better international connections and credit standing than the Swedish crown and managed to operate more efficiently at the markets than the royal officials.

In Chapter 4 that concludes the first part, Petri Talvitie analyses the sales of crown farms as a form of financing the war. The early modern Swedish crown was a major landowner, as, under Swedish law, all farms deserted or unable to pay their taxes three years in a row became crown property. Talvitie shows how the selling of these farms to private buyers became an important source of revenue in the 18th century, first to finance the Great Northern War and later to cover the massive public debt created by the war. By purchasing crown farms, private Swedish and Finnish individuals became indirectly important financiers of war.

The second part deals with the role of countryside and rural population in military maintenance. It is opened by Mirkka Lappalainen, who in Chapter 5 analyses the manufacturing of potassium nitrate in late 16th- and early 17th-century Finland. In order to secure its self-sufficiency in gunpowder manufacturing at the eve of its Age of Greatness, the Swedish crown built a network of state-owned saltpetre works and obliged peasants to deliver the raw materials. The system did not function as hoped for several reasons, not least because of the burdensome 'saltpetre tax', which created conflicts between the local peasants and the crown's men, and it was fairly quickly abandoned for other solutions.

Next, in Chapter 6, Sampsa Hatakka discusses the maintenance challenges of the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743, arguably one of the biggest military catastrophes in Swedish history. Hatakka shows that maintenance problems were one of the root causes for the catastrophe. The war was declared without proper preparations, and the decision makers in Stockholm realised only too late that Finland lacked grain storages, mills and bakeries. The crown's hastily attempts to improve the situation by building new infrastructure and outsourcing bread-making to civilians were of little avail, thanks to scarce population, limited resources, and transportation difficulties. Thus, the Swedish army had to use the critical first months of the war for solving maintenance problems instead of fighting, a fact that contributed heavily to its loss.

In Chapter 7, the final chapter of the third part, Anu Lahtinen offers a long-term microhistorical perspective of the effects of the military on the rural population by following the history of two southern Finnish villages, Hyvinkää and Kytäjärvi, from the 16th to the 18th century. Although the villages were directly touched by war only a couple of times during the period, they were continuously shaped by the indirect presence of warfare and military readiness. They paid taxes to finance the military, lost a significant amount of their male workforce in wars, were obliged to provide upkeep for passing troops, and had to endure new manor lords who gained land grants in return for military service and disturbed the local power balance.

The third part deals with the role of towns and urban population in military maintenance. The chapters by Juha-Matti Granqvist and Sofia Gustafsson discuss the town of Helsinki during the construction of Fortress Sveaborg. Founded in 1747 to be the keystone of the Swedish Realm's eastern defence, Sveaborg was the biggest construction project in the history of the old realm and turned the small Finnish town of Helsinki into a massive building site. The fortress needed massive amounts of construction materials, as well as food, drink and accommodation for its many thousands of soldiers and workers.

In Chapter 8, Juha-Matti Granqvist traces the evolution of the Helsinki burgher community during the fortress construction years, arguing that the close and long-lasting interaction between the town and the fortress gave birth to a special 'military town bourgeoisie'. Guided by the forces of supply and demand, through the process of trial and error, the local burgher community slowly evolved into a shape that was ideal in serving the military. In Chapter 9, Sofia Gustafsson discusses the soldier billeting system, in which the townspeople were obliged to lodge soldiers in their homes. Gustafsson shows that, even though the billeting was a heavy burden to the local burghers, the co-existence of soldiers and civilians in same houses and rooms was in itself surprisingly peaceful. One of the reasons is that the garrison soldiers began, from an early stage, to interact closely with the local community, demonstrated for example by the numerous marriages between them and the local women.

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PART I

Financing the Wars

CHAPTER 2

Officers as Creditors during the Ingrian War (1609–1617)

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Endless money forms the sinews of war.
— Marcus Tullius Cicero

From 1554 to 1660, the Swedish Realm was in a more or less permanent state of war against one or more of its neighbours. During this tumultuous period, organising, extracting and husbanding 'national' resources for warfare was the primary occupation and *raison d'être* of the developing fiscal-military state. Despite its minuscule population of only some 1.2 million and a small, underdeveloped economy, the Swedish Realm nonetheless managed to defeat its rivals and transform into a heavily militarised Baltic empire.[1]

[1] Lindegren 2000, p. 133.

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This remarkable success, the heavy burden of war and their implications for the society have naturally attracted the attention of historians of diverse fields. However, from the point of view of military finances, the focus has mainly been on resource extraction by the central state: taxation, conscription, and state-run enterprises at home, as well as contributions and foreign subsidies abroad.[2] Much less attention has been paid to the role of personal agency and private enterprise in Swedish military finances.[3] Although the extensive use of mercenaries and military enterprisers willing to provide men, money and materials for war is a well-known fact, no deeper study of this business of war has been made. Furthermore, these entrepreneurs are still viewed as foreigners and other outsiders detached from the state, while in reality many were or became members of the Swedish elite and closely integrated with high administration and the royal court.[4]

In this chapter, I investigate the lending practices and credit networks of the officers, both domestic and foreign, of the Swedish army during the Ingrian War (1609–1617); a Russian civil war that the Swedes entered as ally to Czar Vasily IV, which soon turned into a war of conquest of the eastern Baltic sea region (see Figure 2.1). This was a war the Swedish Realm could not afford, and, as the army got little or no help from the central administration, it was left to fend for itself. It was largely thanks to the personal resources of private enterprisers and the army's

[2] See for example Lundkvist 1966, Lindegren 2000, Glete 2002, Hallenberg 2009 and Glete 2010. The most thorough study on 17th-century Swedish war finances is *Det kontinentala krigets ekonomi: Studier i krigsfinansiering under svensk stormaktstid* by Hans Landberg, Lars Ekholm, Roland Nordlund and Sven A. Nilsson (1971). However, even the case studies of this collection assume a very macro-economic view of military finances.

[3] For an overview of the status of the debate regarding the role of personal agency, see Karonen & Hakanen 2017 and Fynn-Paul, 't Hart, & Vermeesch 2014.

[4] For example in Linnarsson 2014.

Figure 2.1: The eastern Baltic sea region at the turn of the 17th century. Source: Map drawn by Kasper Kepsu and Petri Talvitie.

officers that Sweden managed to limp its way to victory eight years later.

I argue that, in the context of this particular war, the state use of credit advanced by its officers was a mutually beneficial solution. Officers were important intermediaries in a chain of borrowing, which tied social and mercantile groups behind the crown's war effort. Thanks to the good credit and broad connections of the

officers, the state gained access to otherwise inaccessible resources at better terms than it could otherwise manage. Officers' credit was also crucial to overcoming the recurring failures of the state's supply apparatus and preventing military collapse. In turn, many officers were greatly enriched or otherwise benefited from lending to the crown.

The chapter is divided into three parts. I begin with a presentation of the various means and mechanisms through which officers advanced credit to the crown during recruitment and, subsequently, during the war. In the second part, I outline the sources of the funds advanced by officers, and their links to a broader credit network. Finally, in the third section I look at how officers were repaid for their services, and the kind of rewards they could hope to receive.

Credit and Military Supply

Officers played an important role in supplying the Swedish military effort. Besides shouldering a large burden of the recruitment of troops and mobilising resources at the start of the war, officers continued to provide funds and credit throughout the war to make up for the inadequacy of state-organised military supply. These loans helped the army tide over the worst disasters and increased the duration that the army could be kept in the field.

Recruitment

Foreign troops formed the backbone of the Swedish army in the Ingrian War. A few years prior to the outbreak of the war, the Swedish conscript army had been virtually annihilated by a smaller Polish force at the battle of Kirkholm. Estimates for Swedish losses at Kirkholm range from 6,000 to 8,000 men, over 1% of the total male population, and a much higher percentage of those of fighting age. As a result, the Swedish army became increasingly dependent on foreigners to make up the numbers and improve

the quality of the army. German, British, French and Dutch soldiers, among others, answered the call. Although domestic troops still constituted half the numbers, the foreigners bore the brunt of the fighting.[5]

Recruitment of these foreign troops depended heavily on credit advanced by recruiting officers. Acting as military enterprisers, foreign officers would contract to recruit a unit of a specified composition and equipment, by a certain time, for a fixed fee. The crown would defray some of the costs, most notably by sometimes providing infantry with arms and armour and cavalry with mounts, as well as a small advance payment of *laufgeld* or *anritt*, but the bulk of costs were to be borne by the officers.[6] These costs included recruitment money, equipment, and upkeep for the men between recruitment and the first muster.

Muster was to be held at an agreed port and in the presence of Swedish commissaries, who would inspect the troops. After making deductions based on shortcomings and advance payments, the commissary would then pay the officer his commission, before boarding the men onto ships and sending them to Sweden. If an officer managed to schedule the various tasks properly and get

[5] Domestic infantry was mostly used as garrison troops and as local militia near the border. Most were reluctant to serve abroad, and the Swedish king had a particularly difficult time forcing troops from mainland Sweden to serve in Finland, let alone in Russia. The total population of the Swedish Realm at the time of the battle of Kirkholm was in the region of 1.2 million. Mankell 1865, pp. 11, 20–21 and Appendix 8; Lindgren 2000, p. 133.

[6] *Laufgeld* (for infantry) and *anritt* (for cavalry) were standardized payments in the international mercenary market, originally intended to cover living expenses for recruits traveling between the recruiting place and muster place and issued to recruits when they first signed up. However, the way the Swedes used these terms in documents and correspondence seem to refer to all funds advanced to assist recruiting officers prior to the first muster. See Redlich 1964, pp. 41–42.

men and equipment at advantageous rates, then he could expect to recover the advanced sums, and perhaps even make a profit.[7]

Companies, headed by captains, formed the basic building blocks for recruitment.[8] In the period 1606–1616, infantry was typically recruited in companies of 200 men at a commission of 1,600 Swedish dalers[9] per full company, excluding arms and armour, which the Swedes would provide and deduct from pay. Cavalry was far more expensive and, to make it manageable for enterprisers, was recruited in companies of 100–150 troopers, with more allowance for deviating from the contracted number of troopers. More lightly armoured cavalry was to be supplied with an arquebus, pistol, sword and helmet, for which the recruiter would receive 26 dalers per trooper. Most expensive were the plate-armoured cuirassiers, armed with a sword and pair of pistols or lance, which were commissioned at a rate of 35 dalers per man.[10]

During the Ingrian War, the Swedes continued to follow the earlier practice of contracting individual captains to recruit their own companies, which would then be loosely combined into regiments

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[7] RA, Riksregistraturet, Charles IX to Philip Scheding and Hans Nilsson 26.4.1606; Charles IX to Henrik Horn, Anders Haraldsson and Henrik Eriksson 5.9.1607.

[8] Cavalry companies were called cornets or *fana*, while infantry were either *fänika* or companies. For the sake of simplicity, I shall refer to all these company-level units, both infantry and cavalry, as companies and their leaders as captains.

[9] The Swedish daler (henceforth simply daler) was a unit of account, equal to 4 marks or 32 öre. As most accounts are conducted in dalers, I have used this throughout this chapter. Actual payments were made in a variety of Swedish, Russian and foreign coinage, as well as luxury furs and other materials. Inflation was considerable and exchange rates fluctuated. Unless an exchange rate has been specifically provided, I have calculated the riksdaler at 6 marks and 1 daler equal to 28 denga (0.28 rubles), which were the norm in military accounts. Edvinsson (2010).

[10] RA, Diplomatica Hollandica vol 1, Hans Nilsson to Charles IX 28.7.1607.

or larger detachments. However, there was an increasing trend towards organising recruitment through higher-level enterprisers, capable of recruiting multiple companies or entire regiments of some five to six companies (1,000–1,200 infantry or 500–600 cavalry), which they would then command with the rank of colonel or higher. Besides reducing the administrative burden of contracting multiple enterprisers, this development was encouraged by the Swedish crown's keenness to secure the services of foreign aristocrats with both fiscal and social capital.[11]

Officers were very dependent on their social standing and networks for recruitment. It was common for men to be recruited from among the enterprisers' personal affinity, from his tenants and clients or, more broadly, from the populace of his area of origin or the area where he held government office.[12] Successful recruiters were also able to subcontract and delegate part of their task to subordinates, family and other contacts. These agents would each be allocated a certain region or place in which to recruit and would undertake part of the responsibility for managing and financing the process. Thus, although a colonel held overall responsibility for recruiting a regiment and served as the frontman towards the Swedish crown, funding was actually shared by a larger group. This was beneficial both to the crown, which gained access to a broader credit network, and to the enterprisers, who could share the burden and risks.

Though information on how much funds various officers actually advanced remains sparse, the sums appear to have been considerable. Colonel Jacob Spens provided at least 9,214 dalers and 8 öre for the recruitment of a regiment of Scottish infantry, for which he was repaid in 1610. Feldherr Jacob De la Gardie, commander of the Swedish army, used 4,000 riksdalers (6,000

[11] RA, Riksregistraturet, Charles IX to Hans Nilsson and Philip Scheding 25.3.1606, and Charles IX to Evert Horn and Hans Nilsson 12.7.1607.

[12] Trim 2011, pp. 158, 185–186; RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, Casteguison to Charles IX 3.5.1608, De Corbeille to Charles IX 23.5.1608, Francois des Essars to Charles IX 17.9.1608.

dalers) of his own funds to recruit some 650 infantry, plus further funds to reform existing companies into his own lifeguard regiment at a time when reinforcements from Sweden were not forthcoming.[13] Smaller sums were provided by captains, such as Daniel Hepburn, who brought 479.75 riksdalers (720 dalers) worth of clothes and cash for the troops recruited by De la Gardie.[14]

Particularly difficult and expensive was the recruitment of cavalry, which required the purchase of expensive equipment and specialised troopers. In 1607 and 1608, when Swedish recruitment was at its peak, competition on the recruiting market was severe, and it was difficult to obtain arms and armour quickly or inexpensively. Manufacturers also required half of the pay up front and in cash. As enterprisers operated largely on credit, obtaining cash posed its own difficulties, particularly since lending from professional moneylenders could be expensive. Furthermore, enterprisers were reluctant to provide funds early on, preferring to minimise risks and costs by deferring payments as late as possible.[15]

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[13] RA, Kommissariats m.fl räkenskaper och handlingar, Account of Swedish crown's debts to Colonel Jacob Spens in 1610. It is possible that Spens had lent even more, for which he had already been repaid. Spens had been contacted as early as 1605 to recruit 1,600 infantry and 600 cavalrymen. In 1608 these numbers were amended to 1,000 infantry and 500 cavalrymen, though it would seem that eventually only 1,200 infantrymen recruited by Spens arrived. However, Spens was also directly and indirectly involved with the recruitment of other Scottish forces, so it remains unclear what these costs actually entailed. See Fischer 1907, pp. 71–73; Grosjean 2003, pp. 26–30; Murdoch and Grosjean 'James Spens' (SSNE); AOSB I:2 pp. 150–153, Axel Oxenstierna to Jacob De la Gardie 16.10.1613; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 836–839, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 18.12.1613; KrA, Militieräkningar 1613/14, 1615/12; Generalstaben 1936, pp. 433–434.

[14] LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol, 6:1, Jacob De la Gardie's promissory note for Daniel Hepburn 25.11.1613.

[15] At this time, pistols and holsters cost 8.5 riksdaler (12.75 dalers) and cavalry armour 16 riksdaler (24 dalers) per set. RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, Wilhelm von Danzig to Charles IX February

Swedish mismanagement of the process incurred additional difficulties and costs. Recruitment was primarily financed with the crown's sale of copper, iron and other mining products to international merchants, who would provide bills of exchange to pay recruiters abroad. However, the Swedes tried to recruit too many troops at once, and had difficulties providing the resources on time. The crown's lack of credit and complications caused by overseas travel and communications meant that payments were delayed, and ships and money arrived in the wrong places at the wrong time.

Enterprisers recruiting troops were confused by the uncertainty and, for fear of personal losses, held back on drawing up their troops until payment was certain. A lack of trust combined with the difficulty of travel to the Swedish Realm also caused problems, as officers refused to sail before receiving their pay in full, whereas the Swedish crown was reluctant to advance funds prior to the first muster, and wished to control shipping so that the recruits would not desert. Finally, diplomatic incidents with the United Provinces and the Stuart monarchy, as well as a war with Denmark in 1611–1613, made the import of already recruited troops from Western Europe difficult at times.

The net effect of these shortcomings was that during the most intense period of recruitment, from 1606 to 1610, the process was drawn-out and expensive. Many units had to wait more than a year abroad before finally arriving in the Swedish Realm. During this entire time, officers were forced to arrange additional funds to maintain their men, or risk dissolution and loss of all their assets. To the detriment of recruiters, what should have been short-term loans of a few months became costly medium-term loans of over a year.

What followed was a great deal of incrimination and haggling between the Swedish crown and the enterprisers over who was to blame and who should pay the extra cost. The crown agreed to

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1608, Regis de Vernet to Charles IX 28.11.1607, La Borde to Charles IX 6.6.1608; Terjanian 2005.

pay for some of the upkeep and help with procuring equipment, yet the officers' debts kept accumulating. For example, a year after his commission to recruit 500 French cuirassiers for a contract sum of 17,500 dalers, Henri de la Borde de Luxe complained that he had only received 2,500 florins (1,250 dalers), despite having spent more than 7,500 dalers of his own money.[16] In another letter, La Borde was growing concerned that his advances might soon exceed 10,000 dalers, and demanded additional security for repayment.[17]

Regis de Vernet, another colonel recruiting 580 arquebusiers for 15,080 dalers, complained in June 1607 that he had already advanced 6,103 livres (2,560 dalers) for the upkeep of 60 men and the purchase of 150 suits of armour. On top of this, Vernet had provided 2,500 livres (1,050 dalers) to his subordinate captains for their recruitment. Six months later, the advanced sum had risen to 4,928.5 dalers, while at least one of the four subordinate captains had spent 500 crowns (625 dalers) to recruit 'good men' from Languedoc.[18]

Eventually, settlements were reached with many of the recruiters. The Swedes feared that failure to meet some of the enterprisers' demands would cause them to lose the recruits they desperately needed, as well as cause irreparable damage to the reputation of the Swedish crown on the international mercenary market.[19]

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[16] RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, De la Borde to Charles IX 6.6.1608.

[17] RA, Kommissariats m.fl. Räkenskaper och handlingar, Sieur de la Borde´s request to Charles IX 1608; RA, Diplomatica Hollandica vol 1, Charles IX to Hans Nilsson 28.7.1607; RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, Regis de Vernet to Charles IX 13.8.1607.

[18] RA, Riksregistraturet, Charles IX to Hans Nilsson and Augustino Cassiodoro 28.2.1608; RA, Latinska riksregistraturet, Charles IX to Regis de Vernet 28.2.1608; RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, Costeguison to Charles IX 1.12.1607 and 3.5.1608, Regis de Vernet to Charles IX 4.6.1607.

[19] RA, Diplomatica Hollandica vol 1, Hans Nilsson to Söffring Jönsson 27.7.1607.

Enterprisers were allowed to bring fewer men than agreed and with incomplete equipment. The crown squeezed additional funds through mercantile credit, and the recruiters agreed to send over part of their units, while making new contracts for the recruitment of the remainder and additional troops.

Despite these difficulties, the Swedish crown eventually managed to recruit tens of thousands of foreign troops, of whom perhaps 16,000–20,000 took part in the Ingrian War at one point or another.[20] The expense was enormous. In 1609, La Borde claimed that French enterprisers alone had provided 500,000 dalers for the recruitment and salaries of their men, which remained unpaid.[21] Though this sum was certainly exaggerated, it is clear that this army could not have been mobilised without significant credit from enterprising officers.

Problems of military supply

Whereas recruitment relied on the private credit of contractors, the subsequent pay, upkeep and resupply of the recruited forces was the responsibility of the crown. Officers and soldiers were supposed to receive their pay on a monthly basis in cash (*sold*) or, more commonly, with a roughly 50–50 mixture of cash and kind (*commis*). As was typical for early modern warfare, the crown's

[20] This is a rough estimate based on calculations from figures in Generalstab (1936), muster rolls (KrA, Militieräkningar) and various commissary accounts (RA, Kommissariats- m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar), as well as pay and supply accounts (RA, Provianträkenskaper 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 12 and 13). This figure includes only troops who ended up serving in the Ingrian War. As the Swedish Realm was also fighting other wars at the time, the total number of recruited troops in this period is higher. I have also excluded thousands of Polish and Russian troops who fought for pay in the Swedish army but were not recruited by the Swedes.

[21] RA, Diplomatica Gallica vol. 548, Larmen Borgereich to Erik Jörensson 3.8.1609.

policy was that national resources would pay for recruitment and mobilisation, but that otherwise the war should pay for itself.[22]

For the first 15 months of the war, this worked well. The compact, 5,000-man army that crossed the border in February 1609 started the war as an allied detachment of Czar Vasily IV's army. As agreed with the czar's representatives, the army would be paid in full by the Russians. Though there were some tensions with regard to the payment of wages and military policy, the main army received most of what was agreed and fought a successful campaign to drive back Vasily IV's rebellious rivals and liberate Moscow.[23]

However, the military situation changed drastically in July 1610, as the combined Russo-Swedish army suffered ignominious defeat against a far smaller Polish-Lithuanian host at the battle of Klushino. The czar's position collapsed, and the much-reduced Swedish army transformed from Russian ally to an occupier. In the future, the war would have to be financed with resources from Sweden and of those Russian territories which the Swedes managed to occupy.

Unfortunately, the Swedish crown was ill-equipped to pay for the war. Besides the difficulty and cost of transporting supplies to Russia, the crown lacked the resources. As Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna put it, the country was in a deplorable state after 52 years of almost constant warfare. The best of the men had already been killed and those who remained could not be paid or fed and were close to mutiny. The crown was out of money, all its credit was used up, and future revenues for many years had already been allocated to service mounting debts.[24] Moreover, in

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[22] Ekholm 1971, p. 145.

[23] According to surviving accounts, the Russians paid 498,167 dalers in cash, clothes, and precious furs. This was sufficient to pay full wages for at least 10 months out of 14, besides which the army received provisions and quarters at various times. See KrA, Militieräkningar 1609/5, 1609/21; RA Proviantträkenskaper 11.3.

[24] AOSB I:2 pp. 42–47, Axel Oxenstierna (on behalf of the Privy Council) to Queen Dowager Christina 25.3.1612.

April 1611, long-simmering tensions with Denmark escalated into the Kalmar War (1611–1613). The war with the Danes threatened the heartlands of the Swedish Realm and was therefore of higher priority to the central administration than the offensives in Russia. The exorbitant indemnities of the Kalmar War, a million riksdalers, consumed virtually all of the crown's resources, which left the army in Russia to fight the remainder of the war on a shoestring budget.

Starting from the rebuilding of the army in Russia in 1610 and 1611, it began to rely increasingly on private capital advanced by both officers and civilian merchants. The capture of the important trading city of Novgorod with its surrounding territories in 1611 alleviated the supply situation somewhat. However, by the end of the year the army was still in a deplorable state. A large portion of the troops were again unarmed and without mounts, which was due to ordinary wastage, but also because soldiers were forced to sell or pawn their equipment in order to get food.[25] The army was close to mutiny and, in April 1612, the commander complained that no more than two and a half months' wages had been received since the battle of Klushino 21 months earlier![26]

By the start of 1613, commerce in Novgorod and other Russian cities under Swedish occupation had all but ground to a halt, and there were no more funds.[27] In order to make ends meet, the commissariat and high command increasingly resorted to dubious means to stretch the limited resources. Methods included debasing the coinage, selectively using more favourable exchange

[25] TUL, F6 Cordt 3B pp. 147–163, 173–181, Jacob De la Gardie to Charles IX 14.2.1611, 12.3.1611, 1.4.1611, 23.4.1611, 26.8.1611, 3.10.1611, and pp. 188–193, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 30.12.1611.

[26] TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 859–866b, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 22.4.1612; AOSB II:5 pp. 5–12, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 22.4.1612.

[27] TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 767b–771a, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 24.1.1613; AOSB II:5 pp. 44–47, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 1.8.1613.

rates, attempting to re-calculate a month as 40 days (with limited success), skimping on payments to the sick and wounded, and alternating between paying wages in cash or kind depending on which was cheaper.[28] Contrary to his orders, Jacob De la Gardie was forced to send units to Finland, where their supply would be somebody else's problem, while officers who had advanced large sums were sent to demand pay from the king himself.[29]

In the spring and summer of 1614, a much larger crisis developed rapidly and threatened to overwhelm the entire army. A failed harvest in 1613 combined with longstanding over-taxation meant that the grain production of the Novgorod region plummeted, and the army and civilian population faced starvation. Rye, which had previously cost 1 daler per barrel, had by 1613 gone up to over 3 dalers, reached 5 dalers around New Year 1614, and skyrocketed to 15 dalers by the summer of 1614.[30] By this point, many of the soldiers were eating horse meat and dying of malnutrition.[31]

Plague struck in the spring. It killed at least 7,652 burghers in Novgorod alone and also laid low a large part of the army.[32] The remaining Russian peasants and burghers mostly fled across the border, and even the meagre harvest could not be collected

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[28] RA, Kommissariats- m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Order of länung for Nils Assersson's cavalry 1615; Berglund & Zakharov 1983; KrA, Militieräkningar 1609/5; RA, Provianträkenskaper 11.3.; TUL F6 Cordt 4 pp. 602–603b, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 27.7.1612.

[29] AOSB II:5 pp. 39–42, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 6.7.1613.

[30] TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 556–560a, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 13.3.1614.

[31] AOSB II:5 pp. 75–77, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 5.5.1614.

[32] AOSB II:5 pp. 75–77, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 5.5.1614; RA, Handlingar rörander proviantering o.d. (M 1287) Fol 19, List of deceased in Novgorod 1614.

without Finnish conscripts sent to help.[33] To make matters worse, a resurgent Muscovy united under the recently elected Czar Michael Romanov started to press the Swedes hard, and threatened to overwhelm Swedish positions with a major offensive launched in the summer.

Although the attack was repulsed, Jacob De la Gardie had no illusions that the Swedes could still profit from the war, and – having himself advanced vast sums to the army – urged the king to negotiate for peace.[34] It took the king slightly longer to come to the same conclusion, and one last big offensive aimed at capturing Pskov was planned for 1615. The king led the operation personally but, despite meticulous planning and all available crown resources being diverted to the task, the operation failed due to lack of cash and supplies.[35]

The last year and a half of the war was mostly a matter of 'hanging through', while the exhausted belligerents negotiated a settlement. The supply base of the army remained as deplorable as ever, and officers continued to advance funds not only for the benefit of the army but also to maintain stately appearances during diplomatic negotiations and provide for the English and Dutch delegations mediating the peace talks. However, the situation was helped by the discharge of parts of the army, and the knowledge that the war would soon come to a conclusion meant that the last resources of Novgorod, which had been spared for the rainy day, could be exploited. Peace was finally resolved on 27 February 1617, with the last troops vacating Novgorod a few months later.

The resources used to supply the army were more or less insufficient throughout the course of the war. The army, which ranged

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[33] TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 566–570, 577b 581, 587, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 20.4.1614, 8.7.1614, 4.8.1614.

[34] AOSB II:5 pp. 71–73, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 13.3.1614.

[35] AOSB I:2 pp. 238–240, Axel Oxenstierna to Jakob van Dyck 26.8.1615.

in size from under 5,000 to little over 10,000 men, required on average around 50,000–60,000 dalers per month.[36] In all calculations and reports, the amount actually provided came to little more than half of this. For example, during the eight months from 8 July 1613 to 8 February 1614, the entire army of just under 9,766 men received only 251,078 dalers' worth of pay and provisions of the 455,386 dalers owed, or 55%.[37] In total, 1,443,458 dalers' worth of cash and wares, plus an undetermined amount of provisions, passed through the army's treasury or were brought from Sweden by special commissaries.[38] This sum was comparable to the contemporary 'Älvsborg Ransom', the 1,000,000 riksdalers the Swedish crown had to pay to the Danes after losing the Kalmar War, and which almost bankrupted the realm. Though enormous, this fortune still only sufficed to pay for half or less of the cost of the war.

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[36] For most of the war the army was 7,000–8,000 men strong. In October 1613 the army of 7,947 was owed 58,345 dalers per month. In February 1614, 9,766 men required 64,726 dalers per month and a projection for 1615 estimated that 7,978 men would require 39,320 dalers per month plus victuals. See KrA, Militieräkningar 1614/4; Generalstaben 1936, Appendix 12; RA, Kommissariats- m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Projection for 1615.

[37] KrA, Militieräkningar 1614/4.

[38] This figure has been compiled from the surviving military accounts: KrA, Militieräkningar 1609/5, 1609/21, 1613/4, 1614/7; RA, Provianträkenskaper 11.3, Jören Thomasson's account for cash and provision to the army 1609–1613, RA, Provianträkenskaper 12, Isack Månssons account for provisions in Novgorod 1613–1614 and Commissary Falentin Jöransson Frost's account for Novgorod 1613; RA, Provianträkenskaper 13, Proviantmästare Erik Andersson's account 1610, Anders Munck's account for provisions in Novgorod 1611–1617, Account for the war treasury and provisions in Livonia 1616–1617; RA, Kommissariats m.fl. Räkenskaper och handlingar, Account of supply to Evert Horn's forces at Koporie 2.5.1613, Brief account of cash handed out by Boo Wernersson for matters of war 1614.

Arrears

The main long-term supply problem was the accumulation of unpaid wages, called *arrears*. Because of the irregular and insufficient availability of resources, military units could seldom be paid more than the bare minimum needed for sustenance. This basic pay, called *läning*, was issued every 10 days with a mix of cash and provisions.[39] In theory, *läning* was meant to be complemented with full wages (*sold*) paid on a regular basis.[40] However, more often than not, these payments were neglected, which resulted in the continuous and untenable accumulation of arrears. This accumulation is illustrated by pay received in both cash and kind by Jacob De la Gardie's lifeguard regiment of foot (Figure 2.2).



Figure 2.2: Pay to De la Gardie's regiment 1.1.1615–4.3.1616 (in Swedish dalers).[41]
Source: KrA, Militieräkningar 1615/12, 1614/7, 1614/25. Figure by the author.

[39] The value of *läning* was approximately half the nominal wage of common soldiers, and a fraction of the normal salary of NCOs and officers.

[40] Later this was established as every four months, which was possibly also the goal during the Ingrian War. Roberts 1958, pp. 217–218.

[41] The unit was meant to receive pay every 10 days. What it was owed was calculated by company clerks based on personnel per company between musters. I have used the medium of what was owed per company per 10-day period. What the regiment actually received is calculated as a combination of payments with known dates and the mean of payments, per 10-day period, of payments with known timeframes.

The regiment, which numbered 13 companies and 2,087 men in January 1615, received a minimum level of upkeep from the crown on a regular basis, supplemented by infrequent peaks when larger quantities of cash or clothes suddenly became available. The timing of these peaks was not haphazard but governed by how funds became available and how pressing the situation was. In particular, commanders sought to ensure that the men received proper equipment and pay prior to dangerous undertakings, such as sieges or battles. Looking at Figure 2.2, the first peak resulted from the payment of a half-month's *sold* to the entire regiment on 25 February 1615, just six days after 33,392 dalers arrived from Stockholm. The troops received another month's *sold* in July as a perquisite for them to be willing to serve at the siege of Pskov, and again more substantial wages while the siege was underway.[42]

Only towards the end of 1615 did the amount of pay issued start to approach the required level, which was thanks to an improvement of the supply situation combined with a decrease in the number of men serving in the regiment.[43] In total, the pay received by De la Gardie's regiment during 1615 and early 1616 was less than half of that owed. With some elements of the regiment having been in service since at least 1610, the regiment was already owed 75,165 dalers by the start of 1615. By March 1616, the cumulative debt to both officers and men was already up to 189,411 dalers, as shown in Figure 2.3.

In the short term, as long as the soldiers received the minimum level of indispensable necessities, arrears were not a problem. Scarcity of resources, irregularity of supply, and delays in payment were common features of economic life and the norm for early modern soldiers, who could borrow or make do without

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[42] KrA, Militieräkningar 1615/12, 1614/7, 1614/25.

[43] In March 1616, the regiment only numbered 1,355 men in eight companies. This decrease was due to attrition caused by disease, desertion and combat, as well as Jost Clodt's company of around 200 men being requisitioned by the king into his new lifeguard regiment. See Barkman 1963, p. 234.



Figure 2.3: Accumulation of arrears to De la Gardie's regiment 1.1.1615–4.3.1616 (Swedish dalers).
Source: KrA, Militieräkningar 1615/12. Figure by the author.

their full salary. However, in the long run, insufficient resources would begin to cause problems: lack of proper equipment, disease, indiscipline, disorders, desertions and eventually rampant loss of life or mutiny among the troops. Moreover, constantly operating on the margin of subsistence made the army brittle, which meant that any unexpected adversity could have potentially catastrophic consequences and lead to collapse.

To make up for this deficiency, the army had two options. It could resort to licentiousness and the forced requisitioning of what was needed from the local population, or it could rely on private credit. As the countless complaints of Russian peasants testify, the former option was frequently used. The resources of occupied Russian territories were exploited with co-ordinated collection of contributions, as well as unlicensed individual and collective looting.[44] However, marauding alone was not sufficient to maintain the army, and it was detrimental to military supply in the long run, since it would erode the supply base and drive away merchants.

[44] See the numerous petitions and complaints regarding the licentiousness of Swedish troops in Löfstrand & Nordquist 2005.

Increasingly, officers were required to advance their own funds to supply the army. They had a contractual and moral obligation to provide for the men under their command, and part of the rationale for their high wages was to recognise this responsibility and to provide the means to support their units.[45] Furthermore, officers had a vested interest to lend money. Lending to the crown could be a profitable and socially beneficial activity in its own right, besides which officers could hope to make a profit with the management of a company or regiment. Officers could also enrich themselves with assorted side ventures of both legal and illegal variety, which entailed being in command of a unit. On the other hand, officers who allowed their units to collapse or disintegrate would lose these revenues and the social prestige of commanding a company or regiment, standing little chance of recovering the funds they had advanced.[46]

Crisis credit

Credit advanced by officers was particularly important during moments of acute crisis. These were unfortunately common occurrences, which could arise from the failure of regular supply, military defeat, unexpected collapse of morale, or some other unforeseen event. Owing to the slow speed of travel, uncertainty of information, and lack of stores, the personal wealth and credit of officers were frequently the only resources available on short notice. This 'crisis credit' formed an important buffer to cushion the army from the worst effects of these failures and saved parts of the army from collapse on multiple occasions.

Isolated detachments, operating away from the main army and the principal supply bases, were particularly susceptible to supply crises. Not only were such troops more difficult to maintain but the requirements for pay, provisions, clothes and armaments were

[45] See for example the recruiting patent for Bertrand du Carrane of 26.9.1606. RA, Riksregistraturet, Latinskt registratur 1606–1610.

[46] Parrott 2012, pp. 90–95, 208–209.

also more stringent due to the rigours of campaigning and the presence of the enemy.

Field Marshal Evert Horn was repeatedly in command of such detachments, and his personal funds and credit helped stave off a number of disasters. The first instance was in early 1610, when Horn led a force of several thousand foreign troops from Finland to reinforce the main army. After crossing the frozen Gulf of Finland, the detachment ran into unexpected difficulties when supposedly friendly Russian magistrates refused to provide provisions and encouraged peasants to flee into the forests with their foodstuffs.[47]

As the soldiers were dying in the snow, Evert Horn had little choice but to provide the men with 8,399 dalers' worth of cash, food and clothes obtained from merchants.[48] Other officers also pitched in, such as captain Pierre De la Ville, who provided an additional 1,200 dalers for upkeep.[49] Although the force suffered severely from the 900-kilometre winter march through hostile territory, Horn nonetheless managed to complete his mission and link up with the main army on the eve of the battle of Klushino.

A slightly different form of crisis arose late in 1612, when Horn led a detachment to capture Ivangorod. Earlier attempts to besiege the fortress had failed, and the passage of troops and incessant raiding had picked the surrounding countryside bare and burned down much of the adjoining Swedish supply base of Narva. With the onset of winter and heavily engaged, the force was fully exposed to the elements and close to starvation. Disaster was once again staved off by the field marshal's personal procurements, which included at least 1,100 barrels of grain (enough to feed 1,500 men

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[47] RA, Strödda handlingar M 1286, Ryska kriget, Evert Horn to Arvid Tönnesson and Erik Elfsson 12.2.1610.

[48] TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 854–859, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 10.4.1612; RA, Strödda handlingar M 1286, Ryska kriget, Jacob De la Gardie's patent of what owed to Evert Horn 25.7.1610.

[49] RA, Provianträkenskaper 11.3, 10.6.1610 entry in Jören Thomasson's account for cash and provision to the army 1609–1613.

for a month),[50] as well as large quantities of clothes, cash, and other supplies from Livonian and Finnish merchants. Later, while petitioning the crown to repay his subordinate, Jacob De la Gardie estimated that Horn had spent over 18,000 dalers for this operation.[51]

Commanders of garrisons were frequently left to their own devices as well. In Porchov, a remote castle near the front line, Stadtholder Hemming Grass had to provide 486 dalers in cash and 538 barrels of grain worth 1,806 dalers to a company of Scottish soldiers quartered there.[52] Similarly, Understadtholder Claus Schlang was forced to pawn his silverware and jewellery in order to provide cash, clothes, food and supplies worth 1,336 dalers and 29 öre for the garrison at Narva at a time when it was close to starvation.[53]

Besides these local emergencies, there were two periods of general crisis, which affected the entire army and forced many officers to dig deep into their pockets. The first was the defeat at the battle of Klushino in 1610, which caused the collapse of both the army and the Russo-Swedish alliance that had supplied it. As the army treasury was lost during the battle, paying and supplying the remaining loyal troops who limped their way back to the border fell on the shoulders of the officers. As commander of the army, Jacob De la Gardie showed the way, providing 5,474 dalers and 8 öre to supply and refit the men. More or less willingly, Colonel Reinhold Taube provided 2,600 dalers, Field Marshal Evert Horn 2,500 dalers, Colonel Samuel Cockburn an unknown figure, and captains smaller amounts. These funds were indispensable for purchasing weapons, ammunition, horses, clothes and

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[50] RA, Kommissariats- m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Ordinance for provisions to Nils Assersson's cavalry 18.1.1615; Korhonen 1939, p. 75.

[51] TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 618–619, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 7.10.1612; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 891b–896, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 17.1.1613.

[52] KrA, Militieräkningar 1617/3.

[53] RA, Kommissariats m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Account with underståthållare Claus Schlang on 22.3.1614.

provisions, but also to pay the troops, who refused to recross the border until they had received money.[54]

An even greater ordeal was the supply crisis of 1613–1614, which arose from a combination of years of deficient supply combined with the economic collapse of Novgorod. As the failure of the 1613 harvest became clear, requests for assistance sent to Sweden became increasingly urgent. These requests had been largely ignored in the previous years and, yet again, most of Jacob De la Gardie's letters to Stockholm went unanswered. Even if the crown had been ready to step in, little help could be expected before the summer, when waterways and roads would be clear of ice and mud, and foreign supplies could again be imported.

To stave off disaster, the senior commanders took the initiative to arrange the necessary supply using their own resources. For starters, Feldherr Jacob De la Gardie provided 700 barrels of grain from his estates and ordered another 1,000 barrels on his own credit from merchants in Tallinn and Narva, worth 5,100 dalers in total.[55] Later, the commander ordered his estate manager to send as much additional grain as could be got during the following harvest.[56] Other officers were also asked to advance funds to pay their men and purchase supplies. Although the sums advanced remain

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[54] RA, Proviantträkenskaper 11.1 pp. 246–247, Evert Horn's and Samuel Cockburn's receipts 6.7.1610; RA, Proviantträkenskaper 11.3, Summary of upkeep for the army under the siege of Kexholm, in Jören Thomasson's account for cash and provision to the army 1609–1613; TUL, F6 Cordt 3B pp. 145–147, Jacob De la Gardie to Charles IX 25.1.1611; LUL, De la Gardieska släktarkivet vol 5-1, Jacob De la Gardie to Lasse Abrahamsson 8.10.1610 and Reinhold Taube's reversal to Jacob De la Gardie 5.12.1610; Brännman 1950 p. 45.

[55] De la Gardie asked to receive 3 dalers per barrel, though he claimed that the actual price in Russia was 5 dalers per barrel. See AOSB II:5 pp. 61–69, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 18.12.1613.

[56] TUL, F6 Cordt 3C pp. 10–11, Jacob De la Gardie to Erik Andersson 10.6.1614.

obscure, we know that Colonel Cockburn provided at least 3,429 dalers for the purchase of clothes and weapons.[57]

Besides grain, the army was in serious need of clothing, which was a recurring problem each autumn and winter. By the end of 1613, this need had become dire, since years of neglect and heightening enemy activity meant that ill-equipped troops were increasingly exposed to the elements. With the resources of Novgorod tied to staving off the anticipated famine, the burden of clothing the troops in 1613 and 1614 was left to the officers.

Jacob De la Gardie and Evert Horn had already previously furnished the soldiers with 12,000 dalers' worth of clothes, and now ordered cloth and clothes to the value of 30,000 dalers from merchants in Tallinn and Narva on their own credit. An additional 6,000 dalers' worth of clothes were purchased from a Dutch merchant, who had conveniently learned of the opportunity and arrived to offer his services to the generals.[58]

These collective efforts helped the army tide over the worst of the 1613–1614 crisis. By mid-July, the military situation had stabilised, and at least 40,000 dalers in cash and several thousand barrels of grain had reached Narva.[59] The defeat of a major offensive from Muscovy gave the army some respite, and the victorious troops could be spread out into small garrisons, where they could be more easily supplied.

The final year of the war was also marked by crises, albeit on a smaller scale than the situation in 1613–1614. With the war winding down, collapse was averted by discharging a large part of the

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[57] TUL, Lossius A1 p. 213, Jacob De la Gardie to Johan De la Gardie 3.5.1614; AOSB II:5 pp. 75–77, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 5.5.1614; RA, Proviantträkenskaper 12, Isack Månssons account for provisions in Novgorod 4.12.1613–30.9.1614.

[58] TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 556–560a, 572, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 13.3.1614 and 8.5.1614; AOSB II:5 pp. 75–77, 5.5.1614 Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna.

[59] TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 585–586, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 23.7.1614; RA, Kommissariats m.fl. Räkenskaper och handlingar, Brief account of cash handed out by Boo Wernersson for matters of war 1614.

army, squeezing the occupied territory of every last resource, and with the officers providing vast sums of money and provisions. De la Gardie himself provided at least 10,000 dalers more, and, together with Field Secretary Måns Mårtensson, the pair imported 730 barrels of grains to Novgorod during the final year of the war.[60]

Sustenance credit

Resources lent in moments of crisis, though crucial, were only a fraction of the total debt owed to the soldiers and officers of the army. The bulk of the crown's debt accumulated over time. Soldiers and officers were constantly underpaid, which put pressure on the officers to lend more of their own resources to cover the shortfall and prevent this attrition from reaching catastrophic proportions. These regular loans significantly increased the resources at the crown's disposal, helped maintain operational effectiveness, and kept the army going longer than would have been possible otherwise.

One common method for officers to maintain their men was by providing them with replacement weapons, armour, clothing, equipment and, most expensive of all, remounts.[61] These would be purchased by captains and colonels from the merchants of Novgorod, Narva, Viipuri or further abroad and distributed to the men, becoming their property. Eventually, when the unit would receive pay, the officer would recover his loan by deducting the value of the items (including a mark-up price) from the individual

[60] AOSB II:5 pp. 102–103, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 22.3.1616; AOSB I:2 pp. 281–282, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustavus Adolphus 30.5.1616; AOSB II:1 pp. 93–95, Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna 10.6.1616; RA, Proviantträkenskaper 13, Anders Muncks account for provisions in Novgorod 1611–1617.

[61] Commanders of domestic troops apparently had less of an obligation to equip their men, and we certainly find examples of small bands or entire units of troops, particularly Finnish cavalry, sent back to Finland to be re-equipped. Though we lack evidence, it seems likely that in the interim officers of domestic units provided replacements for their men in the same way as in mercenary units, but in a smaller scale.

troopers' wages. Horses killed in combat – rather than through disease or 'ill keep' – ammunition expended and ransoms would not be deducted from pay, but would rather be reimbursed to the officer by the crown.[62]

These purchases meant that officers could have significant amounts of their own capital invested in equipping their men, particularly since the crown failed to pay *sold* regularly and thus repayment for these purchases would be delayed at the same time as the purchases continued to accumulate. In 1613, Evert Horn claimed that he had already provided some 20,000 dalers for the army, which included substantial sums of cash, clothes and horses for his own men. Some of the personal accounts of Jacob De la Gardie have also survived, and they list large quantities of clothes, armaments and other equipment imported to the warzone on a regular basis.[63]

Besides providing equipment for their men, officers administered the payment of wages, and could use this to manage the crown's debt within their own units and to lend money. The arrears of each individual officer, NCO and soldier were carefully recorded in company accounts and, in theory, this was a personal debt between each man and the crown. However, the crown did not have the resources or interest to monitor this debt so closely, instead delegating the responsibility to colonels and captains. When units received pay, a commissary would muster the troops, count them and then pay their wages in a lump sum to the commanding officer, who could distribute the pay as he saw fit.[64]

Control of the distribution of wages of course provided great opportunity for corruption.[65] Indeed, during the Ingrian War we

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[62] RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, La Borde to Charles IX 1608; Parrott 2012, pp. 208–209.

[63] See LUL, De la Gardieska Samlingen vol. 12:1, Jacob De la Gardie's personal accounts for Nov 1610–25.2.1611, 8.5.1611–16.9.1611, 3.1.1613–5.6.1613 and 12.2.1614–30.4.1614; AOSB II:5 pp. 53–55, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 17.9.1613; TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 649–652, Evert Horn to Måns Mårtensson 16.9.1613; Löfstrand & Nordquist 2009, vol. II:169 p. 224, Petition concerning payment.

[64] Redlich 1964, pp. 320–321, 503–514.

[65] Redlich 1964 pp. 320–321.

find accusations of officers pocketing the pay of their men. For example, English soldier Nixon describes that, when his regiment mustered for the first time, they received clothes, but all the money was kept by captains and sent back to their wives in England.[66] Later in the war, it apparently became common practice for heavily indebted officers to sell some of the companies' grain rations to pay off their debts.[67]

Table 2.1: Accounts of De la Gardie's lifeguard cornet for the period 2.8.1610–22.5.1617 arranged by rank and months of service.

Rank and numbers	Months in service	Horses at start	Horses at end	Earned (dalers)	Still outstanding (dalers)	Arrears
Ryttmästare (captain)	80	7	7	14,250	9,230	65%
Lieutenant	20	6	6	2,400	882	37%
Fendrik (ensign)	80	4	6	5,220	1,260	24%
2 NCOs	80	4	7	4,910	2,150	44%
2 NCOs	51–62	3	5	2,532	1,093	43%
4 NCOs	30	9	9	3,780	1,215	32%
2 NCOs	20–27	8	7	2,550	694	27%
16 Troopers	80	22	26	18,970	9,827	52%
17 Troopers	61–62	31	36	17,850	7,176	40%
7 Troopers	51–54	10	13	6,270	2,574	41%
17 Troopers	37–44	32	28	11,370	3,602	32%
9 Troopers	30–35	25	23	6,510	1,818	28%
10 Troopers	14–20	22	22	4,450	1,115	25%
89 Men		183	195	101,062	42,636	42%

Source: KrA, Militieräkningar 1610/1. Table by the author.

[66] Nixon 1610.

[67] AOSB II:1 pp. 74–75, Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna 2.8.1614.

However, it can be argued that both cases are examples of officers recovering what was owed to them and using this to manage the personal debt they had accrued on behalf of the company during recruitment and afterward. In contrast, we find numerous cases of officers actively using their own funds, or even borrowing money from third parties, to pay many months' wages for their men, besides which they would pay special rewards and compensations to individual out of their own pocket.[68] Officers could also forfeit their own, substantial wages in favour of repaying the arrears of their men.[69] This practice can be seen from De la Gardie's lifeguard cornet of cavalry, whose accounts were drawn up on 22 May 1617, shortly before discharge (Table 2.1).

As this account demonstrates, the wage arrears of men of every rank could be quite considerable. Indeed, for captains and officers of lower rank, arrears represented the largest single source of money owed by the crown. Unsurprisingly, the men who had served the longest had received the most money, but also had the greatest arrears. These men had also increased their stakeholding in the company by accumulating more horses than they had

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[68] Compensations and rewards included bonus for capturing prisoners, pensions for wounded and widows, ransoms and even funeral expenses. For examples of officers providing salary for their men: TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 555–556, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 20.9.1610 and 16.6.1612, pp. 649–652, Evert Horn to Måns Mårtensson Palm 16.9.1613; TUL Lossius A2 pp. 843–845, Jacob De la Gardie to Evert Horn 10.6.1614, p. 728, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 6.2.1616; AOSB II:5 pp. 460–476, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 14.11.1615.

[69] Officers' wages were set high to compensate for and recognise their personal and financial risk, the responsibility of command, and the personal funds that they were expected to advance. Typical wage rates were: 500 dalers/month for colonels; 100 dalers/month for *överste wachtmestare*; 100 dalers/month for foreign captains or *ryttmästare* + 10–12 dalers/month for his 6–10 horses; and 40 dalers/month for domestic captains or *ryttmästare* + 10 dalers/month for his horses.

started out with, also receiving pay for these extra mounts. Officers consistently had the maximum number of horses allowed in their contract. Others arranged horses from Finland or Novgorod, and then sold these to their captain or to the unit (the crown).[70]

Regarding how large a portion of their wages the men had in arrears, there is no real difference between NCOs and common troopers. However, the two senior officers, *Ryttmästare* Lorenz Wagner and Lieutenant Oluf Bengtsson, had higher arrears than common troopers who had served the same length of time: 65% for the *ryttmästare* compared to 52% for troopers, and 37% for the lieutenant compared to 25% for troopers who had served for 20 months. Another way to look at this is that 27% of the arrears owed to the unit were owed to the three officers alone. The situation was similar in Colonel Patrick Rutherford's personal company of 103 men, mustered in February 1611, where the foremost three officers were owed 31% or 5,083 dalers of the total arrears of 16,643 dalers, on top of which the colonel had separately advanced 1,500 dalers for some of the men.[71]

Besides these arrears, the crown was indebted for the pay of men lost along the way due to death or desertion. The number of men actually serving in the unit could only be calculated when a muster was held, which the men refused to do unless they received pay.[72] Because this was such a rare occurrence, the discrepancy

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[70] For example, Fendrik Johan Jacobsson delivered three horses to the unit from Finland for 78 dalers, while interpreter Erik Andersson and commissary Jören Thomasson provided four horses to replace losses in May 1609. See RA, Proviantträkenskaper 11.3, 6.12.1609 and 10.5.1610 entries in Jören Thomasson's account for cash and provision to the army 1609–1613.

[71] RA, Rullor vol. B7 (1611–1625), Account of what is owed to Colonel Rutherford and his men 1611.

[72] Foreign troops' service contracts expressly guaranteed that they would not be mustered unless they received pay, which was also customary. See RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, La Borde to Charles IX 1608; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 56–570, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 20.4.1614.

between how many men the unit had previously mustered and how many still remained could become quite large.

In central Europe, it was accepted practice that officers were allowed to collect pay based on the starting strength of the unit for the period of service, rather than the men remaining at muster. This extra pay was intended to provide compensation for the widows of dead soldiers and the enterpriser who had provided supplies to the men during the period, as well as informal interest for the delayed payment of wages.[73]

In the Swedish army of the Ingrian War, this practice seems to have been partly followed. Units continued to receive *länung* (upkeep) regularly based on the last known muster strength. Outstanding *sold*, on the other hand, was paid based on the number of men actually present at the muster at the end of a period.[74] Indeed, the crown seems to have counted on the loss of some of the men to reduce the amount of arrears it would have to pay.[75] This meant that officers who provided pay, equipment and supplies for their men ran the risk of losing their investment if the man was killed.

However, officers had several means of offsetting this problem. Issues of pay and acknowledgement of debt left significant room for negotiation and interpretation. At times, when the crown could not provide full payment to the unit or they could not be properly mustered due to the enemy, a partial muster was held instead,

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[73] Parrott 2012, p. 206.

[74] This led to at least one major argument between a German colonel, Linck, and Jacob De la Gardie, after the former lost 500 out of 1,000 men on the march into Russia. Linck demanded pay for the original 1,000 men, while De la Gardie wanted to pay only for the remaining strength. Eventually, a compromise was settled. See RA, Provianträkenskaper 11.3, 25.1.1610 entry in Jören Thomasson's account for cash and provision to the army 1609–1613.

[75] Gustavus Adolphus assumed that 1,500 men would be lost over the winter of 1614–1615 to desertion and death. Although the king needed men for the coming siege of Pskov, he chose to prioritize the recruitment of new troops rather than maintaining the existing ones. Generalstab 1936, p. 500.

whereby the exact composition of the unit was not so rigorously examined and pay was issued based on paper strength instead. Officers of course made use of such situations to receive pay for non-existent *passvolants*, which the crown grudgingly accepted as 'customary' compensation for its inability to provide pay in a timely or regular fashion.[76]

Captains and colonels would also hold regular musters on their own initiative and, presumably, in part at their own expense.[77] These musters helped fix the amounts owed for specific periods of time, even if the men were subsequently lost. For example, De la Gardie's personal company in his infantry regiment reported having served with 237 men from 10 February to 15 September 1611 to the value of 13,916 dalers, with 234 men for the next 5.5 months (10,802 dalers), 230 men for the five months after (9,660 dalers) and so on.[78] Then, when it came time settle debts, the regiment clerk would compare the sum of what was owed for all these periods to how much each company had actually received from the crown, which would form the basis for the commanding officer's debt claim.

Officers did not automatically receive the full sum owed to the unit. When units were discharged or depleted units that owed different amounts were merged together (*reformed*), arrears were paid for surviving individuals. However, officers could make a claim that they should receive some or all of what was owed to the dead men, and would support their claim with receipts, accounts, and muster rolls. Settlement of debts was a process of negotiation

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[76] TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 832–835, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 16.12.1613; RA, Strödda handlingar M 1286, Ryska kriget, Evert Horn to Arvid Tönnesson and Erik Elfsson 16.2.1610.

[77] It is hard to substantiate whether these were at the officers' expense. However, units were mustered more frequently than 'official' *sold* was issued and, due to the unwillingness of soldiers to be mustered without pay, it makes sense to assume that the officers provided some form of compensation. At least this is what the officers claimed later, when demanding repayment for debts.

[78] KrA, Militieräkningar 1615/12.

between the crown and the officers. How much each enterpriser received depended not only on the strength of their claim but many tertiary factors, which shall be discussed later.

By the end of the war, many officers had lent considerable sums to the crown to finance the war. The biggest creditor was the commander of the army, Jacob De la Gardie, who had lent 45,736 dalers to pay his own regiment, as well as 58,568 dalers to the army more generally.[79] Other officers followed suit in proportion to their rank and involvement. Field Marshal Evert Horn had at least 36,000 dalers' worth of receivables from the crown by the start of 1614, and continued to lend money until his untimely death the following year.[80] Duke Julius Heinrich of Saxony had been with the army for only a year by the time he was discharged in 1614, but even in this short period he had accumulated receivables from the crown to the sum of 22,122 dalers.[81]

Colonels also advanced significant sums to their regiments. Dutch Colonel Johan van Mönnichhofen served as the head of his regiment for three years, before being killed leading an assault in 1614. After his death, the crown recognised a debt of 6,093 dalers and 8 öre owed to his estate.[82] Scottish Colonel Samuel Cockburn was lucky enough to survive and served for the duration of the war (1609–1617). By the end of 1612, Cockburn had already loaned at least 8,000 dalers, and by the summer of 1614 had lent an additional 10,000 dalers for the upkeep of his regiment, plus 6,241 to the rest of the army.[83]

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[79] LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 11-1 fol. 47, His Majesty's account with count Jacob De la Gardie for his loans and what he has given to matters of war.

[80] TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 658–659, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 21.5.1614; Gillingstam 'Evert Horn' (Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon).

[81] TUL, Lossius C p. 145, Gustavus Adolphus to Duke Julius Heinrich of Saxony 24.5.1614.

[82] RA, Kammarkollegiets skuldböcker vol. 1, Account with Colonel Mönnichhofen's estate 1615–1623; Generalstab 1936, p. 478.

[83] Brännman 1950, p. 45.

Regarding the total volume of lending, these examples are only the tip of the iceberg. Many loans were repaid during the course of the war, besides which these sums only represent the debts that the crown accepted. For example, the crown repaid Colonel Pierre De la Ville 23,955 dalers and 21.5 öre for credit advanced 1611–1613, yet refused to recognise an additional debt of tens of thousands from 1613–1614.[84] The bulk of debts to captains and lower-ranking officers remain vague as well, although the 9,230 dalers *Ryttmästare* Lorentz Wagner had in arrears (Table 2.1) is perhaps indicative of the amount owed to cavalry captains.

Finances

Having established the scale of funds advanced by the army's officers, let us now turn to look at how these loans were financed, and the credit networks that were involved. There were three sources for these funds: officers might advance their own capital, they could borrow funds, or they could use their personal credit to guarantee loans taken by the crown from third parties.[85]

Advancing capital

The simplest means for officers to lend money to the crown's war effort was to advance their own capital. This capital could come in various forms, including buying provisions and paying salaries

[84] La Ville recruited a regiment 740 men in 1613 at the bequest of Jacob De la Gardie, the senior commander. However, the king had come to mistrust La Ville in the interim and wished to reduce costs, thereby refusing to accept the troops and acknowledge the debt. See RA, Kommissariats m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, 19.4.1614 Account with Monsieur La Ville including attached letter from Jacob De la Gardie dated 18.5.1614; TUL, F6 Cordt 1A pp. 42–43, Gustavus Adolphus to Jacob De la Gardie 23.9.1613; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 832–835, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 16.12.1613.

[85] Redlich 1964, pp. 245–255.

with cash, importing and distributing grain from the officers' estates, redistributing equipment such as arms, armour and horses that had come into the officers' possession, and so forth.

The source of this capital was either inherited or accumulated. Inheritance was often important in establishing officers in their command, particularly for those domestic and foreign officers who undertook to recruit soldiers on behalf of the crown. Inherited estates were also important for providing a steady, reliable income to supplement officers' regular wages during the course of the war. However, inheritances did not go far in financing investment in the war, let alone suffice for large-scale loans. The bulk of inheritances were tied in estates, with only a small amount of liquid capital available for loan. Domestic captains and junior officers were mostly small provincial nobles or commoners with meagre estates. Aristocratic senior officers were not much better off. Jacob De la Gardie's inherited estates produced only 1,500 dalers annually, and the commander in fact commenced the war heavily in debt.[86]

Foreign enterprisers necessarily needed to have the available funds to recruit their units. However, their initial capital does not seem to have sufficed for much more than this endeavour. As Henri de la Borde de Luxe, senior commander of the French in Swedish service, complained, he had inherited little else besides his prestigious name and prowess at arms.[87] In any case, foreign officers serving far from home did not have access to their estates, and were dependent on payment from the Swedes and the profits of war.[88]

As the war progressed, officers started to accumulate capital in the form of salaries received, enfeoffments from the crown granted as either rewards or as recompense in lieu of salary, loot, profits

[86] Grill 1949, pp. 16–18.

[87] RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, La Borde to Charles IX 6.6.1608.

[88] RA, Skrivelser till Hertig Karl, Karl IX, French captains to Charles IX 25.10.1608.

from buying and selling equipment, and other sources. These profits could be substantial, and, unless some calamity struck, could surpass the officers' inherited wealth in only a few years.[89]

Only a small portion of this accumulated capital was retained as cash and movables – mainly silverware and clothing – to cover running expenses and provide liquidity in case of emergency. The bulk was invested in land and realty such as town houses or mansions back home, or reinvested in the military enterprise.[90] How much officers chose to send back home and how much to reinvest in the army depended on their level of commitment to the Swedish crown and this particular war, expected risk and reward in financing the war, as well as the availability of other sources of investment.[91]

Some foreign officers served only to gain an apprenticeship in command or were otherwise merely 'passing through'. These officers would send virtually everything back home and were reluctant to invest anything but the bare minimum in the war. Other foreigners, the Scots in particular, were looking to enter Swedish service more permanently and eventually settle in the Swedish Realm. These foreigners, as well as those professional military migrants who had no desire to return home – if such a place even existed – were more committed and also more ready to reinvest their

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[89] Of course, we must remember that the war was much more profitable in the early years than towards the end, when the crown was running out of funds and most of the warzone had already been picked bare. See AOSB II:5 pp. 61–69, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 18.12.1613.

[90] It was common for officers to seek to purchase ownership of those farms whose taxation the crown had already enfeoffed to the officer as payment of salaries or debts. Also existing estates were enlarged and new estates purchased from other nobles. Nilsson 1990, pp. 290–291.

[91] For many, reinvestment in the army might be the only or most secure place to invest profits, which also saved the trouble and risk of sending profits back home. See TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 649–652, Evert Horn to Måns Mårtensson 16.9.1613; Nilsson 1989, pp. 162–167; Nixon 1610; Grill 1949, pp. 16–18.

earnings. The same was also true of ambitious domestic officers, who stood to gain from the war not only economically, but also through career advancement and advancement in royal favour.

There were two methods by which officers might reinvest in the war: providing wages and provisions for existing troops, or by recruiting additional forces. Owing to the mounting arrears detailed previously, officers were often called upon to use their own wages and other means to provide for the troops under their command. These additional investments in the officer's own unit in effect increased the crown's debt towards the officer, as well as the officer's vested interest in seeing the war through to a victorious conclusion. Owing to the desperation of the situation, such loans were not always voluntary, since, without added investment, the unit might collapse and the officer might lose his best chance at reclaiming the debt, as well as his command. As such, the choice was more about how much to reinvest and how much he could afford to send to safety. Another option was to pull out completely, although this was not always feasible without incurring the wrath of the Swedish king or without losing everything invested.[92]

However, during the Ingrian War we also find ample evidence of officers of all ranks, as well as NCOs and common soldiers, actively seeking to increase their investment in the army by recruiting more soldiers and providing mounts. Captains such as Pierre De la Ville, who had recruited and commanded a company since 1607, arranged the recruitment of an entire regiment from France in 1612. Lieutenant Edmund Kolb managed to 'buy' the captaincy of his company after the former captain had died by recruiting an additional 20 men and settling the debts of the former

[92] Some foreign officers managed to withdraw from the war while still recovering their funds by finding buyers for their units, as did domestic officers who were excused by the king due to wounds or old age. The two most senior Swedish commanders, Jacob De la Gardie and Evert Horn, each petitioned the king to discharge them at least temporarily so that they could get their finances in order, but were repeatedly denied.

captain's widow at better terms than his competitors were offering.[93] Another lieutenant, Daniel Hepburne, went on to recruit his own company and ended up lieutenant colonel in Count Jacob De la Gardie's regiment, which De la Gardie and the other officers recruited largely with their own funds in 1613.[94]

Far more numerous were the captains who undertook to recruit new troops for their devastated companies or, in several cases, recruit completely new ones after the former had been destroyed or had deserted *en masse*. Furthermore, as the accounts for De la Gardie's lifeguard cornets (Table 2.1) show, officers, NCOs, and common troopers alike would also reinvest their earnings to furnish additional mounts for their company.[95]

Borrowed funds

What the officer corps lacked in inherited wealth, they made up with social capital. Positions of command went hand in hand with social hierarchy and, although the officers were in many ways the runt of the litter in their own class, they were nonetheless members of the elite. Through their familial, clientage, and social networks, officers had access to significant wealth. Moreover, thanks to their connections and status, officers had credit and networking value, which they could use to gain access to mercantile credit.

Using these connections, officers would frequently borrow what was needed and advance these funds to finance the war on the crown's behalf. This followed the common early modern pattern identified by Laurence Fontaine: the officer borrowed money primarily from his family, close friends and acquaintances, and secondly from the outer circle of his social network. Only after

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[93] TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 631–632, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 13.12.1612.

[94] RA, Västergötlands handlingar 1607:1, Älvsborg och Gullberg, Receipt for Lieutenant Daniel Hepburn 4.3.1608; KrA, Militieräkningar 1613/14; Generalstab 1936, pp. 433–434.

[95] KrA, Militieräkningar 1610/1.

that did he resort to 'outsiders', such as professional moneylenders and merchants.[96]

Family and friends were an important source of funds, particularly at the start of an officer's career. Foreign enterprisers relied heavily on their innermost network to find and equip the men they were to lead. Military enterprise was often a family affair, with most captains or colonels having one or more brother, cousin or other close relative serving as their second, not to mention more removed kith and kin as NCOs or in the ranks. On top of these serving relatives, foreign officers would receive financial support from relatives staying afield to provide starting capital, and in some cases further loans while abroad.

Domestic officers would also borrow extensively from family and friends. At the outset of the war, Jacob De la Gardie was very dependent on some 4,500–5,000 dalers' worth of funds and resources provided by his siblings, as well as their aristocratic contacts, Councillor Axel Oxenstierna and Admiral Henrik Tönnesson.[97] Evert Horn also borrowed at least 1,000 dalers from his mother and several thousand from his brother Henrik Horn, and seems to have enjoyed further support from his family through the transfer of estates to finance loans, although the exact nature of these dealings remains vague.[98]

Family and friends were more or less socially obliged to lend funds, particularly when the need was dire.[99] Even when they did not actually lend money, the existence of a wealthy inner network

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[96] Fontaine 2014, p. 26.

[97] LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 6-1, Receipt to Henrik Tönnesson 18.1.1609, vol. 4, Order to Mats Olsson 12.2.1609, vol. 12:1, Account of items purchased from Johan Grönwald 1608, vol. 6-1, Copy of receipt for Johan Grönwald January 1609, vol. 11.2, Lasse Abrahamsson's account of items sent by Jacob De la Gardie and taken to Runsa 1611.

[98] TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 557–558, 561–564, 658–659, 663–664, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 28.9.1610, 13.11.1610, 21.5.1614 and 30.10.1614.

[99] Fontaine 2014, p. 44.

provided important security in case the officer hit a rough patch or if he needed additional guarantors for loans he wished to obtain. Moreover, through a network of family and friends an officer could call upon an even broader social network of potential creditors. To continue the example of Evert Horn: after his family could not (or would not) lend any more, the field marshal still managed to borrow 700 dalers from Brita De la Gardie, the sister of his friend and superior Jacob De la Gardie, who had asked his sister to advance these funds.

Moving outward from an inner ring of family and friends, the next source of lenders were colleagues and associates. On the front, fellow officers and civil-military administrators were often the readiest source of funds for an officer strapped of cash. As members of a military collective and in close proximity for protracted periods, officers got to know each other and form a rapport. Though officers did not always see eye-to-eye, members of the community – one could even call them a guild – were expected to trust and look after each other, while the shared military structure provided multiple mechanisms for arranging repayment.[100]

Most numerous were the multitude of small short-term loans officers would give and receive from each other to alleviate the chronic shortage of coinage or to help each other through fluctuating fortunes. Many of these loans were meant to cover mundane personal expenses, such as gambling debts, wages to servants and cash needed to purchase supplies for their households. Others were given for the maintenance of a fellow officer's soldiers by providing a few horses or some cash to pay wages and purchase provisions.[101]

At times, officers would also lend more sizeable sums to one another. This often occurred during moments of crisis, such as when supply failed or a particular unit met with some disaster. If a commander was unable to meet the unexpected shortfall,

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[100] Fontaine 2014, p. 32.

[101] See for example the multitude of personal accounts in the De la Gardie family archives: LUL, De la Gardieska Samlingen vol. 12:1.

then fellow officers with deeper pockets might lend a hand. This was the situation during the crisis of 1610, where Field Marshal Evert Horn had to borrow 1,000 dalers from Colonel Mönnichhofen and 500 dalers from Captain La Ville to purchase clothes for his men, besides which he took out loans on behalf of the crown and asked his subordinates to provide additional funds.[102] Similar round sums were advanced by other officers such as the Duke of Saxony, who borrowed 1,000 dalers in 1614, and Jacob De la Gardie, who in turn borrowed 1,000 riksdalers from Count Mansfeld in 1608 and another 1,000 dalers from Colonel Mönnichhofen in 1613.[103]

The multitude of overlapping loans issued by officers to one another meant that many, if not most, officers were connected through a web of debts. This interconnectivity is visible in Count Jacob De la Gardie's personal accounts. Between 12 February and 30 April 1614, the Feldherre received 1,350 rubles (4,820 dalers), of which at least 506.92, possibly up to 1,070 rubles, were loans from nine officers and civil administrators working in his chancellery. The accounts indicate that the officers had in turn taken many of these loans from other officers or from merchant bankers. This money was used to pay all sorts of personal and military expenses and repay debts, including some of those received during this same period, but also to issue a loan of 280 rubles (1,000 dalers) to Duke Julius Henrik of Saxony, and a similar sized loan to Karl Karlsson Gyllenhielm.[104]

By lending to each other, officers could manage their personal debts and their level of commitment to the war. Loans were not

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[102] TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 567–568, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 26.4.1611.

[103] LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 3:3 fol. 288, Jacob and Johan De la Gardie's obligation to count Mansfeld; AOSB II:5 pp. 61–69, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 18.12.1613.

[104] LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 12:1, Jacob De la Gardie's accounts for 8.5.–16.9.1611, 13.1.–5.6.1613 and 12.2.–30.4.1614, Carl Carlsson Gyllenhielm to Jacob De la Gardie 24.2.1614.

only financial transactions but also formed social ties and marked out hierarchies. In the military context, traditional notions of credit and patronage – of patrons lending to their clients, who in return owed loyalty and friendship – did not apply in exactly the same way as in the civilian world. Rather, military subordinates would advance funds to their superiors, who would guarantee repayment, but also advance their own funds to those above them. The amounts advanced and who owed who were expected to follow military hierarchy, which meant that superiors were expected to 'bail out' their subordinates, and the total sums advanced were expected to increase with military rank.

Credit advanced between officers added few new resources to the sustenance of the war. However, these loans were important in a number of ways. First, they enhanced the fiscal resilience of the officers and, by extension, the army. Second, by lending to each other, officers could manage and share the burden of financing the crown's shortcomings and weather the worst of fluctuating fortunes. Furthermore, these loans also alleviated problems caused by a shortage of coinage and helped keep the existing money in circulation, thereby stimulating the market sustaining the army. Finally, the interlinked web of debts created bonds between officers. Although it is hard to prove, this bond probably strengthened social and military hierarchies, and helped tie the officers into one cohesive force.

Finally, let us turn to look at officers' connections with the civilian market, and their effect on financing and supplying the war. Sutlers, peddlers and tavern keepers, as well as local and international merchants, were a vital group in supplying the army on both private and public levels. A large and active market developed around the army, which officers and common soldiers would turn to sell loot and to purchase provisions and equipment, ranging from beer and garments to armour and horses. This market was vital in shoring up the shortcomings of military supply, which was not only slow and unreliable but also unable to deliver many of the individual items required by the troops.

Owing to the lack of coinage, much of this commerce took place with credit. Sales credit was a common feature in purchases made

by all ranks. Common soldiers would often buy food and drink based on a running tab, with a promise to settle their debts when their pay came in.[105] Officers would purchase equipment and provisions for themselves and their men with short-term sales credit of a few months or even a year. International merchants were often willing to accept payment in agricultural produce from the officer's estates or with a bill of exchange abroad, which facilitated commerce, as the officers did not have to transport or sell the agrarian products themselves.[106]

Some officers also conducted personal businesses with merchants, increasing the interconnectivity of military and mercantile groups. For example, in 1614 or 1615, Evert Horn was selling 60 lasts of tar worth 1,500 dalers as well as some hemp obtained from the conquered territories to Dutch merchant Gert van der Heyden, which he intended to use to repay some other loans. Heyden was also a major provider of clothes to the army, to whom Evert Horn and Jacob De la Gardie were indebted at various times.[107] Claes Grambou, who had provided cash, clothes and provisions for Evert Horn's ill-fated detachment in 1610, continued to offer wares for many years. Grambou became a trusted supplier to Jacob De la Gardie and Evert Horn, and the commanders went out of their way to ensure that the merchant's business would prosper, including arranging reparations for Grambou's wares that were destroyed in a fire.[108]

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[105] When the army left Moscow in June 1610, many units had to be issued advance payment of their wages to settle debts accrued over the previous three months. See RA, Proviantträkenskaper 11.1 pp. 239–240, 12.6.1610 receipt.

[106] LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 12:1, Accounts with Johan Grönewaldt for January 1609 and 6.12.1611.

[107] TUL, Lossius B1 p. 95, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie.

[108] Arguably, the commanders were also motivated by their own debt to Grambou and it was mutinying French soldiers in Swedish service who caused the fire that destroyed his warehouse. TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 559–560, 658–659, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 6.10.1610

However, despite these connections, relations with merchants remained far more detached, formal and professional than with fellow officers, friends and family. Although officers frequently made use of merchants' services to obtain supplies, in terms of borrowing they were the last, outermost circle to which officers would turn to. This more stringent relationship is evident in the contractual nature with which officers received credit from merchants. Whereas loans from their inner circle were very open-ended verbal agreements or simple IOUs, the terms of mercantile credit, such as repayment schedules and interest, were formally drafted with promissory notes and contracts. Quite often, these contracts would also stipulate some form of security for the loan.

All the purchase and cash loans that I have found were made for the short term. Repayment was tied to established market days, such as Pentecost or Michaelmas, and were usually due within six months or a year. Most had an annual interest rate of 6%, which was perhaps a norm for short-term loans with good securities. Less secure loans were at 8% annual interest, which seems to be in line with rates charged by merchants from one another in risky overseas transactions.[109] We also find a case of Evert Horn paying interest on a monthly basis at a high but unspecified rate for a loan of 1,000 dalers taken in Tallinn, which suggests that short-term credit might be lent at even more exorbitant rates.[110]

Most loans required some form of security. For small loans, officers might pawn silverware or jewellery, which the creditor could sell if the loan were not repaid within a certain period after it was due. For example, at the outset of the war, Jacob De la Gardie had to pawn a gold chain worth 532 dalers in order to obtain a loan

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and 21.5.1614; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 843–845, Jacob De la Gardie to Evert Horn 10.6.1614.

[109] Möller 1954, pp. 261–262.

[110] AOSB II:1 pp. 68–69, Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna 25.7.1614; LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 6:1 p. 10, Jacob De la Gardie's receipt to Axel Oxenstierna 4.1.1609; TUL Lossius B1 p. 95, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie; Möller 1954, pp. 261–263; Heckscher 1936, pp. 577–578.

of 400 dalers needed to outfit himself for the coming campaign.[111] Similarly, in 1614, Understadtholder Claus Schlang pawned a silver pitcher and quart for a loan of 176 dalers, as well as a golden chain for a loan of 286 dalers, to obtain pay for the soldiers of his garrison.[112]

For larger loans, officer's estates or their revenues often acted as security. Such loans were arranged so that, after they became due, repayment of interest was tied to the produce of the mortgaged estate. If the debt remained unpaid for some time, the creditors would gain control of the estate and, depending on the contract, retain it either in perpetuity or until the yield of the estate had cleared the debt. I have been unable to find out how well defined or long this period of grace was before the estate would be handed over. However, some indication is provided by a loan of 5,000 dalers taken by Jacob De la Gardie in 1613, with the Feldherr's Livonian estates mortgaged as security. The debt remained unpaid three years later, and although the creditor, a merchant from Tallinn, had received interest this whole time, he was now becoming impatient and demanding the transfer of the estates.[113]

The most extreme example of mercantile borrowing during the war is provided by Evert Horn. By the end of 1614, the field marshal was heavily indebted to various merchants for purchases of military supplies. Having expended other sources of credit, Horn decided to turn to the open market to obtain new loans to pay off

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[111] Remarkably, the jewellery was borrowed first from Henrik Tönnesson, so that De la Gardie could pawn it to merchant Henrich Schmidt. De la Gardie promised to repay the loan to Tönnesson within three months, with 50 dalers (9%) interest and revenue from his estates as security. LUL, De la Gardieska samlingen vol. 6:1, Contract between Jacob De la Gardie and Henrik Tönnesson 18.1.1609.

[112] RA, Kommissariats- m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Account with underståthållare Claus Schlang on 22.3.1614.

[113] AOSB II:5 pp. 118–121, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 9.9.1616.

his previous debts, as well as advance a further 20,000 dalers 'to keep the army willing to serve'.[114]

To obtain the loans, Horn provided his representative Philip Scheding with the deeds of Saris, Mallahof, Parikkala and Kankainen manors with their underlying farms, three smaller estates, a number of farmsteads, and a royal patent he had received to collect an annual rent of 2,000 dalers from four Finnish parishes.[115] Scheding was to take these documents to Tallinn and find willing merchants to accept the documents as security for an unspecified sum of money. Should the debt be repaid within a year, Horn asked that he should repay only the principal. Otherwise, the estates would pass to Horn's creditors, who would use the revenues to amortise the debt with an annual interest of 8% collected from the cash revenue portion of the estates' rent.[116]

Guarantors of loans

The third and final way in which officers financed the Swedish war effort was by acting as guarantors for loans taken by the crown when procuring supplies from merchants. This is similar to the personal loans taken by officers from the merchants outlined above, yet distinct in that the state was the debtor, with the officers simply acting as guarantors.

During the course of the war, the crown depended heavily on merchants to supply the army with wares that could not be obtained through taxation. Clothes and armaments were particularly

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[114] TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 663–664, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 30.10.1614; TUL Lossius A2 pp. 441–443, Gustavus Adolphus to Evert Horn 22.1.1615.

[115] Kankainen and Mallahof had recently been transferred to Evert Horn from his brothers Henrik and Gustaf (Mallahof temporarily for five years) and, in all likelihood, constituted loans or some other form of support for their indebted brother.

[116] TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 663–664, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 30.10.1614.

necessary and were imported in large quantities from abroad. Eventually, as the economic basis of Novgorod deteriorated, the army also became dependent on horses, grain and provisions purchased from foreign merchants.

Procurement of these supplies was a shared responsibility between agents of the central administration operating from Stockholm, and the senior commanders and civil administrators responsible for supplying the army in Russia. Initially the army's supply officers were able to procure most of what was needed on their own, using local tax revenues to repay merchants. However, as the cost of purchases increased and they had to be procured from further afield, supply officers increasingly requested the central administration to pitch in and arrange payment from Sweden. Unfortunately, the central administration was slow to act and usually possessed only a superficial and out-of-date understanding of the situation. Owing to the urgency of the moment, senior officers thus assumed an increasingly active role in contracting merchants on behalf of the crown.

As was customary for most commercial transactions of this magnitude, these purchases took place with short-term, interest-free credit. In this case, senior officers acting in their role of state agents would promise repayment by the crown from copper mined in Sweden, butter taxed in Finland, or other sources of revenue, as the crown would see fit. The broad and ambiguous range of goods for repayment does not seem to have been a problem for merchants, who traded in a variety of goods on the international market.

However, many merchants had reservations with lending directly to the crown, which was notoriously bad at repaying debts and difficult to hold accountable if it failed to pay. In 1612, the crown was already having trouble paying all of its debts in the allotted time and found it impossible to purchase wares on credit except at exorbitant rates and with heavy securities. The state was repeatedly embarrassed to find out that, due to lack of co-ordination, the same sources of revenues had been allocated to the repayment of multiple debts. In 1613, the crown's credit sunk further, as the new king, Gustavus Adolphus (Sw. Gustav II Adolf), cancelled

all previous assignments of state revenues to service debts (*invisningar*). The following year, a strict regime of prioritisation was undertaken to decide which debts would be serviced and which neglected, further increasing the reluctance of merchants to provide credit.[117]

As the crown's credit standing sunk, senior commanders and administrators procuring supplies on behalf of the crown were increasingly forced to guarantee repayment with their own credit. Merchants were far more willing to sell to noblemen, who were easier to hold accountable, and who possessed sizeable estates, which could be used as securities. Furthermore, merchants perceived credit as a means of building bonds with powerful aristocrats, who might in return petition the crown on their behalf or enable them to do commerce in other areas.[118]

The primary commodity purchased with the credit of senior commanders was clothes. In the early years of the war, these purchases could be repaid with property confiscated from Russian 'traitors' or the tax revenues of conquered Novgorod, which the commanders administered. In this situation, acting as guarantor for the crown's purchases was hardly a risk or a burden worth mentioning. However, by the end of 1611, the army had grown in size and the resources of Novgorod were becoming thin. With winter approaching, Feldherr Jacob De la Gardie and Field Marshal Evert Horn contracted the Tallinn-based merchant Claes Grambou to provide the army with 7,200 dalers' worth of clothes repayable by the crown but guaranteed by the officers. Because of the lack

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[117] AOSB I:2 pp. 42–48, Privy Council to Queen Christina 25.3.1612, pp. 873–884, Privy Council to Karl Bonde 18.4.1614; AOSB II:1 pp. 43–47, 53–55, 68–69, 89–90, Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxensiterna 17.5.1614, 31.5.1614, 25.7.1614 and April 1616; AOSB I:2 pp. 199–202, 264–266, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustavus Adolphus 4.8.1614, 13.8.1614 and 26.4.1616, pp. 238–240, Axel Oxenstierna to Jakob van Dyk 26.8.1615, p. 218, Axel Oxenstierna and Johan Skytte to Gustavus Adolphus 3.11.1614.

[118] Möller 1954, pp. 220–227; Fontaine 2014, p. 87.

of resources, De la Gardie sent a letter to Stockholm, requesting the crown to arrange payment by the following Pentecost, or Midsummer at the latest.[119]

De la Gardie received no reply. Together with Evert Horn he started to arrange repayment on their own from Finnish and Russian revenues, with meagre results. Taxes and confiscated property from the Novgorod region proved insufficient, and local administrators in Finland refused to provide payment without express orders from Stockholm. The debt went unpaid, yet Grambou continued to advance funds, providing at least another 7,985 dalers of supplies in 1612 and 1613, before his premature death.

The clothes purchased during the crisis of 1613–1614 followed the same pattern as with Grambou, but on a larger scale. 40,000 dalers' worth of clothes were purchased at the end of 1613 by De la Gardie and Horn on behalf of the crown, of which De la Gardie guaranteed 30,000 dalers and Horn secured repayment for the remaining 10,000.[120] The pair made additional purchases in 1614 and 1615, and by 1616, De la Gardie had personally guaranteed crown loans of some 38,000 dalers to Dutch merchant Gert van der Heyden and 41,729 dalers to a Tallinn merchant Bogislaus von Rosen, as well as others for which we have no records.[121]

The crown recognised these debts and promised payment. However, because of the lack of revenues, this became a long-drawn-out process. Only 77% of the debt to Bogislaus von Rosen had

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[119] TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 854–849, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 10.4.1612.

[120] AOSB II:5 pp. 58–69, 71–73, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna October 1613, 18.12.1613 and 13.3.1614; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 832–835, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 16.12.1613.

[121] Von Rosen 1938, p. 44; AOSB II:5 pp. 85–87, 118–121, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 10.1.1616 and 9.9.1616. A large amount of clothes was apparently also purchased from a merchant named Herman Timbermann on behalf of the crown, though the value of these purchases and how they were repaid remain obscure. For Timbermann see AOSB II:5 pp. 79–80, 107–110, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 23.5.1615 and 6.4.1616.

been paid by 1617, while De la Gardie's commitment to van der Heyden continued until at least the end of 1623.[122] All the while, De la Gardie's and Horn's credit was tied up with guaranteeing the debt, and the commanders continued to actively remind the crown of its obligation and to ensure that the funds were actually transferred. It does not seem as though De la Gardie or Horn handed over any of their estates, but they were forced to pay interest on behalf of the crown.[123]

For the most part, merchants appear to have been willing to settle for longer repayment periods, with steady interest. However, there were instances where repayment was hurried. Merchants who lost confidence in the Swedish crown's or its aristocratic intermediaries' ability to repay – which was closely connected to how well the war was perceived as going – were less willing to wait. A merchant's financial overcommitment or the demands of his own creditors could also add pressure for speedy repayment. Moreover, because lending remained a very social, inter-personal practice, the death or withdrawal of a debtor would push creditors to demand swift repayment.[124]

The death of Claes Grambou in 1613 caused a small crisis, since this incited his creditors to demand what the merchant owed them. In March 1614, De la Gardie warned that, unless Grambou's widow could be repaid by the following Bartholomew's Day (24 August), De la Gardie would be forced to repay everything, at the cost of ruining his own finances. The king heeded the plea, and on 19 July 1614 Grambou's widow received estates in Estonia as security of the still-outstanding debt of 12,000 dalers, which she could retain and use to recover the funds advanced by her husband.[125]

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[122] Von Rosen 1938, p. 44; AOSB II:5 pp. 241–244, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 27.10.1623.

[123] TUL, F6 Cordt 3C pp. 10–11, Jacob De la Gardie to Erik Andersson 10.6.1614; AOSB II:5 pp. 83–85, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 14.11.1615.

[124] Fontaine 2014, p. 50.

[125] AOSB II:5 pp. 5–12, 32–35, 58–60, 71–73, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 22.4.1612, 21.3.1613, October 1613 and 13.3.1614;

Besides financial self-interest, De la Gardie and Horn had a national interest in safeguarding the repayment of merchant creditors, which the king and the Privy Council (Sw. Riksrådet) also recognised. The default, or even rumoured lack of liquidity of one of these merchant bankers could lead to their financial collapse. Besides losing a good supplier, this would close access to an important source of mercantile credit and hurt the crown's reputation. Because of the interconnectivity of debts, the default of a single creditor could also reverberate through the rest of the network and threaten to topple the entire system of mercantile borrowing on which military supply depended.[126]

Repayment

As the previous sections demonstrated, officers served as important intermediaries in the mobilisation of resources for war: both lending funds by various means, as well as borrowing from the civilian market on behalf of the crown. It now remains to look at how these debts were repaid, and what sorts of reward the officers could hope to reap.

Settling debts

The bulk of the debts by the crown to officers and by officers to others started out very informally. Except for some of the commercial loans taken from merchants, debts were ill-defined in

RA, Kommissariats m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Summary of debts to Claes Grambou; RA, Riksregistraturet, Mortgage letter for Grambou's widow 19.7.1614.

[126] TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 559–560, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 6.10.1610; TUL F6 Cordt 3C pp. 10–11, Jacob De la Gardie to Erik Andersson 10.6.1614; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 556–560a, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 13.3.1614; AOSB II:5 pp. 85–87, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 10.1.1616; AOSB I:2 pp. 238–240, Axel Oxenstierna to Jakob van Dyck 26.8.1615.

terms of means and time of repayment, securities and interest (if any). Credit advanced on behalf of the crown was seldom agreed beforehand with the central administration, owing to the urgency of the situation and the difficult communications to Stockholm. On the other hand, arrears and purchases made on behalf of an officer's company or regiment were constant, ongoing affairs, which were expected to be settled at some indeterminate point in the future.

As debts went unpaid and started to accumulate, pressure to find a solution guaranteeing their repayment increased. At this point, the original debt was usually renegotiated, and formally confirmed in official contracts. There was usually significant room to renegotiate debts in order to find a secure solution for repayment, and debtors could usually postpone repayment for some time, especially if they were high up in the military or social hierarchy.

As far as possible, debts were managed and repaid within the military organisation. The commissariat and senior commanders controlled the military treasury, the taxation of occupied Russian territories and, to a degree, revenues from Finland and Estonia allocated to supply the forces. Merchants and officers who had provided cash and supplies for the army might be repaid by the commissariat from the revenues of the occupied territory and from the property of Russian merchants and boyars labelled as 'traitors'. In some cases, the debts between officers could even be repaid through the army treasury by transferring part of the wages of one officer to another.[127]

Debts were also redistributed within the military. Senior officers were personally responsible for the pay and supply of their juniors and the men under their command. As arrears began to mount and officers were forced to advance funds, restitution was always sought from the next rung of military hierarchy: soldiers and

[127] Regarding repayment of merchants from Russian resources, see for example TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 555–556, 602–603b, 614–617, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 20.9.1610, 27.2.1612, 16.9.1612 and 27.9.1612.

junior officers from captains, captains from colonels, and colonels from the commissariat and senior commanders. Superior officers, under increasing pressure from below, would frequently appropriate part of their subordinates' debts by repaying them or their creditors, or by leaving the debts unpaid but assuming responsibility for them.

For example, Evert Horn was eventually forced to repay Captain Pierre De la Ville for some of the funds which the latter had been forced to advance while under Horn's command.[128] Horn, in turn, complained of his mounting debt to Commander Jacob De la Gardie, who assumed part of this debt.[129] In the end, credit advanced by officers followed military and social hierarchies, and the transfer of debts from subordinates to seniors served to rectify any irregularities in this hierarchy.

The rearrangement of debts within the army helped waylay the problem but could not overcome the insufficient means at the army's disposal. Soldiers became unwilling to serve or outright mutinous and would require payment or additional rewards before they could be expected to undertake difficult or dangerous tasks. By 1614, the situation had become so bad that De la Gardie, the senior commander responsible for all wages, could not appear in front of his troops for fear that this would spark a mutiny.[130]

To ease these mounting debts, commanders sought to shift responsibility for repayment directly to the king. Already in 1612, De la Gardie was forced to send Colonel Samuel Cockburn's regiment to Finland to receive pay and provisions either from local administrators or by force from Finnish peasants. The colonel was given leave to travel to Stockholm to demand repayment directly from the king. To aid his cause, De la Gardie wrote strong letters

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[128] TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 567–568, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 26.4.1611.

[129] TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 555–558, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 20.9.1610 and 28.9.1610.

[130] AOSB II:5 pp. 74–75, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 29.3.1614; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 577b–581, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 8.7.1614.

praising Cockburn's services and the necessity of repaying him and gave them to the colonel to deliver to the king and Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna.

Colonel Cockburn was successful in petitioning his case. His long and loyal service, De la Gardie's strong support, and the fact that the colonel still commanded a sizeable regiment of veterans, which could continue to offer good service if paid, probably aided his cause. In December 1612, Cockburn was enfeoffed with several estates in the Finnish parishes of Pernaja and Porvoo, which he could hold for life, as well as 465 royal homesteads in the Finnish provinces of Ostrobothnia and Satakunta, which were mortgaged against a loan of 8,000 dalers recognised by the royal accounting chamber (*räknekammaren*). The annual rent of the homesteads would be used to repay the debt over a number of years, and the rights of the peasants were secured so that they could not be evicted or forced to pay more than the customary annual rent.[131]

Over the following years, Cockburn successfully negotiated the repayment of additional loans. By summer or autumn of 1614, the crown accepted a further debt of 16,241 dalers, which Cockburn had used to pay his own regiment and for the upkeep of the rest of the army. Cockburn requested that this sum should be paid in cash, probably so that he could repay his creditors, to which Gustavus Adolphus concurred. However, repayment was drawn-out, and in 1615 new settlements were made. In June, Cockburn was enfeoffed with the parishes of Kroneby and Karleby in Ostrobothnia and was promised cash payment when the king arrived in Narva.[132]

However, the cash which the king brought from Sweden was insufficient to repay all the creditors waiting in Narva, especially since a major siege against nearby Pskov was in the works.[133]

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[131] Brännman 1950, p. 45; Boëthius 'Cockburn' (Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon).

[132] Brännman 1950, pp. 45–49.

[133] Some of the funds brought with the king were used to repay Cockburn, besides which the king asked Jacob De la Gardie to advance

Instead, a new agreement was ironed out in September 1615, whereby Cockburn received a multitude of additional estates across southern Finland against a shortening of the debt by 6,000 dalers. These new estates, as well as those enfeoffed for life in 1612, were now endowed as inheritable property (*donations*), with all the freedoms and privileges that nobles enjoyed for their inherited estates. There were also stringent requirements: the estates could not be sold or mortgaged without first offering them to the crown; only male heirs[134] could inherit the estates; and these rights would have to be confirmed with every future king. Finally, Cockburn received a promotion to the rank of *generalfältvaktmästare*, and started to receive higher wages.[135]

These settlements with Samuel Cockburn were typical of how the crown managed its overgrown debts to the army's officers. Repayment was a long-drawn-out process, requiring active petitioning by the creditor and multiple rounds of negotiation. Amount of debt and terms of repayment were negotiable, and the crown repeatedly reneged on its promises. Every time the debt was renegotiated, even those settlements that had already been agreed upon were reconfirmed, suggesting that they were not so secure after all. After a settlement was reached, it could take some time and much work before the funds were actually arranged. It was quite common to find the revenues assigned to service the debt already directed elsewhere, or to prove to be far less than the optimistic administration had calculated. Furthermore, bailiffs, toll masters, and other civil servants could prove quite intransigent in handing over the promised estates or sources of revenue, even after receiving direct orders from the king.

5,000 dalers, of which some or even all were used to repay Cockburn. However, the total sum repaid in cash remains obscure. AOSB II:5 pp. 102–103, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxensiterna 22.3.1616.

134 If no male heirs were present, the estates would return to the crown and female inheritors would be repaid with the original 6,000 dalers against which the estates had been donated.

135 Brännman 1950, pp. 45–49; Boëthius 'Cockburn' (Svenskt Biografiskt Lexikon).

As in Cockburn's case, many debts were serviced by enfeoffing or donating land, or by farming out the collection of taxes from parishes, tolls, and other sources. The heavy cost of the Ingrian War and the crown's other military ventures led to a massive increase in the alienation of crown revenues during Gustavus Adolphus's reign (1611–1632). Enfeoffments and donations often took place within the newly conquered territory. In the case of the Ingrian War, virtually all of the annexed territory consisting of the provinces of Kexholm and Ingria was enfeoffed to the largest creditors, Feldherr Jacob De la Gardie and merchant Bogislaus von Rosen. Besides gaining the title of count and a number of estates in Finland, Sweden and Estonia, De la Gardie was repaid for his services and the credit he had advanced with 4,500 rubles (15,000 dalers) from Russian war indemnities and the enforcement of Kexholm province and Nöteborg for six years, which was later extended to 12 years.[136]

In general, officers appear to have been content to receive land in lieu of payments in cash. As Evert Horn put it, allocations of land were much better than promises of repayment in cash, since the Treasury (Sw. Räkningekammaren) was so flooded with demands that repayment would take years or be neglected altogether.[137] Though repayment from enfeoffed land was slower, it provided security and a steady and predictable stream of revenue, and, if the terms of enfeoffment allowed, the land could be mortgaged or sold to settle an officer's debts with his own creditors.

Enfeoffments and donations also served to tie officers to the service of the state. As long as the debt continued to be serviced, officers and the crown remained connected by the personal bond of credit. For officers, control of land and debts from the crown

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[136] Besides repaying the 104,304 dalers' worth of credit he had advanced to the crown, Grill calculates that Jacob De la Gardie made a profit of 170,218 dalers from the enfeoffment over the 12-year period. Hallenberg 2009; Grill 1949, pp. 26–44.

[137] TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 658–659, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 21.5.1614.

provided influence, prestige and the promise of future employment and advancement. From the crown's perspective, land grants were part repayment, part reward, which increased an officer's stakeholding and enticed him to continue in the crown's service. Donations and their promise were an important component in enticing Swedish elites to serve, but also a tool for retaining the services of good foreign officers.[138]

Prioritisation of payments

Not everyone was as lucky as Colonel Cockburn or Feldherr Jacob De la Gardie. The massive cost of the war meant that, even with the alienation of crown revenues, the means to repay everything owed to the army simply did not exist. In 1613 and 1614, an increasing number of disgruntled officers received a leave to travel to Stockholm, overwhelming the central administration with their petitions. In April 1614, the Privy Council wrote to the king asking for prompt instructions what to do with the 'multitude of soldiers' who arrived daily from Russia and Finland to demand payment. The councillors also reminded the king that the country was overcommitted, and asked the king to outline which debts they were to pay, and what would have to be left unpaid, even with some peril.[139]

The king and Privy Council settled on a form of triage. Priority was given to the repayment of those senior officers deemed absolutely necessary for the prosecution of the war: Feldherr Jacob De la Gardie, Field Marshal Evert Horn, and Colonels Mönnichhofen and Cockburn. These men were to receive some payment immediately, with which they could repay their creditors and their subordinates. More permanent, long-term settlements were to be arranged to cover the rest of the debt. Bogislaus von Rosen, the principal contractor supplying the army at the time, was also

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[138] Fontaine 2012, pp. 129, 249; Nilsson 1990, pp. 117–146.

[139] AOSB II:5 pp. 17–26, Jacob De la Gardie to Axel Oxenstierna 17.1.1613; AOSB II:2 pp. 170–174, Axel Oxenstierna and Johan Skytte to Gustavus Adolphus 18.4.1614.

included on the priority list, but other merchants who had lent money in the past would either be made to wait or promised repayment in the distant future, if the situation and their merits allowed. Individual creditors owed very little could be repaid more freely, since this would not jeopardise the royal finances.[140]

Some officers such as Colonel Pierre De la Ville, who had served since 1607 and lent significant sums of money, were neglected. Despite being close to Jacob De la Gardie and receiving strong endorsement from the feldherr, La Ville had fallen out of favour with the king, who did not trust him. Gustavus Adolphus was also furious that La Ville had recruited more troops at De la Gardie's bequest without consulting Stockholm. De la Gardie, on the other hand, was not reproached for allowing this, nor for conducting an identical recruitment of his own. The feldherr was 'part of the system', favoured and indispensable, and thereby received repayment, whereas La Ville was not.[141]

Unlike other senior officers who received land, La Ville received pay merely in cash, mostly in the form of bills of exchange redeemable in Lübeck and Hamburg. Moreover, the crown refused to acknowledge a substantial part of La Ville's claim. The royal accounting chamber calculated that the colonel had received 955 dalers and 21.5 öre in excess of the acknowledged debt of 23,000 dalers, and that the Frenchman in fact owed the crown. The colonel's outstanding claim went unpaid, and a petition was made as late as 1781 – 170 years later – asking for recompense to his descendants![142]

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[140] AOSB I:2 pp. 170–174, Axel Oxenstierna and Johan Skytte to Gustavus Adolphus 18.4.1614; AOSB II:1 pp. 44–45, 68–69,Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna, Johan Skytte and Broder Andersson 17.5.1614, Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna 25.7.1614.

[141] TUL, F6 Cordt 1A pp. 42–43, Gustavus Adolphus to Jacob De la Gardie 23.9.1613; TUL, Lossius A2 pp. 832–835, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 16.12.1613; TUL, Lossius A1 pp. 556–560a, Jacob De la Gardie to Gustavus Adolphus 13.3.1614.

[142] RA, Härens löneavkräkningar 1620–1680 series 4, Memorial for the outstanding debt to Pierre De la Ville's descendants 5.3.1781; RA,

The choice of who would receive repayment was in part a matter of utility: could the crown expect to have future use for this individual, and what would be the cost if it refused to pay? Creditors knew this, and most petitions for repayment of officers and merchants alike promised to serve faithfully and to advance further sums, but only if the previous debts were first repaid. Officers who still commanded sizeable units might also use the threat of mutiny or licentiousness to pressure the crown, although this required subtleness and a balance of threat combined with justified grievance and ability to negotiate in order to succeed.

For example, in 1616, when the situation in Russia was untenable, a number of units that had fought well were sent to Finland with promises that the crown would repay all its debts from the treasury of Turku Castle. Unsurprisingly, the money was not available, but the threat that the soldiers would forcibly exact repayment from the peasantry prompted the crown to divert funds from other ventures. It still could not afford to pay the officers and men in full but managed to negotiate settlements with the officers. Some of the troops were retained in service, which enabled the crown to postpone repayment still further. In the case of others, the crown offered to pay part of its debts and give the officers good commendations, and then sought to find a foreign sovereign who would accept them into his service and assume responsibility for the remainder of the debt.[143]

Besides utility, patronage was important for securing repayment. Evert Horn and Samuel Cockburn could rely on Jacob De la Gardie's support, who in turn relied on Chancellor Axel Oxenstierna's patronage. Even the Duke of Saxony, who failed as a military commander, received repayment through the patronage of Queen Dowager Christina, who pressured her son to repay the duke. Truly 'mercenary' officers who remained detached from the

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Kommissariats m.fl. räkenskaper och handlingar, Peder Olofsson's account for Pierre de la Ville's company 18.3.1614.

143 TUL, Lossius A2 p. 439, Gustavus Adolphus to Jacob De la Gardie 29.3.1616; AOSB I:2 pp. 271–273, 281–828, Axel Oxenstierna to Gustavus Adolphus 22.5.1616 and 30.5.1616; AOSB II:1 pp. 93–95, Gustavus Adolphus to Axel Oxenstierna 10.6.1616.

Swedish crown and aristocratic elite stood little chance of receiving pay over those creditors more closely integrated to the state.[144]

Finally, repayment was very much a question of moral obligation and reciprocity. Those officers who had served well and, above all, loyally, could expect to receive both repayment and reward. In their petitions, officers emphasised the sacrifices they had made both to their health and to their inherited wealth on behalf of the crown. In particular, the widows of officers killed in combat could expect recompense. The most prominent examples were Colonel Mönnichhofen, killed leading an assault on Gdov, and Field Marshal Evert Horn, who died repelling an attack at the siege of Pskov. The king was present to witness both these deaths and did not fail to repay the estates of his brave subordinates.[145]

Conversely, officers who failed in their duties or proved disloyal stood little chance of recovering their investment, even if warranted. Charles IX refused to repay his debt to many of the French officers who recruited troops between 1606 and 1610, because he considered that they had not earned it. Henri de la Borde de Luxe planned to complain to the King of France Henry IV and make this a diplomatic matter, but the assassination of the French monarch prevented this. Naturally, those French troops who defected to the enemy in 1610 – arguably with little choice – forfeited all chance of repayment. Despite their latter successes, Charles IX held Evert Horn and Jacob De la Gardie partly responsible for the defeat at Klushino in 1610 and refused to repay the funds they had advanced to maintain the army before this defeat.[146]

Most successful were those officers who proved their commitment to the war effort, often with great financial and personal risk, and managed to integrate themselves in Swedish social networks. These officers were favoured with not only repayment of their outstanding debts but also additional gifts of land and wealth,

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144 AOSB I:2 p. 211, Axel Oxenstierna to Johan Skytte 2.10.1614.

145 Generalstaben 1936, pp. 478, 522; RA, Kammarkollegiets skuldböcker vol. 1, Account with Colonel Mönnichhofen's estate 1615–1623.

146 Le Mercure Francois 1615, pp. 49 – 56; TUL, F6 Cordt 4 pp. 557–558, 561–564, 567–568, Evert Horn to Jacob De la Gardie 28.9.1610, 13.11.1610 and 26.4.1611.

money and jewellery, social advancement and offices in the rapidly expanding state bureaucracy.

Conclusion

> *Victory often goes to the army that makes the least mistakes, not the most brilliant plans.*
>
> — Charles de Gaulle

The history of the Ingrian War can be presented as a series of failures in military supply. Despite best efforts, state-run military finances and supply proved utterly inadequate to pay, feed or clothe the Swedish army in Russia. However, in spite of recurring crises and steady deterioration, the army managed to outlast the enemy and limp its way to victory. The ensuing Treaty of Stolbova gave the Swedish Realm control over the entire Gulf of Finland, tighter control of Baltic trade revenues, the new provinces of Ingria and Kexholm, and a more secure eastern border.

This victory was largely the result of the commitment and credit advanced by the entrepreneurial officers of the Swedish army. The men, money and materials provided by both native Swedish and foreign officers alike greatly expanded the resources at the state's disposal at the point where they mattered the most, increasing the longevity that the army could be kept in the field. Moreover, the personal resources of officers helped the army tide over the worst supply crises, thereby making the army more robust and preventing its collapse on multiple occasions.

As well-connected members of the elite, officers also functioned as crucial intermediaries at the nexus between the civilian and military economies, obtaining resources from the civilian market and putting these to use for the benefit of the war effort. This helped tie disparate economic agents within the realm and beyond its borders behind the crown's interests in support of a common war effort. Moreover, tapping into the credit network of the army's officers gave the crown access to a larger resource base, and otherwise inaccessible resources at potentially lower transaction costs, than if the entire affair had been state-run.

An important yet often overlooked component of military entrepreneurship was the devolution of risk from the crown. Officers were not merely subordinates but investors and stakeholders in the 'military enterprise'. So long as the war went well, officers could expect to make a profit and enjoy a prestigious position in the king's service. However, if they failed in their duties or the war was lost, officers stood to lose their investment and reputation.

Morals and social ties governed reward and repayment, which encouraged officers to serve faithfully and integrate with Swedish networks, rather than remain detached mercenaries. Many officers accepted a vested interest in the outcome of the war and were prepared to commit both their person and their wealth. Through military entrepreneurship, members of the elite were enticed to participate in the crown's military venture and integrated more closely with the interests of the nascent Swedish empire.

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CHAPTER 3

The Burghers of Nyen as Creditors and Suppliers in the Great Northern War (1700–1714)

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During the Great Northern War, some of the burghers of the town of Nyen supported the Swedish crown in organising supply for the army and navy. Interestingly, this was mainly done at the same time as the burghers were forced to flee the war.

Before the war, Nyen had become an important Swedish town at the far end of the Gulf of Finland, located in the same place that Saint Petersburg is located today. In the last decades of the 17th century, timber trade prospered and the economic development in the town was rapid.[1] In 1703, Nyen was destroyed by the Russians and the merchants fled to different coastal towns in the north-eastern Baltic Sea region. As refugees, they played

[1] Kepsu 2019; Kepsu 2018.

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in many cases a crucial role in financing and supplying military units close to the front.[2]

Earlier research has pointed out the important role of private entrepreneurship in supporting military forces in early modern Europe. Since the end of the 16th century, states had paid private contractors and entrepreneurs to supply military services, even to raise and maintain fully equipped units. This was a consequence of rulers' limited power, even though early modern states are generally described as absolutist. In practice, powerful private individuals were necessary for a centralised power as allies in governing the state, particularly in peripheral border regions. Early modern rulers and governors tried to win over these local elites to support the state apparatus, including financing military units, which required economic power and wealth.[3]

However, earlier research has focused more on binding members of the landowning nobility to the state, and using them as military entrepreneurs who were responsible for recruiting, arming and officering their own troops, as well as organising their supply.[4] The role of burghers as private financers of war in Northern Europe is known to a lesser degree. In addition, earlier studies have mostly dealt with food supply and the billeting of soldiers, but to a lesser degree with credits.[5]

In this chapter, I analyse the burghers of Nyen as creditors for the Swedish army. The main question is how the crown used the burghers' extensive transnational networks and commercial competence to finance the Great Northern War. I will also discuss how this benefited the burghers themselves, who as refugees were in a vulnerable position. This gives an interesting perspective on the relationship between the private and public sphere, in particular

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[2] Kepsu 2020.

[3] Parrott 2012, especially pp. 2–3; Hårdstedt 2002, p. 56; Black 1998, pp. 88–89; Reinhard 1996, pp. 6–7; Parker 1996, p. 64. See also Kepsu 2014, pp. 60–61 with references.

[4] Parrott 2012, p. 57; Black 1998, p. 89; Parker 1996, pp. 64–65.

[5] See e.g. Hatakka 2019; Hårdstedt 2002.

in how the army could utilise civilian society in fulfilling its supply needs. The role of burghers in early modern state formation is also dealt with.

Nyen is not well known in historical research, nor are its burghers. Their arrival as refugees in Viipuri and Helsinki during the Great Northern War is, however, noted in the histories of those towns.[6] Primary source material about the Nyen burghers is also scarce, as no private account books of the burghers have been preserved. However, some administrative documents, such as court records and correspondence between the burghers and crown's officials, have survived. To this study, the most important source material is the credit documents filed by the Chamber College (Sw. Kammarkollegium), located in the Swedish National Archives in Stockholm.[7]

Nyen and Its Burghers

The town of Nyen (Fin. Nevanlinna, also called Nyenschanz and Schanzdernie) was located at the mouth of the river Okhta, close to the place where the river Neva runs into the Gulf of Finland. The town was protected by the fortress Nyenskans, where construction began during the Ingrian War in 1611. Nyen was founded *de jure* in 1642, when it was granted town privileges.[8]

Even though the location of Nyen was ideal for Russian trade, transit trade was almost constantly characterised by various problems during the 17th century. The turning point came in the 1680s, when trade and commerce increased in the whole Baltic region. The final decades of the 17th century can be seen as an economic boom, as for the towns of the Swedish eastern Baltic provinces. The aims of the crown's derivation policy, which aimed

[6] See in particular Aalto 2016. See also Ruuth 1906.

[7] RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 Serie A, 522:95–96.

[8] Jangfeldt 1998, pp. 18–19; von Bonsdorff 1891, pp. 361–363, 381–387.

to channel the transit trade between Russia and Western Europe via Nyen and Narva instead of Archangelsk, were partly fulfilled.[9]

Sawmills, shipyards and the timber trade were the base for the economic boom in Nyen, and timber exports increased greatly during the last decades of the 17th century.[10] According to the Sound Toll Registers, which catalogue all maritime traffic in and out of the Baltic Sea via the Danish Sound, some 30 ships from Nyen sailed yearly through the Sound between 1681 and 1703. They were loaded with the so-called naval stores, or timber and other shipbuilding material, and sailed mostly to Amsterdam. In addition, ships also sailed to other Baltic ports, particularly to Stockholm and Lübeck.[11]

The increase in trade would not have been possible without a great demand for naval stores in Western Europe during the time.[12] The Nine Years War (1688–1697), where the Netherlands and England fought against France, had also a favourable effect on trade in the Gulf of Finland. During the war, Dutch shipmasters, merchants, and technological experts moved some of their commercial activities to neutral countries in order to avoid French privateers.[13] Some 15 Dutch shipmasters became burghers in Nyen in 1691–1696.[14] With the help of Dutch capital and professionals, new fine-blade sawmills and shipyards were established along the Narva and Neva rivers.[15] The Dutch interests in acquiring naval stores from ports around the Gulf of Finland continued even after the Great Northern War broke out in 1700.

The most powerful burghers in late 17th-century Nyen were of German or Baltic-German descent and closely tied together by marriages. Among the most influential families were Hueck, Luhr,

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[9] Kepsu 2018, pp. 62–64; Küng 2008.
[10] Kepsu 2018, pp. 63–66; Åström 1988, pp. 30–31, 44–46.
[11] Sound Toll Registers (www.soundtoll.nl); Kepsu 2018, pp. 75–76; Kepsu 2017, p. 427.
[12] Davids 2008, especially pp. 347–349, 362.
[13] Müller 2019, pp. 54–56; Bruijn 2004, pp. 42–43.
[14] Kepsu 2019, pp. 470–472; von Bonsdorff 1891, p. 495.
[15] Kepsu 2018; Åström 1988, pp. 30–31, 44–46.

Frisius, Siliacks (Zilliacus), Blom and Pölck (Pölke).[16] Most of them had settled in the town quite recently. Although the crown encouraged foreign merchants to settle in Nyen, many immigrants moved there through their personal networks as chain migration, in particular from Lübeck and Tallinn.[17] In the Swedish Realm, the 'imported burghers', as Åke Sandström has called them, were important connections to the international market.[18] The crown especially craved different kinds of specialists of trade and manufacturing.[19] Another important but less noticed motive was the possibility to get credit from the foreign merchants, which was needed for financing the continuous wars.

The elite merchants in Nyen had an important position as mediators in the transit trade between the merchant houses in Western Europe and the raw material markets of North-Eastern Europe.[20] The rapid economic development during the last decades of the 17th century provided the burgher elite in Nyen with valuable trading connections, which in turn proved to be vital after the destruction of the city in 1703. Beside good transnational networks, they had commercial experience and they could communicate with the merchant houses in Amsterdam in Middle Low German.

To sum up, the merchant elite in Nyen was quite powerful at the time of the outbreak of the Great Northern War. It dominated both the economic and political sphere in the town. The elite was not as powerful as the top burghers in Riga, Tallinn or Narva, but clearly wealthier than the burghers in Finnish coastal towns like Viipuri (Sw. Viborg, Ru. Vyborg) or Helsinki (Sw. Helsingfors). According to Seppo Aalto, refugee merchants from Nyen who arrived in Helsinki after 1703 were superior to the local burghers

[16] Kepsu 2019.
[17] Kepsu 2019.
[18] Sandström 2016, pp. 223–224.
[19] Naum & Ekengren 2018, p. 107; Villstrand 1989, pp. 10, 17–19, 29.
[20] Kepsu 2019.

regarding both ships and networks, as well as capital and commercial competence.[21]

Even after the merchants of Nyen lost a major part of their real property along with their hometown, most of their private means seemed to have been invested in Amsterdam. Politically, they were also quite well integrated in the Swedish Realm and seems to have been relatively loyal towards the central government.[22] Altogether, these factors made it possible for the Nyen merchants to support the crown by financing war costs and supplying military units during the Great Northern War.

The First Financial Agreements

Conquering Ingria was the main objective of Peter the Great during the Great Northern War, as he wanted Russia to get access to the Baltic Sea.[23] Russian troops had already invaded parts of eastern Ingria in the summer of 1700. In Nyen, the situation became even more threatening in September, when Russian troops initiated the siege of Narva. Some of the burghers chose to leave the town at this point, but many returned in 1701 when the military threat was temporarily decreased. In the autumn of 1702, the town was struck by panic when Russian troops lead by Czar Peter himself conquered the fortress of Pähkinälinna (Sw. Nöteborg, Ru. Oreshek/Shlisselburg). More or less all burghers remaining in Nyen left the town at this point.[24]

There is not a lot of information on war financing from Ingria during the first years of the Great Northern War. Yet, the intensive trade between Nyen and Amsterdam came up for discussion at the beginning of the war. According to James Cavallie, Nyen was used as security in credit negotiations between Swedish Realm and the Netherlands in 1700. Dutch merchants trading with cit-

[21] Aalto 2016, pp. 488–491.
[22] Kepsu 2019, pp. 486–492.
[23] Scheltjens 2011, pp. 115–116; Jangfeldt 1998, p. 23.
[24] Kepsu 2020, pp. 133–134, 138; Kepsu 1995, pp. 110–111.

ies in the eastern Baltic provinces and willing to provide credit to the Swedish crown were to be given toll exemptions in Nyen and other ports in order to shorten the loans. These attempts were, however, unsuccessful.[25] It is likely that Dutch merchants regarded the geopolitical location of Nyen too insecure for a credit security.

Some attempts to acquire credit from private individuals were made at the beginning of the war. Otto Wellingk, governor-general for Ingria and Kexholm Province, was ordered to investigate if he could find any individuals who could give credit to the crown. As a pawn, they could receive some of the crown's manors or incomes in Ingria. Wellingk was advised to make contracts between the crown and the possible creditors; these contracts were apparently supposed to function as a model for similar agreements in the future. The central government in Stockholm had seemingly high hopes for credit, but Wellingk regarded them as unrealistic. According to him, difficult and turbulent times in the province had made people fearful and concerned, and therefore he feared that not many persons were ready to please His Majesty's will.[26]

Even though only a few contracts were signed, at least one burgher from Nyen was involved in pawning of a manor. In 1702, Henrik Luhr, one of the most powerful merchants in Nyen, provided Lieutenant Axel Bure with 3,663 silver dalers and got the Porits crown manor in Järvisaari pogost in eastern Ingria as a pawn. Bure was not able to pay Luhr back, which meant that Porits passed on to Luhr. However, Luhr could not benefit from the manor, as it was conquered by Russian troops in the early autumn of 1702.[27]

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[25] Cavallie 1975, pp. 94–100. See also Frost 2000, p. 281.

[26] RA, Livonica II:192 (mf. FR 89), Governor-General Otto Wellingk to Charles XII, 16 March 1700. See also Cavallie 1975, p. 70.

[27] RA, Kammarkollegiet, Skrivelser från Kammarkollegiet 1717, 1134:4, vol 92, The Chamber College to Charles XII, 13 May 1717. Henrik Luhr pleaded in 1717 to be compensated for the loss of his pawn manor. His undated petitions are attached to the letter from the Chamber College.

Another problem for the crown seems to have been that the government had a very poor credit standing.[28] This fact made it difficult to loan money on the international credit market in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. The Swedish crown did not have any long-term credit relations to international creditors and was in general regarded as an unsecure borrower. During the Great Northern War, the state made further attempts to get loans on the international market, but they were not very successful. Competition on the international credit market was tough, while Europe was also ravaged by the War of the Spanish Succession.[29]

An interesting preserved document illustrates the attitude of the Nyen burghers towards financing the military when the war broke out. In a meeting held at Nyen courthouse in the end of January 1700, Governor-General Otto Wellingk discussed the building of new vaults in Nyenskans fortress with the town council and burghers of Nyen. The vaults were intended as a bomb shelter to protect both the inhabitants and their most valuable possessions. The crown hoped that the burghers would either build them on their own or finance the building project. After the Nyen burghers had discussed the matter, the town council answered by a written letter at the end of February, when the war had already broken out and the siege of Riga began.[30]

In its answer, the town council declined in subservient terms to finance the vaults. By highlighting setbacks during the last few years, such as wrecking and seizing of ships, the burghers emphasised their poverty. According to them, their wealth was tied up in house building and merchandise, which made it impossible for them to cope with extraordinary fortification costs. The town council implied between the lines that the crown should

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[28] Cavallie 1975, p. 70.

[29] Winton 2010, pp. 172–173.

[30] RA, Livonica II:192 (mf. FR 89), Nyen town council to Governor-General Otto Wellingk 21 February 1700; Governor-General Otto Wellingk to Charles XII 10 March 1700. See also von Bonsdorff 1891, p. 377.

strengthen the defence of the town with its own resources. In that case, the burghers could for their part strengthen the town by building their own houses in stone.[31] Clearly, the council regarded military protection and fortification to be the crown's responsibility. In fact, the town had repeatedly requested stronger fortifications from central government during the 17th century.[32]

Otto Wellingk, who forwarded the letter to King Charles XII (Sw. Karl XII) along with his own comments, did not recommend that the burghers should be encouraged to build stone houses, since the town was not to be fortified. According to military plans, only the star fortress of Nyenskans was to be enlarged. In his letter, Wellingk confirmed the poverty of the burghers. He also pointed out that most of the merchants were young and at the beginning of their careers.[33] However, both Wellingk and the town council mentioned an interesting fact: the merchants were trading mostly by credit, which they received from foreigners.[34] This proved to be essential in later financial contacts between the Nyen merchants and representatives of the crown.

Charles XII did not give up and ordered Otto Wellingk to discuss the matter once more with the burghers of Nyen. They were to be persuaded by fair means (Sw. '*gode ock lämpa*'). Wellingk assembled the burghers in May 1700, just before the governor-general himself was appointed as commander of the Finnish troops about to march to reinforce the besieged Swedish army in Riga. His persuasions did not change the burghers' stand in Nyen.[35]

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[31] RA, Livonica II:192 (mf. FR 89), Nyen town council to Governor-General Otto Wellingk 21 February 1700. On shipwrecks and privateering of ships from Nyen, see Kepsu 2018.

[32] Kepsu 2019, pp. 474–475.

[33] RA, Livonica II:192 (mf. FR 89), Governor-General Otto Wellingk to Charles XII 10 March 1700.

[34] RA, Livonica II:192 (mf. FR 89), Nyen town council to Governor-General Otto Wellingk 21 February 1700, Governor-General Otto Wellingk to Charles XII 10 March 1700.

[35] RA, Livonica II:192 (mf. FR 89), Governor-General Otto Wellingk to Charles XII 24 May 1700. Wellingk's appointment is mentioned

It seems that the town council had a positive attitude towards the building project, but the burghers in general were against it because of their poverty. Persuasion did not have an effect on the insistent burghers.[36]

In general, the Swedish crown had difficulties in getting credit from wealthy merchants in its cities and in this way binding them to the war effort. The crown paid 6% interest, but normal trade probably yielded a much greater profit.[37] In addition, repayment from the crown was quite insecure. Because trade connections to Western Europe were still functioning more or less normally, it was more profitable to focus on trade than to lend money to the crown.

According to the Sound Toll Registers, the number of merchant ships departing from Nyen and sailing through the Sound was at a normal level during the first years of war. During the last decades of the 17th century, around 30 ships on average had departed yearly from Nyen. In 1700, when the Russian attack in Ingria started at the end of the sailing season, 55 ships sailed from Nyen. The number dropped to 18 in 1701, when most of the leading merchant families lived as temporary refugees in Viipuri, but returned to 36 ships in 1702. In 1703, the year of Nyen's destruction, only one ship passed through the Sound.[38]

In Narva and Tallinn, the downfall in trade seems to have been far heavier than in Nyen. In Viipuri, on the other hand, the numbers of departing ships actually increased. After the losses of Nyen and Narva, Viipuri became the centre for transit trade in the

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in RA, Livonica II:192 (mf. FR 89), Lieutenant Colonel Johan Stael von Holstein to Charles XII 21 May 1700.

[36] RA, Livonica II:192 (mf. FR 89), Nyen town council to Governor-General Otto Wellingk 9 May 1700.

[37] Cavallie 1975, pp. 125–135.

[38] Sound Toll Registers. The number of departures shows variations also during peaceful years in the registers. For Nyen, yearly departures varied from 13 to 62 in the period 1681–1703.

eastern Gulf of Finland, and refugees from Nyen settled in the town also boosted trade in Viipuri.[39]

Trade in Narva and Riga was affected by the Russian offensive, followed by sieges in both towns. The Privy Council (Sw. Riksråd) and the Chamber College pointed out that there were major obstacles in trade on these locations, which has resulted in loss of income, particularly from the profitable licence toll in Riga (Sw. *licent*). The financial situation overall was considered alarming. Because of the war, incomes in the state budget had decreased while expenses had risen.[40]

However, some credit arrangements involving traders from Nyen were made. They were arranged through personal networks, not through the crown. In July 1704 Christian Hueck, one of the most wealthy and powerful burghers in Nyen, advanced 1,500 dalers to the town of Tallinn. In the document, it is stated that the means would be used for the fortification of the town. Like the Swedish crown, Tallinn offered an interest rate of 6%.[41] Apparently, the town council accumulated private means in order to protect the town. The military situation in the eastern Baltic provinces was threatening since Dorpat had surrendered to the Russians a couple of weeks earlier and Narva was under siege.[42]

It is very likely that the loan was organised through the family network. Christian Hueck, a member of Nyen town council, had already migrated from Lübeck together with his brothers in the middle of the 17th century. Some of his brothers had settled in Tallinn and become very influential. Christian Hueck's brother Wendel still lived in Tallinn, as did his nephew Johann, who later became burgomaster in the town.[43]

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[39] Kepsu 2020, pp. 135, 144.

[40] Historiska handlingar I p. 116, The Privy Council and the Chamber College to Charles XII 25.2.1701.

[41] TL, Fond 230:1, BB 45, Bond of Christian Hueck 7.7.1704.

[42] Kujala 2001, p. 219.

[43] Möller & Luther 1981, pp. 89–90.

Organising Credits and Military Supply in Viipuri and Helsinki

By far the most prominent burgher from Nyen who financed the Swedish war effort was Johan Henrik Frisius. His father, Heinrich Frisius, was one of the town's many German migrates. He moved to Nyen from Rostock in the mid-17th century and in 1662 became the vicar in the German church of the town.[44] Johan Henrik became a burgher in 1691, but court records from Nyen show that he had already been involved in trade a few years earlier.[45] His position was strengthened by his marriage in 1696 to Catharina Barckman, who was the daughter of a former elite burgher, Daniel Barckman, and a widow to Diedrich Blom, a relatively powerful merchant with a background in Lübeck.[46]

At the beginning of the 1690s, the burghers of Nyen were involved in a heavy increase of timber trade and shipbuilding. Johan Henrik Frisius was amongst the first to invest in ships. Together with his brother-in-law Detleff Jochims, he founded a shipyard just outside Nyen along the Neva river. In addition, he owned parts in at least eight ships.[47] Frisius travelled to Amsterdam and Paris and managed to become wealthy before the outbreak of the Great Northern War. His private means were apparently invested abroad, mostly in Amsterdam.[48]

Frisius arrived to Viipuri in 1702 with his stepchildren, merchant Didrik Blom Jr and Catharina Blom, who later married Christian Hueck's son Johan Hueck. During the first years in Viipuri, Johan Henrik Frisius and the other refugee merchants from Nyen focused on trade. Until around 1708, merchant ships

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[44] Mäkelä-Alitalo 2014; Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d. (www.frisenheim.se).

[45] See for example KA, Town Court of Nyen 1687, n:1, pp. 285–288; Town Court of Nyen 1688, n:2, pp. 225–229, 231–234; Town Court of Nyen 1690, n:4, pp. 248–250, 252–254.

[46] Mäkelä-Alitalo 2014; Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.

[47] For shipping and shipbuilding in Nyen, see also Kepsu 2018; Küng 2009.

[48] Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.

could sail quite safely in the Baltic Sea, and the flow of goods was more or less normal.[49] In Viipuri, a refugee network started to develop between the former merchants from Nyen. A young merchant, Jobst Dobbin, later one of the wealthiest burghers in Hamina (Sw. Fredrikshamn), worked as Frisius's merchant's apprentice (Sw. *köpgesäll*) and lived in his house.[50]

Frisius seems to have quite quickly reached an important position in the town. He also organised business possibilities for other merchants in Viipuri. Just before the siege in Viipuri in 1706, when the Russians tried to take the town, Frisius made a contract with some merchants on salt trade. He had ordered a large quantity of salt, which he sold forward to other merchants. One of them was Jacob Danneberg, who belonged to the old elite in Viipuri. He had ordered a hundred barrels of salt from Frisius but did not receive it since he would not agree to all of Frisius's transaction terms.[51] It is possible that there were some controversies between Frisius and Danneberg.

As the war went on, difficulties in trade became more evident. However, fortification works opened new business possibilities. After the loss of the Ingrian fortresses Nyen and Narva, Viipuri was once again a border stronghold. After the siege in 1706, fortification works intensified even more.[52] Financing military units and fortification works was, however, problematic. The Swedish military administration, which was based on the allotment farm system and static budgets, worked excellently in peacetime, but faced difficulties when the outbreak of war raised the expenditure to another level.[53] The new governor and commander-in-chief, Georg Lybecker, solved the problem by starting to use burghers in organising supply for the army. His main companion was Johan

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[49] Ericson Wolke 2011, pp. 86–87.

[50] KA, Town Court of Viipuri 1707, x:43, pp. 27–28; KA, Lower Town Court of Viipuri 1707, x:83, pp. 36–37.

[51] KA, Lower Town Court of Viipuri 1707, x:83, pp. 34, 36–37, 65, 67–68, 149, 153–154.

[52] Ruuth & Halila 1974, pp. 403–405, 412–414; Ruuth 1906, p. 472.

[53] See e.g. Frost 2000, pp. 281–282, 316–317.

Henrik Frisius, but also other Nyen burghers, like Matthias Pylse (Pülse, Pylss), participated. Still, Frisius was the key to all deliveries and credits. The other burghers advanced means only if Frisius guaranteed the loan.[54]

Frisius also organised means to fortification works in Viipuri. He continued to support the fortress until the bitter end of Viipuri as a Swedish town. In addition, Carl Dobbin from Nyen organised means and supply just before the second siege of the town in 1710. This was very important, since the Swedish defence system in general was based on strong fortresses. However, the fortresses in the eastern part of the realm were in bad condition and difficult to defend. Even though Swedish fortresses had been strengthened during the reign of Charles XI (Sw. Karl XI), the main emphasis was on the newly captured provinces, in particular Scania.[55]

Because of strategic choices and the crown's limited resources, the local governors and military commanders had no other option than to rely on the burghers. When Russian troops had already occupied the outskirts of Viipuri, Lieutenant Colonel Lorentz Stobæus – later ennobled as Stobée – sent a letter to General Quartermaster Magnus Palmqvist and pointed out in harsh words that the crown's fortification funds were exhausted. As communication lines were broken, Stobæus had not received any answers on his letters to Stockholm.[56] Frisius broke through the siege and left the town when surrender was evident. Interestingly, he made an agreement with the other burghers where he took all the claims to the crown on his responsibility.[57] This arrangement strengthened his position towards the crown, and probably allowed Frisius to continue with his supply business.

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[54] Hjelmqvist 1909, pp. 107–108.

[55] Sundberg 2018, p. 42; Kepsu 2014, pp. 77–80.

[56] RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 14, Johan Henrik Frisius's claims.

[57] Ruuth & Halila 1974, pp. 424–425, 434; Ruuth 1906, pp. 477–478, 484.

Altogether, the support of the Nyen burghers was substantial before and during the siege of Viipuri. Before the siege of the town started in 1710, Johan Henrik Frisius had claims of around 82,000 silver dalers.[58] According to Frisius himself, as well as many later historians, the activity of Frisius encouraged the brave resistance in Viipuri. Antti Kujala states that Frisius was among the crown's most reliable income sources in Finland during the Great Northern War, because of his excellent networks to the Netherlands and Hamburg. Without Frisius and other burghers like Pylse and Dobbin, the fortress would most likely have surrendered much earlier.[59]

After the fall of Nyen, some burghers fled to Helsinki. Initially, Henrik Luhr became the most influential merchant from Nyen in Helsinki. He managed to escape to Helsinki in the autumn of 1702 after dramatic incidents. His ship *Tre stjärnor från Nyen* was almost wrecked outside Nyen, but eventually he managed to reach Helsinki along with his ship, loaded with salt and tobacco.[60] The Nyen refugee community in Helsinki was quite large, in 1708 about 10% of the total adult population in the town.[61] Besides Luhr, other important traders from Nyen fled to Helsinki, most notably Berend Dobbin, Jobst Hueck, Jürgen Pölck and Casper Everding.

In addition, Jochim Donner, the schoolmaster from Nyen's German school, fled to Helsinki. He taught the children of the

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[58] Ruuth 1906, pp. 477–478, 484.

[59] RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 14, Chamber College memorandum, 13 July 1714; Kujala 2001, p. 248, 256; Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d. The Russians captured some of the burghers from Nyen after the surrender of the town in 1710. Quite many families settled in the Russian Viipuri and were during the following decades important in trade and city administration. Among the prisoners of war was also Friedrich Wittstock, who was appointed, not surprisingly by Frisius, burgomaster in Hamina after the war. See Kepsu 2020, pp. 137–143.

[60] Kepsu 2020, pp. 133–134, 138–140.

[61] Aalto 2016, p. 456.

Nyen elite but started later to build a new career as a merchant. It is also important to mention Henrik Luhr's sister Anna Luhr. As a widow to the Nyen merchant Conrad Siliacks, she had taken care of family affairs in Nyen. Their daughters Christina, Maria and Anna Elisabeth were married to Jobst Hueck, Jürgen Pölck and Casper Everding, and formed a base to the network of Nyen burghers in Helsinki.[62]

Former Nyen burghers in Helsinki were also connected to the merchant families who resided in Viipuri. The most important link was Henrik Luhr, who was a brother-in-law to Johan Henrik Frisius. During the first years after the fall of Nyen, Luhr partly resided in Stockholm, which presumably provided both him and the Nyen refugee network important connections to the central government.[63] Like in Viipuri, the Nyen burgers in Helsinki seem to have mostly focused on trade during the first years in the town. They were active in timber trade, in particular Henrik Luhr and Jobst Hueck.[64]

It is not clear when the Nyen burghers in Helsinki got involved in supplying the Swedish army, but deliveries to the crown soared when Frisius arrived after the surrender of Viipuri. While in Helsinki, Frisius continued to supply the army using other burgers in Helsinki as subcontractors. His contacts to the credit market in Amsterdam were valuable for the Swedish crown. The Netherlands were officially neutral in the war, but it was important for the merchant houses in Amsterdam to secure the import of naval stores from the ports of the Gulf of Finland. Helsinki became an important centre for the Swedish–Dutch timber trade in 1710, when Viipuri as well as Tallinn and Riga were conquered by Russian troops. This made it possible for the burghers in Helsinki to quite successfully organise supply and to fulfil the enormous needs of the army.

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[62] Kepsu 2020, pp. 138–141; Möller & Luther 1981, pp. 83–84, 92–99; Donner 1891, pp. 4–13.

[63] Aalto 2016, pp. 478–479.

[64] Aalto 2016, pp. 363–364; Kuisma 1992, pp. 137–138.

According to Seppo Aalto, the merchants from Nyen had an exceptional ability to get means and to turn money into goods and goods into money.[65] In addition, the connection between the Nyen network and the armed forces was strengthened by the fact that many former Nyen merchants held positions in the army's commissariat. Besides Frisius, who was appointed commissary general (Sw. *överkrigskommissarie*) in 1710, Lars Malm served also as a commissary general, while Frisius's stepson Didrik Blom was appointed field commissary (Sw. *fältkommissarie*) in 1711.[66] Consequently, the Nyen network focused more and more in crown deliveries, as normal trade became more difficult.[67]

One of the most successful operations for the burghers was supplying the Swedish navy in Helsinki during the winter 1711–1712. In the autumn of 1711, the naval high command ordered parts of the Swedish naval squadron, ironically still called 'the Nyen fleet' (Sw. Nyenska eskadern), to stay the winter in Helsinki. As a fleet-in-being operation, the purpose of the squadron was to control the Gulf of Finland and to block the Russian navy to the far end of it. This prevented Russian marine operations in the Baltic Sea and secured the Finnish coast and above all Stockholm.

Usually, the squadron returned to the navy's main base in Karlskrona in Blekinge for the winter before the northern parts of the Baltic Sea were covered by ice. However, in 1711 the naval strategic situation in the Gulf of Finland was threatening for the Swedes. The Russian navy had been expanded quickly under the strict command of Peter the Great, and already consisted of numerous vessels waiting for a chance in what earlier had been Nyen. Staying in Helsinki during winter meant that the Swedish navy was operational immediately after the ice broke up.[68]

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[65] Aalto 2016, pp. 488–491. See also Kujala 2001, p. 256.

[66] Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.

[67] Kepsu 2020, pp. 144–145.

[68] Ericson Wolke 2011, pp. 113–173, in particular pp. 122, 158–159; Kujala 2001, pp. 254–256.

Johan Henrik Frisius agreed to organise the supply for the naval squadron. There was a great demand for both victuals and cash. A document by the Chamber College states that Frisius supplied and fitted out very promptly the naval squadron (‘*mycket promt utrustat och providerat Kongl. Majts. Escadre wid Helsingfors*’).[69] Other burghers in Helsinki, many with a background in Nyen, took part in the supply operation. Jobst Hueck delivered 2,389 silver dalers in cash for the squadrons needs at the beginning of March 1712.[70]

A year later, Frisius and his merchant contacts were again given the responsibility to supply the naval squadron, which indicates that the supply of Nyenska eskadern in 1712 was successful. In the spring of 1713, Russian troops, in particular their galley fleet, increasingly threatened southern Finland. This time, however, the Swedish naval squadron had not stayed the winter in Helsinki but returned to the main base in Karlskrona in late autumn 1712. The fleet was expected to arrive in Helsinki as soon as the ice melted.[71]

The supply of the army and navy units in Finland was for all practical purposes privatised to Frisius in spring 1713. Former Nyen merchants were active in the supply operation. War commissioner Frisius was the main organiser, while Nyen burghers in Helsinki delivered grain. Source material in Stockholm reveals that Jobst Hueck delivered 750 barrels of barley and 400 barrels of rye to the crown magazine in Helsinki. The prize was fixed at 9 copper dalers for barley and 8 copper dalers for rye (3 and 2⅔ silver dalers, respectively). Hueck appealed three years later for the crown to liquidate his claim, in total 3,880 silver dalers, including

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[69] RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 14, Chamber College memorandum, 13 July 1714.

[70] RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 24, State Treasury memorandum, 23. November 1716.

[71] Aalto 2016, pp. 496–501; Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.

interest.[72] Initially, the grain was expressly reserved to the Swedish navy.[73] Later, grain was stored to Helsinki also for the army as a preparation for the anticipated Russian offensive according to orders from Governor Johan Creutz.

Jochim Donner, the former schoolmaster turned merchant, was also involved in supplying the armed forces. Like Hueck, Donner delivered grain (170 barrels of barley, 70 barrels of rye) to the crown magazine in Helsinki in May 1713, just a few days before the battle of Helsinki. Compared to Frisius and Hueck, his claim was at this time modest, in total 696 silver dalers.[74]

The efforts to store grain proved to be in vain. The decision to order the 'Nyen fleet' to Karlskrona for the winter had been a mistake. The Russian army attacked Helsinki in a surprising amphibious operation. Hundreds of galleys with some 17,000 men, including Peter the Great himself, appeared outside the town and caused major concern amongst the townspeople. When Russian troops managed to get a foothold in the outskirts, the town along with the crown magazine was set on fire. Ironically, Johan Henrik Frisius was one of the four men who made the decision to burn down both the magazine and the grain that had after energetic efforts only just been stored there.[75]

Before the Great Wrath

After the destruction of Helsinki, supplying the armed forces in Finland became a more difficult task. The naval squadron,

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[72] RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 24, Jobst Huecks claims.

[73] RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 24, State Treasury memorandum 23 November 1716.

[74] RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 8, Jochim Donners claims.

[75] Aalto 2016, pp. 500–501. The other men in charge were Major General Carl Gustaf Armfelt, Governor Johan Creutz and burgomaster and Quartermaster (Sw. *proviantmästare*) Henrik Tammelin.

which arrived just a day too late to prevent the Russian attack to Helsinki, still had to be supplied. However, the magazine had went up in flames and the port of Helsinki was lost.[76] This increased the chronic Swedish military problem.

The Swedish army was not prepared to fight a defensive warfare. Even though food and victuals were occasionally stored in fortresses and magazines for garrison troops, a systematic supply system with strategically located magazines was introduced only in the mid-18th century. Therefore, no distinctive magazine supply system existed for war on home soil at the time of the Great Northern War. During the 17th century, the Swedes had almost entirely fought in enemy territory, where the armed forces were sustained mainly by contributions and plunder. During the Great Northern War, this was also the case for the main army, which in 1702–1708 could supply itself moving around in Polish territories.[77] Finland, however, was poor and could not support a large army.

In this difficult situation, the crown had to rely even more on Frisius and other merchants. Commander-in-chief Georg Lybecker took the initiative. He was once again in charge of the Finnish army and had used Frisius and other merchants already in Viipuri. In practice, supply of the armed forces in Finland was privatised to Johan Henrik Frisius. He obtained means and goods in his own name and sent the receipts to authorities in Stockholm. Letters written to Charles XII by Lybecker and his successor, Major General Carl Armfelt, show that Frisius was responsible for purchases

[76] RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 14, Chamber College memorandum 13 July 1714.

[77] Kuvaja 2013, p. 49; Frost 2000, pp. 281–282, 315–317. On magazines in Finland, see Hatakka 2019. During the Norwegian campaigns 1716–1718 magazines played, however, a central role in supplying the Swedish troops, see Florén, Dahlgren & Lindegren 1992, pp. 200–210.

for both the army and the navy until the Battle of Napue/Storkyro in February 1714.[78]

According to Armfelt, who took command in August 1713 when Lybecker was dismissed, the army would have perished without the efforts of Frisius. He organised provisions like grain and dried meat, but also other important necessities like tobacco, salt and horseshoes. He was assisted by Commissary General Lars Malm, who focused on the administrative and fiscal aspects, while Frisius travelled around and took care of purchases. Frisius discussed with the burghers in Ostrobothnian towns and with their help managed to improve the clothing of the troops.

The key to Frisius's success was his credit. Armfelt described how repressive methods do not function in order to supply the army, as they usually made the common people to hide or deny their possessions. Frisius, in turn, managed through his accountability to acquire whatever there still was to be had in the country, even though it demanded a lot of travelling along the coasts and the countryside.[79]

The navy was also satisfied. Frisius organised its supply, and the navy was surprised by the good quality of the goods, which kept the crew in good health. During the autumn of 1713, however, Frisius's means were out, and in January 1714 he planned to travel to Stockholm in order to receive payments from the crown.[80] In addition, it was more and more difficult to get loans from other merchants, like the Nyen burghers. Most of them had at this point fled to Stockholm and probably pressured Frisius to repay his

[78] RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 14, Major General Carl Armfelt to Charles XII 19 January 1714; Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.

[79] RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 14, Major General Carl Armfelt to Charles XII 19 January 1714; Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.

[80] RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 14, Major General Carl Armfelt to Charles XII 19 January 1714; Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.

earlier loans.[81] However, Armfelt convinced Frisius to stay with the army for a few months more. Frisius's travel to Stockholm was also delayed by the Battle of Napue/Storkyro in February 1714, where Russian forces won a decisive victory. Before the battle, Frisius promised one month's salary to all soldiers and officers. It greatly improved the morale of the troops, but it was not enough to prevent a military defeat.[82]

Frisius got regularly in trouble with his creditors because the crown had difficulties in liquidating his claims. He wrote continuously to the central government in Stockholm and pleaded in subservient words to get at least some of his loans repaid. In other case, he would lose his creditworthiness and not be able to organise cash and necessities to the armed forces. Frisius struggled with this problem during the whole war.[83]

In 1715, for example, he applied the State Treasury (Sw. Statskontoret) to liquidate at least some of his claims, altogether 16,500 silver dalers, in order to keep his creditworthiness. Frisius stated that he had financed the Finnish troops both with his own means and by providing credit. However, in 1715 he was in Stockholm, where he discussed his financial situation in the Chamber College. Frisius declared his loyalty to the king and assured that he would continue to supply the army. In addition, he did not prefer to be repaid at the expense of the Finnish troops, while this would make his attempts to supply the army even greater.[84]

Interestingly, Frisius's motives as a supplier and creditor have been presented in different ways in earlier research. The debate is a part of the discussion of whether burghers who supported states should be considered patriots or mere war profiteers.[85]

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[81] Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.

[82] Hornborg 1953, pp. 203–213; Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.

[83] Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.

[84] RA, Kammarkollegiet, Skrivelser från Kammarkollegiet, 1134:4:89, Chamber College to Charles XII 18.3.1715. However, the State Treasury did not recommend Frisius's proposal.

[85] Hårdstedt 2006, pp. 133–135; Hårdstedt 2002, pp. 261–264, 282. See also the introduction chapter in this book with references.

Antti Kujala has doubted that Frisius was motivated by patriotic reasons, even though military commanders and Frisius himself highlighted this aspect to the central government in Stockholm. According to Kujala, Frisius profited from the interest the crown had to pay him.[86] Yet, Jakob Jakobsson and Anna Guttorp have pointed out that Frisius did not always receive his claims with interest. In addition, his merchant activities were seriously disrupted, which on several occasions almost ruined him.[87]

Frisius's patriotism is difficult to evaluate. He was indeed very loyal to the crown, but, at the same time, financing the war effort and organising supply to the armed forces was a way to continue business in a situation where the political situation made normal trading difficult. Credits and supply were probably not very profitable for Frisius in pure economic terms. In this case, David Parrott's emphasis on profit as the principal motivation for offering credit and services to the state is not adequate.[88] In fact, many scholars have pointed out that there was not much profit in supporting the state. Seppo Aalto notes that war supplies were not a gold vein for the burghers in Helsinki, but they prevented them from falling into poverty.[89] And, as Martin Hårdstedt has pointed out, the crown paid quite low prices for deliveries to the army.[90]

It is also possible that Frisius became so deeply involved in supporting the crown that it was difficult for him to return to his previous life as a merchant. However, Frisius gained a lot of social status through his hard work for the crown. He was

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[86] Kujala 2001, p. 256. See also Aalto 2016, p. 489.

[87] Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d. See also Jakobsson & Guttorp 2013. Teemu Keskisarja and Eirik Hornborg also highlights the patriotic aspect in Frisius's activity, see Keskisarja 2019, in particular p. 88; Hornborg 1953, pp. 110–111, 203–204.

[88] Parrott 2012, pp. 241–250.

[89] Aalto 2016, p. 491.

[90] Hårdstedt 2002, p. 253. However, Hårdstedt's research deals with the Finnish War 1808–1809.

ennobled and after the war appointed governor of Kymenkartano and Savonlinna Province (Sw. Kymmenegårds och Nyslotts län).[91]

In the autumn of 1714, most parts of Finland were occupied by the Russians. At the same time, Frisius returned from Stockholm to the Finnish troops, which were retreating to Västerbotten. He continued to supply the Finnish attachments until the end of the war, and again during the catastrophic campaign to Norway in 1718, when thousands of soldiers froze to death in the mountains.[92]

There is not a lot of knowledge of the activities of the other former Nyen burghers regarding the years of the Great Wrath (1714–1721). At least Henrik Luhr, Jobst Hueck, Jochim Donner, and Carl Dobbin resided in Stockholm, where they constituted a tight network.[93] However, the years in Stockholm have not yet been properly studied and it is not clear to what degree they participated in supplying armed forces. Documents in the Chamber College archives imply that it continued. In 1718, Henrik Luhr delivered wood, some of it intended for brewing, to a royal purchase deputation (Sw. Upphandlingsdeputationen) in Stockholm.[94]

Financing and Supplying War through Improvisation

Burghers with a background in the town of Nyen took part in financing and supplying the Swedish army during the Great Northern War, in particular regarding military units in Finland from 1708 to 1714. The former Nyen burghers spread around the coastal towns from Viipuri to Stockholm and became more and more involved in deliveries to the crown.

It is evident that above all Johan Henrik Frisius had extraordinary skills in supplying and financing armed forces, even though

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[91] Mäkelä-Alitalo 2014.

[92] Hornborg 1953, pp. 225–272; Jakobsson & Guttorp n.d.

[93] Möller & Luther 1981.

[94] RA, Kammarkollegiet, Försträckningar och leveranser efter 1680 Serie A, 522:95–96, vol. 30, Henrik Luhr's claims. Henrik Luhr's son Jürgen applied for the claim to be liquidated in 1734.

commanders-in-chief Lybecker and Armfelt probably exaggerated his importance to support his efforts to receive payments in Stockholm. Frisius became deeply involved in state administration by war financing efforts, and acted more and more as a crown servant, while his personal trade faded, especially after the loss of Helsinki in 1713. His merchant skills were, however, of great benefit in his efforts to supply the army. Frisius used his personal networks, both to the West European merchant houses and to local merchant partners, not the least those from Nyen.

The former burghers from Nyen were essential in providing supply for the armed forces in Viipuri and Helsinki. After Finland was occupied by the Russians in 1714 the Nyen network seems to have faded, but it became relevant after the Treaty of Uusikaupunki (Sw. Nystad) in 1721. When Frisius was appointed governor in Southeastern Finland, he recruited former Nyen burghers to key positions, in particular to Hamina, the new Swedish centre for Russian transit trade.[95]

During the Great Northern War, the loss of the eastern Baltic provinces, in particular the Russian conquest of Ingria, transformed Finland once again to a border region. Since the Treaty of Stolbova in 1617, Finland had had a protected strategic position, the Russo-Swedish War 1656–1658 exempted. Thus, a functional supply organisation for wartime troops in Finland was lacking. In addition, the fortresses in Finland were in decay. This was problematic not only for their military capacity but also for supply reasons. The fortresses were centres where grain, victuals, ammunition and weapons were stored.[96]

Therefore, the armed forces in Finland had to be supplied with ad hoc solutions. Governors, military commanders and war commissioners had to improvise to provide food, clothes and ammunition. This proved to be more or less impossible, since Finland was relatively poor, with forest as its main natural resource. It could not support a large army for a long period, even though

[95] Kepsu 2020, pp. 141–145.
[96] Mickwitz & Paaskoski 2005, pp. 17–18.

the activity of burghers and other suppliers eased the situation.[97] These problems also became evident for Peter the Great after the Russians had occupied Finland. As Christer Kuvaja has shown, the Russians supplied their troops in Finland mainly with commodities from Russia, transported by the Russian galley fleet.[98]

In general, the case of the Nyen burghers as suppliers and creditors strengthens earlier analyses that the state in many ways tried to use private individuals with economic power and transnational networks to support the state apparatus. In wartime, merchants were particularly important when the situation required improvisation. The absolutist early modern states, like the Swedish Realm, often referred to as power states, were relatively effective in recruiting troops but not in supplying them. In Northern Europe, where resources were scarce, merchants could find a way to profit in supplying military units and financing the war. However, profit margins were not high, and repayment was insecure and time-consuming. Therefore, it seems that burghers were not particularly eager to support the state until the military situation was more or less desperate and normal trade did not function properly.

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[97] The relative poverty of Finland and Northern Europe in general has been emphasised by many scholars; see e.g. Perlestam 2018, pp. 44–48; Kuvaja 2013, pp. 48–49; Hårdstedt 2002, pp. 36–37; Frost 2000, pp. 281, 315–317.

[98] Kuvaja 2002; Kuvaja 1999, pp. 276–278.

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CHAPTER 4

The Sales of Crown Farms and State Finances 1580–1808

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Early modern states were important landowners throughout the Nordic countries after the Reformation. In the mid-17th century, over half of all farms in Denmark and Norway were owned by the crown. In Sweden and Finland, the share of crown farms was at its highest level at the turn of the 18th century. As many as 70% of all farms in Finland were crown farms after the Great Northern War (1700–1721). In Sweden, the corresponding percentage was 36 in 1700.

The high proportion of state landowning in Finland resulted mainly from the large-scale desertion of farms during the severe famine years of 1695–1697, when approximately one-quarter of the population died. According to statutes, the crown was entitled to confiscate freeholding farms if the owner failed to pay taxes for three consecutive years. Hundreds of freehold farms also became crown farms in Norrland between 1695 and 1725 because

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of tax arrears. Most of the crown farms in Sweden, however, were former Church estates confiscated by King Gustav Vasa (r. 1523–1560) after the Reformation.[1]

This chapter discusses the selling of such a massive amount of landed property during the 18th century in Sweden and Finland. The operation was called *skatteköp* by contemporaries, literally meaning tax purchase. The term refers to the fact that every crown farm that was bought during the operation was converted into a 'tax farm' (Sw. *skattehemman*), i.e. into a freeholding farm that the owner was entitled to bequeath to his or her offspring. The focus of the chapter is on state finances. The principal objective of the chapter is to analyse the role of *skatteköp* in the Swedish public economy and to illustrate that, initially, the entire phenomenon was closely related to the war economy. The Swedish crown began to sell its farms in 1701 to finance its war efforts, and after the year 1719 to amortise the public debt generated by extensive military spending during the Great Northern War.

Several other European states also resorted to the same method of raising finances during the 16th and 17th centuries. The heavily indebted Danish government was obliged to alienate crown estates to its creditors after the mid-17th century for several million Danish rigsdalers. These sales signified a massive transfer of landed property from the public domain to private landowners, mainly to wealthy burgers and noble officers from Copenhagen, northern Germany, and the Netherlands. Owing to the sales, the share of crown estates in relation to all landed property decreased from 50% to 27% between 1660 and 1688. The same process also took place in Norway, which was part of Denmark until 1814.[2]

Likewise, several Tudor and Stuart kings and queens were forced to turn to crown estates to finance their warfare on the continent and on the British Isles. The sales began in the 1540s when King

[1] Jutikkala 1976, p. 359; Hermansson 1979; Myking & Rasmussen 2010, pp. 289–293.

[2] Jespersen 2000, pp. 96–97; Myking & Rasmussen 2010, pp. 292–293; Olsson & Morell 2010, p. 315.

Henry VIII sold most of the estates he had confiscated from the Church during the Reformation because he needed money for an ongoing war against France and Scotland. Alienations also continued during the 17th century, gradually altering the structure of the state budget. At the turn of the 17th century, one-third of the fiscal incomes of the English crown originated from crown estates; a hundred years later, rents and other revenues derived from the crown lands comprised only 5% of public incomes.[3] Crown lands were also sold in several German principalities after the Reformation, as well as in France during the wars of religion, despite the fact that French kings were not allowed to sell crown property without the consent of the parliament.[4]

This is not the first work to argue that the selling of crown farms was closely connected to state finances. Eli F. Heckscher mentions in his pioneering article on *skatteköp* that the operation was motivated by fiscal goals during the Great Northern War. Also, Eino Jutikkala briefly refers to fiscal needs in some of his writings.[5] However, no scholar has actually investigated the motivations for selling crown farms before. Most studies concentrate on the legislation regulating the sales as well as on the actual selling process, focusing on who the buyers were, what their social backgrounds were, and what the average sales prices were.[6]

Additionally, the social and economic consequences of the sales have been analysed to some extent. According to Heckscher, the extensive sales of crown farms were decisive for the strengthening of peasants' political influence in 19th-century Sweden. Owing to *skatteköp*, peasant farmers were able to dominate the second chamber of the reformed parliament after 1866, when national voting and eligibility rights were determined by income or real estate ownership. Mats Olsson and Patrick Svensson argue that the

[3] Hoyle 1992; Elton 1997, p. 196; O'Brien & Hunt 1999, pp. 60–61.
[4] Vann 1984, p. 228; Cohn 1987, pp. 167–174; Bonney 1995, pp. 447–448.
[5] Heckscher 1944, p. 111; Jutikkala 1963.
[6] Rydeberg 1985; Kyle 1987.

process also had economic consequences, at least in Scania, where the productivity of agriculture increased from the 1780s onwards. Their conclusion is based on the fact that freehold farms produced more than crown farms in Scania during that period of time.[7]

Markku Kuisma likewise emphasises the economic effects by underlining the close relationship between forest-based industry and the sales of crown land. Most crown farms were sold to peasant farmers, and, when the forest prices began to rise at end of the 19th century, freeholding peasants were able to benefit from the economic upturn, and thus the operation quite probably reduced economic inequality in industrialising Finland.[8]

The purpose of this chapter is to point out that there was also a seller involved in the process, and that by analysing the motivation of the seller it is possible to complement the picture we have of *skattetköp*, which formed one of the most significant reorganisations of land ownership in Sweden and Finland during the early modern period.

Historical Background

Most of the crown farms in Sweden and Finland were sold during the 18th and 19th centuries. The roots of the phenomenon, however, are to be found in the 1580s, when John III (Sw. Johan III), the king of Sweden (r. 1569–1592), began to sell crown farms to finance an ongoing war against Russia. The first regulations were enacted in March 1582. During that time, the crown owned approximately one-third of all farms in Sweden. In Finland, the share of crown land was much lower, only 2–3%. Over 90% of farms belonged to freeholding peasants during the late 16th century.

There are several reasons why the sales began during the 1580s. The state budget was constantly running a deficit during the 1570s and 1580s because of a lengthy military campaign against Russia.

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[7] Heckscher 1944, p. 103; Olsson & Morell 2010, p. 332; Olsson & Svensson 2010, p. 291.

[8] Kuisma 2006; Bengtsson et al. 2018.

The most important fiscal revenues came from taxes and custom duties, as well as from the sales of copper and iron. The flows of public money, however, were not enough to cover the expenses stemming from the recruiting of foreign mercenaries, from the transporting of troops and from the maintenance of the navy and army. King John III and his administration tried to borrow money from European credit markets, but these efforts were not successful and the king had to resort to other means, including debasement, the outsourcing of iron production, the pledging of crown estates as collateral for silver and cash, and the direct selling of crown farms.[9]

Also, the taxation burden increased during the Russo-Swedish War of 1570–1595. The Swedish system of taxation consisted of permanent taxes, such as annual rent (*jordeboksräntan*), and temporary taxes, such as contributions (war taxes) and auxiliary taxes. When the government wanted to levy a new auxiliary tax – a common occurrence during the 16th and 17th centuries – it had to consult the Swedish Parliament (Sw. Riksdag) and its four estates: nobility, clergy, burghers and peasants.

Until the late 16th century, most of the taxes paid by the peasant population were permanent taxes, the most important of which was the annual rent. After the 1570s, however, the share of auxiliary taxes rose, and by the end of the century over half of all taxes collected by the state in Finland were temporary wartime taxes. The burden was so high that hundreds of peasant families were incapable of managing their obligations, and the fiscal desertion of farms increased rapidly. The extent of desertion varied, but in some regions as many as 30% or even 50% of farms were unable to settle their taxes during the early years of the 16th century.[10]

The sales of crown farms during the reign of John III were called *bördsrättsköp*, which can be translated as the sales of hereditary rights. These sales were highly regulated. A peasant who bought

[9] Odén 1955, pp. 354–375; Odén 1967, pp. 10–12; Loit 1979; Hallenberg 2008, p. 44.

[10] Jutikkala 1963; Seppälä 2009.

a crown farm during the 1580s and 1590s was entitled to transfer the farm to his offspring after the purchase. He was also allowed to sell the farm, but only to other peasants, and he was not allowed to ask for more money than he had paid to the crown in the *börds-rättsköp*. The nobility was not allowed to participate in these land markets. It should be underlined that the state did not lose anything in the process in fiscal terms because the annual rent and other obligations remained unchanged. Geographically speaking, the sales were relatively common in central Sweden. In the province of Upland, for instance, one-fifth of all crown farms were bought between 1582 and 1587. In other parts of Sweden, the sales were much rarer, and they were forbidden altogether in Finland and Estonia, as well as in the regions conquered from Russia.[11]

The sales of crown farms continued again after 1623. This time the phenomenon was called *skatteköp*. The sales were again closely connected to the Swedish war economy, this time to fund the military campaigns in Poland and Germany. During the same period, the government also sought to benefit from crown lands by other means. In 1622, the king began to sell crown farms to the nobility. Tax revenues from freeholding farms were also sold. These sales (Sw. *frälseköp*) differed from *skatteköp* in that the former were intended only for the nobility, while the latter were open to all non-noble classes in Swedish society, including peasants, merchants and industrialists. Another difference had to do with fiscal revenues. When a noble officer bought a crown farm, the peasant living on that farm began to pay most of his obligations to him. The state only received the sale price. In contrast, after *skatteköp* the fiscal revenues continued to flow to the treasury as before.[12]

The *frälseköp* purchases were quite important during the Swedish offensive in Poland. In the 1620s, the state derived half of its cash income from these sales. In 1624, the share of *frälseköp* accounted for as much as 60% of all incomes. No scholars have studied the

[11] Loit 1979.

[12] Brännman 1950; Rydeberg 1985, pp. 39–41.

importance of *skatteköp*, though revenues were probably much smaller considering that the sales were relatively infrequent in most provinces of the realm outside central Sweden. Little research has been done on the topic, but it seems as if most sales were concentrated in the provinces of Värmland, Närke, Östra Götaland and Västra Götaland. In Finland, in all probability not a single farm was sold.[13]

The Swedish Realm also continued its aggressive foreign policy after the 1630s. It participated in the Thirty Years War, and it fought against Poland, Denmark, Russia, Austria and Brandenburg between 1655 and 1661. The final military campaign of the 17th century took place Scania in 1675–1679. All these operations, however, were financed by resorting to means other than selling crown farms because the Royal Regency Council forbade the sales in May 1639. The motivations behind the decision are not known. Probably the regency wanted to stop the sales because the crown farms were needed for other purposes, namely for the noble officers who had distinguished themselves on the continental battlefields: A significant number of farms and fiscal revenues were donated to nobility by the regency and later on by Queen Christina (r. 1644–1654). The *frälseköp* purchases continued until the 1680s.[14]

The Sales During the Great Northern War

The third and the last phase in the history of *skatteköp* began in the spring of 1701, one year after the onset of the Great Northern War. This time the sales were also part of the Swedish war economy. In March 1701, King Charles XII (Sw. Karl XII), residing

[13] Bergström 1920, pp. 45–47; Brännman 1950, pp. 245–260; Rydeberg 1985, pp. 39–41.

[14] The sales of crown farms did not stop totally in May 1639. A few farms were sold to iron works during the 17th century. The extent of such sales is not known, however. Kuylenstierna 1916, pp. 104–106; Karlsson 1990, pp. 158–159.

in a winter camp in present-day Estonia, wrote to the Chamber College (Sw. Kammarkollegiet), the most important central agency in all issues related to taxation and crown properties, ordering the agency to initiate the sales once again because he needed more resources for his campaign in Livonia. He mentions in his letter that other former monarchs had also resorted to the same method in wartime situations.[15]

The king's order was based on a memorandum composed at the Chamber College in the autumn of 1700. In this document, the sales were justified not just as a means to collect money for the ongoing war but also on the grounds that the state had nothing to lose in the trade. Every silver daler (hereinafter abbreviated sd.) that the state was able to obtain from the sales was pure profit because peasants continued to pay their rent as before. Thus, the logic was the same as with the *bördsrätt* sales. Furthermore, the members of the Chamber College estimated that peasant farmers would settle their taxes more reliably after the *skatteköp*, because they did not want to forfeit the newly acquired property immediately to the crown. As mentioned above, the crown was entitled to confiscate a freeholding farm after three years of tax arrears. This legal norm was abandoned in 1789.

Both arguments reveal that state officials saw the crown lands as a source of fiscal revenues and not as capital having the potential to produce something more than just tax yields. Therefore, from the crown's point of view, it did not matter who owned the farms in Sweden: the state or private persons. The Chamber College even considered that peasants would cultivate the farms better when they knew for sure that all their efforts to ameliorate the farm economy would also benefit their offspring.[16]

It was not a coincidence that the sales began in the spring of 1701. The Privy Council (Sw. Riksrådet) was desperately looking for new sources of income at the beginning of the second year of war, because thus far expenditures had far outstripped available

[15] Bergström 1919 vol. II, p. 79.
[16] Bergström 1919 vol. II, pp. 189–192.

incomes. The Privy Council and the Chamber College wrote to the king in February 1701 that, according to their estimation, the budget deficit would be eight million sd. in 1701. There were several reasons behind the deficit. Severe crop failures and outright famine in the 1690s continued to negatively impact public finances in 1701 because many peasants had difficulties in paying their annual taxes. Also, the siege of Riga by Saxon troops and the associated loss of custom duties in 1700 affected the war economy.[17]

The central government in Stockholm made several proposals to the king to fix the deficit. They included the collecting of a war tax in Sweden and Finland, the launching of new loan negotiations with foreign and domestic lenders, the cutting of public spending, and the selling of crown farms. The Privy Council also expressed the desire that 'God will bless the king's righteous army', so that it would manage to extract resources from the occupied territories in Livonia and elsewhere. What was common to all these suggestions was that they had been made several times before. The collecting of war taxes was essential to the Swedish war economy throughout the 17th century, and King Charles XII had no intention of abandoning the method when he came to power in 1697. War taxes were collected almost every year from the year 1699 onwards, except for the years 1713, 1715 and 1716, when the war tax was replaced by a wealth tax based on immovable and movable property.[18]

Likewise, the government had begun borrowing money before the spring of 1701. The crown began to pledge all kinds of crown properties, such as estates, mills, fisheries and customs duties, as collateral for cash or grain and other victuals in the winter of 1700. The operation produced over two million sd. between 1700 and 1711. The selling of crown farms yielded nearly half a million sd.

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[17] Historiska handlingar 1861 vol. I, pp. 114–117; Cavallie 1975, pp. 48–50.

[18] Historiska handlingar 1861 vol. 1, p. 130; Åmark 1961, p. 530; Cavallie 1975, pp. 53–64.

by the year 1719, meaning a profit of 27,000 sd. annually, which can be considered a relatively low figure compared to other sources of income. The contributions brought in 8.7 million sd. between 1700 and 1709, and the loans from the Bank of the Estates of the Realm (Sw. Riksens ständers bank), the national central bank, rose to 5.7 million sd. during the same time period. On the other hand, most of the crown farms were sold at the beginning of the campaign. In 1704, for instance, the crown managed to sell its farms for 300,000 sd., which was not an insignificant figure.[19]

There is also some evidence that the crown actively tried to promote the sales during the first few years of war. For instance, in the province of Göteborg and Bohus in western Sweden, the local county governor sent his representatives to the countryside to ask the farmers who actually tilled the crown farms (Sw. *kronobönder*) whether or not they were interested in buying the farms from the crown. When the peasants reported that they were too poor to redeem the farms, the representatives responded that the crown was also entitled to sell the farms to outsiders. The threat was based on law. According to the regulations, enacted in the spring of 1701, all the crown farms were to be sold in public auctions, and everybody had the right to participate in these sales, independent of his social position.

There was one exception. A farmer who lived on a crown farm being put up for sale was entitled to buy the farm if he managed to pay the same sum as the highest bidder. In practice, the sale prices were often so high that peasants were unable to participate in the auctions. One-third of all the crown farms sold were bought by officers, priests and other persons of high social standing in Sweden between 1700 and 1723. As regards Finland, only 19 crown farms were sold between 1700 and 1719. Thus, practically all the profits mentioned above came from Sweden.[20]

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[19] Brandell 1941, p. 82; Ahlström 1959, pp. 79–82; Åmark 1961, pp. 603–604; Cavallie 1975, p. 197.

[20] RA, Kammarkollegiets kansliarkiv, register över skattebrev 1701–1730 (B VI b 1, vol. 1); Kyle 1987, pp. 80–81.

The Sales of Crown Farms and Public Debt

The Great Northern War ended in August 1721. The crown continued to sell its farms, however, without interruption. This was an unusual situation, because previously the *skatteköp* sales had typically been a wartime phenomenon. Why did the central government also want to continue with the sales in peacetime? To understand the reasons, it is necessary to take a closer look at a decision made in the Diet in the spring of 1719, when hostilities were still ongoing.

One of the most important questions the Diet had to address in 1719 was the heavy war debt, which is estimated to have been approximately 63 to 64 million sd. The sum was equal to all private wealth in Sweden and Finland at that time, according to the wealth tax of 1713. It is possible to clarify the magnitude of the debt by comparing the sum to the state budget. According to estimates made during the spring of 1719, the fiscal incomes for the ongoing year were to be 3.5 million sd., that is to say, just over a twentieth the size of the debt. In reality, incomes increased to eight million sd. in 1719. The prospects, however, were much worse in April 1719, when members of the Diet discussed settling the national debt.[21]

The debt consisted of several elements, and the structure of liabilities is highly telling in terms of the Swedish war economy during the Great Northern War. Several public institutions, such as the churches, schools and poorhouses, had been obliged to loan cash and valuables to the crown. For instance, churches had been ordered to give to the state all the silver objects that were not needed for services. Officers and civil servants had been given promissory notes as compensation for unpaid salaries, and several wealthy families as well as foreign bankers and merchants from the Netherlands, France, England and Austria had lent money to the king. The sultan of the Ottoman Empire was also among the creditors, because King Charles XII had spent several years in exile in the Ottoman Empire after the defeat in Poltava.[22]

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[21] Axelson 1888, p. 132; Malmström 1893, p. 120; Åmark 1961, pp. 598–599; Fregert & Gustafsson 2008, p. 4.

[22] Julén 1916, pp. 9–23.

The single most significant element consisted of coin tokens (Sw. *nödmynt*, literally meaning emergency coins) and coin notes (Sw. *myntsedlar*) issued in 1715–1719. As regards the coins, the value of the copper metal from which they were minted was only 0.5–1% of their face value. This was not the first time token coins had been used to finance military campaigns in the Swedish Realm. King John III had also issued debased coins in the early 1590s. The idea behind such emergency coins was that the state would redeem the coins at their full value after the war had ended. That was not the case, however. The Diet decided in April 1719 that all the coin tokens valued at one sd. would be redeemed for another token coin valued at two öre silvermynt (1 sd. = 32 öre silvermynt) and a note valued at 14 öre silvermynt. The decision meant that the token coins were devalued by 50%. The same principles were followed for coin notes. As a whole, the redemption of coin tokens and coin notes cost the government nearly 27 million sd.[23]

The Diet made another important decision in April 1719 concerning public debt. It decided to establish a special department for the purpose of redeeming the coins and notes and ultimately paying the liabilities to all the creditors in a special order specified in the statutes. The department was first called the Office of the Estates (Sw. Riksens ständers kontor) and later renamed the National Debt Office (Sw. Riksgäldskontoret). The Diet also decided to channel several flows of revenues to the office. The most important source of income was a new tax called *lön- och betalningsavgift*, which was a personal auxiliary tax somewhat similar to a contribution. The level of taxation was determined according to one's social position. High-ranking officers and bishops had to pay more than ordinary peasant farmers. The second most important source of revenue was an extra customs duty (Sw. *licenten*), which was collected upon all imported goods. This new tax was also collected for such exports as copper, iron, timber, tar and grain.[24]

The sales of crown farms constituted the third most important source of revenue for the office. The idea to use *skatteköp* profits to

[23] Åmark 1961, pp. 4–5, 683.

[24] Julén 1916, pp. 35–41; Åmark 1961, pp. 676–682.

amortise public debt was probably first proposed by senior judge (Sw. *lagman*) Bernhard Cederholm in a meeting of the Secret Council on 8 April. The secret council was the most powerful committee of the Diet, and most of the bills were first discussed there before the Estates took a stand on the issue. Other members of the committee supported the proposition, and later, in May 1719, the Estates confirmed the new application of the *skatteköp* payments.[25]

The decision had far-reaching effects. All the *skatteköp* payments were used to repay government debt throughout the 18th century, except for the year 1764 and the years 1773–1789, when the sales were forbidden. After that, the sales continued in Sweden without interruption until the 20th century. In Finland, the situation changed in 1809 when the country became part of the Russian Empire. Henceforth, the payments were used as any other public incomes, because the newly born Grand Duchy of Finland refused to take any responsibility for public debt originating before 1809.

The fact that the sale of crown farms was linked to the amortisation of public debt did not mean that all members of the political elite supported the sales after 1719. Members of the noble estate in particular criticised the continuation of the operation on several occasions during the 18th century. The aristocracy thought that it would be better to use the crown farms to support the manufacturing industry and manorial economy than to sell the farms cheaply to the peasantry. Critics often had a personal stake in the debate.

Johan Ehrenpreus, an arms factory owner and a leader of the maritime customs house (Sw. Stora sjötullen) in Stockholm, wrote a long memorandum to the Diet in 1723, in which he asked the Estates to stop the sales once and for all because, in his opinion, it would become more difficult to manage iron works if all the farms around industrial plants were freeholding farms. Ehrenpreus wanted to remind the Estates that iron works needed two things above all: raw materials and cheap labour. He argued

[25] RA, Frihetstidens utskottshandlingar, Sekreta utskottets protokoll 8.4.1719, fol. 119–137 (mf. KA); Staf 1945 vol. I, p. 116; Thanner 1980 vol. V, p. 62.

that the sale of crown farms made it difficult to fulfil both these needs because freeholding farmers asked higher prices than the farmers of crown estates. He also wrote that the sales violated the privileges guaranteed to the manufacturing industry in 1668. According the statute, the founders of textile factories, glassworks and other manufactures were allowed to ask the crown to donate land to them to facilitate raw material acquisitions. In Ehrenpreus's opinion, such privileges would be of no use if all the farms were freeholding farms.[26]

As regards the manorial economy, Ehrenpreus referred to the privileges of the nobility. This law-like prerogative enabled the aristocracy to change their tax-exempt farms (Sw. *frälsehemman*) into crown farms when located near manors to facilitate the emergence of large and integrated stretches of cultivation. According to Ehrenpreus, the *skatteköp* legislation was inconsistent with the prerogative because such changes were only possible so long as crown farms were available in the vicinity of manors.[27]

Ehrenpreus's objective did not win support from his fellow members of the nobility. All the estates endorsed continuing the sales of crown farms in the Diet of 1723. However, a new law enacted during the same year did satisfy several of his goals. According to the statute, the owners of metal works and manufacturers had a pre-emptive right to the crown farms of surrounding area, and owners of cavalry farms (Sw. *rusthåll*), i.e. farms that provided a cavalryman, horses and equipment for the crown in exchange for a partial tax exemption, had a similar pre-emptive right to their auxiliary farms (Sw. *augmentshemman*). Both these prerogatives advanced the development of large domains in Sweden and Finland. The owners of iron works in particular managed to enlarge their landholdings by purchasing large numbers of crown farms during the 18th century.[28]

Twice, critics managed to prevent the sales altogether. The first time the sales were abolished in December 1763. The principal

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[26] Bergström 1919 vol. II, pp. 216–218.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Laine 1950; Karlsson 1990.

reason was a heavy rate of inflation caused by the Swedish Realm's involvement in the anti-Prussian alliance during the Seven Years War (1756–1763). The war effort was mainly financed by borrowing money from the central bank. According to Patrick Winton, the loans from the central bank covered 44% of military expenditures in 1757–1764, while the share of French subsidies, the second most important resource base, was 20%. The central bank paid for the loan by issuing new bank notes. The number of notes in circulation increased from 13.8 million sd. in 1755 to 44 million sd. in 1763, causing a rapid depreciation of the Swedish currency in relation to the most important foreign currencies, such as the Hamburger reichstaler, and consequently the cost of living increased throughout the Swedish Realm especially after 1759.[29]

The Privy Council reacted to the situation by abolishing the sales of crown farms for the time being, because the sale prices did not follow the overall rate of inflation, and consequently the crown lost money in every transaction. The argumentation was based on the fact that the level of *skatteköp* payments was tied to the annual rent paid by crown farmers. In Sweden, the minimum price was equal to six years of annual rent payments from 1723 onwards; in Finland, the minimum price was equivalent to three years' rent beginning after the year 1741. The prices of freeholding farms, however, were set by the markets, which meant that buyers were able to use the system to their benefit.

The council was under the impression that people were buying crown farms at low prices just to resell them at profit soon thereafter. As a solution, the Privy Council suggested that, in the future, all crown farms should be sold at auctions, as had happened during the Great Northern War. The government reminded the Estates that the purpose of the sales was to collect funding for repayment of the public debt and not to take care of the security of the peasant farmers, 'since the farmers were secure enough as long as they cultivated the crown farms according to the law'.[30]

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[29] Jörberg 1972, pp. 75–90; Winton 2012.

[30] Paloposki 1976, pp. 216–217.

The abolishing of the sale of crown farms was short-lived at the end. The Diet decided to rescind the decision in 1765 with the support of all the non-noble estates (peasants, clergy and burghers), and no alterations were made to the pricing policy. The peasant estate participated most actively in the process. Members of the clergy and burgher estates decided to support the peasants mainly for tactical purposes, as they wanted to count on peasants' support on issues important for them. Several members of the nobility would have liked to continue the decision to abolish sales made by the Privy Council, but they did not manage to find enough support for their views from the other estates.[31]

The sale of crown farms was abolished for a second time in October 1773, one year after the coup d'état of King Gustav III. This time, too, the ban was justified by referring to low sales prices. The Chamber College complained in 1779 that the *skatteköp* process had enabled private persons to become rich at the expense of the crown, because the sales prices had constantly been far below the market prices. The college also argued that the sales were inconsistent with the privileges of nobility and the manufacturing industry, just like Johan Ehrenpreus had argued 50 years earlier.[32] The new political situation affected the outcome, too. The coup put an end to the Age of Liberty (1719–1772), the period of early parliamentarism in Swedish history, meaning that the peasants were less capable of having an impact on domestic policies. The Diet convened rarely, and it was the king, not the parliament, who was the supreme exerciser of power in the realm.

The ban was in force until the winter of 1789. During that time, King Gustav III was at war against Russia, and he had to summon the Diet in order to obtain more resources for his war efforts.

The central bank was unable to lend enough money to the king, and foreign investors in the Dutch Republic and Genoa were not as eager to give credit as they had been in the 1770s and early 1780s. The king did not see any other alternative but to ask the Diet to accept a new financial programme consisting of a new war

[31] Kyle 1987, pp. 184–185.

[32] Bergström 1919 vol. II, pp. 427, 436–437, 456.

tax and new government debt of twenty million riksdalers, which the Estates promised to take over the administration of. To win over the peasants, the king promised to support several of their demands, including the withdrawal of the sales ban on crown farms. The withdrawal was put into force in February 1789.[33]

Sale Revenues in 1701–1808

Since the *raison d'être* of the sales of crown farms was fiscal at base, at least at the beginning of the operation, it is of interest to investigate how much the sales produced for the treasury. The results are summarised in Table 4.1.

A couple of remarks are in order before analysing the results any further. First, the figures are chiefly derived from the nominal ledgers of the National Debt Office, founded in May 1719 by the Diet.[34] Until 1777, the official accounting unit was silver daler; after the monetary reform of 1777, the principal unit was silver riksdaler (Sw. *riksdaler specie*). The official conversion rate was six to one (6 sd. = 1 riksdaler specie). However, after 1789 the National Debt Office began to issue riksdaler paper notes (Sw. *riksdaler riksgälds*) to finance the ongoing warfare with Russia. These notes could be converted into silver riksdalers, but their value began to fall during the late 1790s, and until 1803 the silver standard was de facto replaced by a multi-currency with varying exchange rates. In 1789, for instance, the premium was 1–7%, and in 1798 approximately 50%. The National Debt Office used both currencies in its bookkeeping, and as a consequence it has been necessary to convert all the figures expressed in *riksdaler riksgälds* into *riksdaler specie*.[35]

Secondly, the column 'returns' in the table refers to the fact that the National Debt Office was obliged to return a varying sum of *skatteköp* payments to the countryside each year. Most of the

[33] Åmark 1961, p. 633; Winberg 1985, pp. 187–189; Gärdebo 2009.

[34] About the organisational changes see Åmark 1961.

[35] The conversion is done using the exchange rates calculated by Rodney Edvinsson. See Edvinsson 2010, p. 209.

returns probably resulted from conflictual transactions. It was relatively common that two parties competed for the same crown farm. Sometimes it happened that both the competing parties paid the sale price to the treasury to further their chances. After the dispute was over, the Office sent the losing party's payment back.

When the returns are also taken into account, the sales of crown farms yielded altogether approximately 5.7 million sd. between 1701 and 1808. The impact of inflation is ignored here. On a yearly basis, the profits were approximately 60,900 sd., while allowing for the fact that the sales were banned between 28 October 1773 and 21 February 1789. The crown received annual incomes of the same size from the renting of the crown demesnes and other crown properties (43,000 sd.), from lighthouse and pilot taxes (43,800 sd.),

Table 4.1: Sales revenues in Sweden and Finland, 1701–1808 (nominal values).

	Revenues	**Returns**	**Total revenues**
1701–1718	481,276 sd.	no information	481,276 sd.
1719–1765	2,493,874 sd.	148,019 sd.	2,345,855 sd.
1766–1776[a]	281,273 sd.	52,839 sd.	228,434 sd.
1789–1808	441,719 rdr sp (2,650,314 sd.)	7,347 rdr sp (44,082 sd.)	434,372 rdr sp (2,606,232 sd.)
Total	5,906,737 sd.	244,940 sd.	5,661,797 sd.

sd. = daler silvermynt; rdr sp = riksdaler specie (Exchange rate: 1 rdr sp = 6 sd.)

[a] Although the sales were banned in 1773–1789, the *skatteköp* payments continued to flow to the National Debt Office (Sw. Riksgäldskontoret) until 1776.

Sources: Ahlström 1959, p. 82 (1701–1718); RA, riksens ständers kontor, kammarkontoret, renskrivna huvudböcker (1719–1762); RA, riksens ständers kontor, kammarkontoret, koncepthuvudböcker (1764–1765); RA, Riksdagen 1765–1766, kontorsdeputationen (R3381); RA, statskontoret, kammarkontoret, memorialböcker över riksgälds- och manufakturfonderna (1766–1776); RA, riksgäldsarkiven, riksgäldskontoret, bokslutskontoret, renskrivna huvudböcker (1789–1808). Table by the author.

and from fines (39,200 sd.). The annual rent levied on the crown farms and freeholding farms, the most important source of fiscal income during the 18th century, yielded approximately two million sd. annually between 1722 and 1776. In that respect, the profits were relatively small.[36]

The best way to place the profits in perspective is to compare the *skatteköp* payments to other revenues obtained by the National Debt Office. As mentioned before, the Diet assigned the Office the task of collecting several sources of income in 1719, including a new personal tax called the *lön- och betalningsavgift*, an extra custom duty (Sw. *licenten*) and the *skatteköp* payments. Other smaller resources were allocated to the Office as well, such as the incomes generated by the auctions of booties and by the sales of captured merchant vessels. Most of the proceeds came from the *lön- och betalningsavgift* tax and the custom duty between 1719 and 1765. They accounted for nearly 90% of all incomes. The share of the *skatteköp* payments was 6%.[37]

The proportions were approximately the same between 1766 and 1776, although the data is more fragmentary. No nominal ledgers have been preserved; only two memorial books are available that contain information on the three most important sources of income. According to these books, the share of the *skatteköp* payments was only 3%. Most of the incomes originated from the *lön- och betalningsavgift* tax.[38]

After 1789, the income structure of the National Debt Office changed significantly, as the crown began to collect a new extraordinary tax (Sw. *bevillning*) in the middle of the Russo-Swedish War of 1788–1790. This new tax, the collection of which also continued after the war, was by far the most important source of income for the Office, yielding nearly 30 million silver riksdalers between 1789 and 1808. Its share was nearly 70% of all revenues.

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[36] Åmark 1961, pp. 417–418, 433.

[37] Åmark 1961, pp. 689–701.

[38] RA, Statskontoret, Kammarkontoret, Memorialböcker över riksgälds- och manufakturfonderna (1766–1776).

The *lön- och betalningsavgift* tax brought in 2.6 million riksdalers during the same period, forming the second most important income group. The share of the *skatteköp* payments in contrast was only 1% in 1789–1808.[39] From a fiscal standpoint, their role was relatively insignificant. The National Debt Office would also have managed perfectly well without selling a single crown farm.

The Progress of the Sales of Crown Farms

The profits of *skatteköp* were distributed quite unevenly both in terms of time and space. Most of the yields came from Sweden. This can clearly be seen in the two diagrams (Figures 4.1 and 4.2), which describe the distribution of sales revenues in the Swedish Realm between 1719 and 1808. Approximately 80% of all the proceeds originated from the Swedish provinces during that period. The geographical difference was even greater before 1719, because only a handful of crown farms were sold in Finland during the Great Northern War, as mentioned before.

The lack of interest was quite probably related to the pre-famine situation in Finland. Hundreds of freeholding farms became crown farms during the late 17th century because of the large-scale fiscal desertion rates. It would have been surprising if the crown peasants had been able to redeem the farms just a couple of years after the catastrophic famine. The Russian invasion of Finland and the subsequent military occupation put an end to the already faint interest after 1713.

As regards the post-1719 situation, the difference between Sweden and Finland partly resulted from the fact that, in Sweden, the minimum price was two times higher than in Finland after 1741. In that sense, the diagrams do not convey a totally reliable picture of the geographical differences. The *skatteköp* sales were to some extent more popular in Finland than the spread of the revenues suggests.

The geographical differences become even more obvious when looking at individual provinces. The sales of crown farms yielded the most in central and southern Sweden as well as in south-western

[39] Åmark 1961, pp. 637–639.



Figure 4.1: The total revenues from *skatteköp* sales in the Swedish realm as well as in Finland between 1719 and 1776 (sd.)

Sources: RA, Riksens Ständers kontor, Kammarkontoret, renskrivna huvudböcker (1719–1762); RA, Riksens Ständers kontor, Kammarkontoret, koncepthuvudböcker (1764–1765); RA, Riksdagen 1765–1766, kontorsdeputationen (R3381); Edvinsson & Söderberg 2010, pp. 443–447 (inflation index). Figure by the author.

Finland. In the province of Östergötland, the revenues increased to 324,019 sd., while in the province of Turku and Pori they increased to 206,190 sd. and in the province of Skaraborg to 147,461 sd. in 1719–1765. The sales revenues also exceeded one hundred thousand sd. in the provinces of Södermanland, Jönköping, Älvsborg, Malmöhus, Göteborg, Uppsala and Kristanstad. In the province of Dalarna, in contrast, the sales yielded less than six thousand sd. during the same period. The profits were relatively low also in northern Sweden and eastern Finland.[40]

The distribution was approximately the same after 1789. The National Debt Office received the greatest profits from the provinces of Östergötland (65,121 rdr sp), Kristianstad (59,095 rdr sp),

[40] See Table 4.1 for sources.

Malmöhus (52,046 rdr sp), and Turku and Pori (46,711 rdr sp). In most of the other provinces in Sweden and Finland, the revenues remained under 10,000 rdr sp. In Värmland, the proceeds were as low as 151 rdr sp between 1789 and 1808. That was by far the lowest figure in the Swedish Realm. The geographical differences reflect the prevalence of crown land in separate parts of the realm. In Dalarna, for instance, most of the farms were freeholding farms already in 1700, whereas in southern Sweden (Götaland) the share of crown land was over 40%, on average, at the beginning of the Great Northern War. In Turku and Pori, the share of crown land was over 80% in the 1720s, when the sales began to increase in Finland.[41]

When it comes to the chronology of the sales, the most striking feature is the close temporal connection between the *skatteköp* sales and military campaigns, not just during the Great Northern War but also after the year of 1721, when the sales officially had nothing to do with the Swedish war economy. Most of the sales took place during the Seven Years War (1756–1763) and during the Russo-Swedish War of 1788–1790. The connection is not a coincidence. The rapid increase in sales after the outbreak of the Seven Years War was probably a reaction to the extensive issuing of paper notes mentioned before.

The notes began to fall in value rapidly after 1755, and people tried to exchange them as quickly as possible for specie coins, making the coins very difficult to come by.[42] It is quite likely that, under these circumstances, the buying of real estate became an attractive option both in rural and urban areas. The forceful increase of *skatteköp* revenues after 1755 seems to point towards that kind of reaction. It should be noted in this connection that the increase was not caused by inflation but by real growth in sales activity, because sales prices were connected to annual taxes, which were not affected by governmental monetary policy.

Additionally, new statutes and sales bans affected the course of events. Probably the most important single new regulation was

[41] Gadd 2000, pp. 43–44.
[42] Winton 2012, p. 23.



Figure 4.2: The revenues from *skatteköp* sales in the Swedish realm in 1789–1808 (rdr sp).

Source: RA, Riksgäldsarkiven, Riksgäldskontoret, Bokslutskontoret, renskrivna huvudböcker (1789–1808). Figure by the author.

one that broadened the pre-emptive rights of the owners of cavalry farms. The statute was enacted in 1756, and it had immediate consequences for the sales process. In Sweden, every second crown farm was sold to an owner of a cavalry farm in 1761–1765.[43] It is impossible to give corresponding figures for Finland owing to gaps in the source material. Deducing from the discussions at the Diet, however, it is possible to conclude that the cavalry farm owners were active also in Finland, and that the owners were often noble officers or other persons of standing.

The rapid decrease in sales revenues afterwards was caused by a ban on sales in 1764. This is clearly seen when comparing the level of inflation to the changes in *skatteköp* revenues during the mid-18th century (see Figure 4.1). The revenues peaked four years before the inflation, and sales began to decrease after 1763

[43] Heckscher 1944, p. 116; Rydeberg 1985, pp. 99–103.

when the overall price level was still rising. As for the peak in 1790, it was evidently related to the repeal of the second sales ban. Peasants seemingly wanted to redeem the crown farms they were tilling as quickly as possible, scared that the sales window might not be open forever.

Conclusions

The large-scale selling of crown farms is often quite straightforwardly linked to the improved social and economic position of peasants in pre-industrial Sweden and Finland. The conclusion is understandable when looking at the final outcome. Tens of thousands of crown farms were sold to private persons during the 18th and 19th centuries, and most of the farms were bought by peasants actually living on these farms. In Finland, the number of farms sold was over 40,000; in Sweden, the figure must have been significantly higher.

However, the original purpose of the process was not to improve peasants' living conditions but to gather funds for ongoing military expenditures during the Great Northern War. The Swedish crown had resorted to the same means earlier, first in the 1580s and later in the 1620s. What was different during the 18th century was that the sales also continued after the war. The principal motivation was the heavy national debt caused by the war efforts between 1700 and 1718. The crown needed all available cash flows for a situation in which the national economy was in ruins.[44]

On a general level, the *skatteköp* sales were a method to mobilise private resources for warfare. From the state's point of view, the method was comparable to war taxes, debasement of coins, pledging of state property, short-term credits, or other ad hoc means to raise funding in a situation when military expenditure rose exponentially. When it comes to the actual profits, they were relatively low throughout the 18th century. Sales proceeds were probably quite essential at the very beginning of the Great Northern War, and again in 1719, when the revenues were

[44] Karonen 2008.

redirected to the National Debt Office. In general, however, the incomes were quite insignificant compared to other fiscal incomes used to finance warfare or to amortise national debt. Some members of the nobility considered that a problem during the Age of Liberty. They wanted to obtain better profits or put a stop to the sales once and for all, and twice they succeeded in halting the sales temporarily.

The principal reason why the Diet decided to continue with the sales time and again was that the continuation of the sales was extremely important for the peasant estate throughout the 18th century. So long as the other estates wanted to cooperate with peasants, it was unwise to support the sales bans.

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PART II

Military Supplies and the Countryside

CHAPTER 5

Manufacturing Saltpetre in Finland in the Late 16th and Early 17th Centuries

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Gunpowder was essential for early modern warfare. Without it, it would have been impossible to increase firepower, develop weaponry and equip the ever-growing mass armies. Scarcity of gunpowder would have been fateful for a ruler who wanted to take part in the wars in Europe or in the battle for the dominion of the seas. The rulers of the Swedish Realm shared this problem, as its rise to a north European great power would not have succeeded without an adequate and reliable supply of gunpowder.

The making of gunpowder (black powder) was not in itself especially complicated. It was manufactured by mixing and grinding together coal, sulphur and potassium nitrate, also known as saltpetre. Coal and sulphur were easily obtainable and relatively cheap

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ingredients. The problem was potassium nitrate, the key ingredient, as black powder was 67–75% saltpetre.[1] Saltpetre could be bought from dealers in the great merchant cities such as Amsterdam and Danzig, but imports were expensive and uncertain, especially in times of war – in other words, most of the time.[2] The rulers and their armies could not rely on such a risky method to obtain a product that was necessary for their existence. Historian David Cressy has compared saltpetre with oil and uranium in the modern world: no realm or country could exist without it, and the quest for saltpetre was an ongoing task for every king and government up until the development of modern explosives.[3]

Luckily, saltpetre could be also produced locally by extracting it from the most mundane of ingredients: dung and urine-soaked soil, straw and ash. The required raw materials were seemingly low-cost and abundant, but production was logistically difficult to organise, very slow, and labour-intensive.

This chapter studies how the manufacturing of saltpetre was organised in Finland in the late 16th and early 17th centuries, specifically from the Peace of Teusina in 1595 to 1629, when all the saltpetre works in Finland were leased out to a private entrepreneur. This was a key period of Swedish state-building and laying the foundation of the military great power it would become. During this period, the Swedish Realm waged wars against Russia in the east and against Poland in Prussia and in today's Baltic countries. This made Finland a strategically important area due to its central location, crucial to the upkeep of armies in the field. Finland also played an important role in the Swedish Civil Wars in the 1590s and experienced a bloody peasant war in 1597, because it formed the base of support for the displaced King Sigismund. In these turbulent times, the production of saltpetre in Finland was very important.

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[1] Kiuasmaa 1962, p. 361.

[2] Uola 1998; Cressy 2013, pp. 90–91; Parrott 2015, pp. 198–199, 214–215.

[3] Cressy 2013, pp. 1–2.

The early phase of Finnish saltpetre manufacturing was exceptional for both the means of production and for the active involvement of civilians. The crown owned and operated fairly large saltpetre factories, to which the peasants were obliged to deliver enormous quantities of raw material. By 1634, the crown had already changed the 'saltpetre tax' to a monetary payment, and peasants were no longer obliged to supply dirt and wood to the factories. After the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the need for gunpowder diminished and the required saltpetre could be imported from abroad. During the late 17th century, the production of saltpetre was revived, but now the system was based on itinerant workers, who travelled around with their equipment.[4]

This study shows how difficult saltpetre production was to organise in times of primitive administration. Although royal statutes were clear, they could not be put into action. There were problems with obtaining raw material, acquiring and maintaining equipment, and distributing the saltpetre itself. The production system could not meet the demands of the constant level of warfare, and therefore it is easy to understand why it had to be reorganised. The necessity of supplying raw materials and equipment made the factories an integral but disliked and somewhat obscure part of their local communities and the broader power structure.

Late 16th- and early 17th-century Finland was a sparsely populated, cold and economically underdeveloped land that relied on a fragile agricultural system. Towns were few and small, and the huge inland tracts were covered with forests and swamps. Finland was, however, geopolitically important because of its proximity to the Russian and Livonian fronts. The coastal areas were buzzing with activity, and the Gulf of Finland in particular was filled with maritime traffic. This formed the local scene where saltpetre factories were established. In practice, they were the first industrial ventures established in the Finnish countryside.

[4] Haggrén 2007; Uola 1998, p. 19.

Previous Research and Sources

In the late 1930s, Finnish historian Kaarlo Blomstedt complained that, despite saltpetre production's huge importance for the state and its impact on Finland, historians had not taken an interest in studying it.[5] Eighty years later, the situation is still much the same. The general picture is still very incomplete, especially concerning the 'golden age' of saltpetre works, the first decades of the 17th century.

The manufacturing of saltpetre has not been a core interest for economic or military historians – in Finland, Sweden or anywhere else. Whereas the history of mining or the manufacturing of guns has been researched extensively, the mundane process of making potassium nitrate has been almost forgotten. In Finland, the saltpetre production was hugely important in its own time, but it was also a dead-end industry – it did not develop into a more modern system. For the historians studying agrarian history and peasant societies, the production of raw materials for the factories has been a side note and seen as just another burden for the commoners. On the other hand, saltpetre has also been a side note for military historians studying the development of artillery. In recent international research, however, scholars have taken an interest in the economic and logistical aspects of military history, thereby bringing saltpetre into limelight. David Parrott writes about saltpetre as part of the international trade in army supplies in his *Business of War* (2012), and John Cressy focuses on England in his book *Saltpeter: Mother of Gunpowder* (2013).

The oldest work on the saltpetre industry and saltpetre tax in Finland is K. R. Melender's extensive study about taxation in Finland from 1617 to 1634 (1894). After Melender, it was Kaarlo Blomsted who next studied the topic and published an article (1939) about saltpetre administration in the 16th century. In 1962, Kyösti Kiuasmaa published a large volume about 16th-century officials and other employees of the crown, also including

[5] Blomstedt 1939, p. 195.

the manufacturing of saltpetre. After these earlier 'classic' works, the industry was more recently researched by Georg Haggrén in connection with the archaeological study of the royal mansion and related saltpetre works in Perniö (1997). Recently, the production of saltpetre has been touched upon by Suvianna Seppälä in her dissertation (2009) concerning different forms of taxation from 1539 to 1609. In addition, there is Mikko Uola's non-academic but well-researched book about the history of explosives in Finland (1998). Saltpetre production has also been studied as a part of local history.

In Sweden, most of the few studies that concern saltpetre deal with the 18th and 19th centuries, local history, or the history of artillery, and are not especially relevant to this chapter.

In the late 16th and early 17th centuries, the administrative system of the Swedish Realm was still in its infancy. Documents considering saltpetre are fragmentary and scattered in different archives and collections. The bailiffs' accounts at the National Archives of Finland hold a variety of papers primarily dealing with factories' expenses, which were compensated from tax revenues (including, most importantly, wages). In the late 16th century, Finnish saltpetre works were in principle directly under the control of the Chamber, but apparently this system had its faults, because in 1602 King Charles IX (Sw. Karl IX) ordered that the bailiffs must include the saltpetre tax and related payments in their accounts. In practice, the bailiffs did this very haphazardly. The bailiffs' accounts from the 1610s and 1620s include receipts from saltpetre workmen, brief remarks about production amounts, and sometimes information about the saltpetre tax paid by the peasants, but not the accounts of the works themselves.[6]

The Lagus Collection (Sw. Laguska samlingen) at the National Archives of Finland is a somewhat strange entity formed by a

[6] The fragmentary nature of the archive material may have a connection to the intermittent history of the chamber's sub-division in Finland, the *Turun laskukamari*, which operated intermittently in the 16th and 17th centuries.

notorious 19th-century history enthusiast, C. G. Lagus. It includes a volume about the mining industry, containing dozens of letters and other documents about saltpetre production. In addition to the Lagus Collection, other records in the National Archives of Finland have also been used in this study, mainly the district court records[7] and the *Acta Historica*. The royal statutes and letters about saltpetre manufacturing play a central role in this research. Among the otherwise fragmentary material, they present themselves as a clear and well-preserved body, recorded in the Collection of King's Letters (Sw. Riksregistratur) at the National Archives of Sweden. Most of these were printed in the 19th century in the so-called Waaranen's source editions.

In general, most of the sources offer information about how expensive and labour-intensive it was to run these factories: there is information about wages, buildings, and the raw material that local peasants had to deliver to the factories. There is also information about official plans and proceedings: how the crown wanted these factories to work. For the most part, however, these sources lack information about production amounts, delivery and the logistics of the actual production. Either this information was never documented or the documents have disappeared.

Kings and Saltpetre

During the 16th century, gunpowder changed from an expensive curiosity into a military necessity. The increasing role of firepower in warfare meant an increasing need for saltpetre. From 1570 to 1595, Sweden was waging constant war with Russia, but the process of manufacturing saltpetre was still in many ways unestablished. There were numerous small saltpetre works, and gunpowder was made in mills close to the front.[8] This system was primitive and could not meet the demands of expanding warfare. In 1593 Bengt

[7] In order to find court cases related to saltpetre, an old index of keywords ('*Tuokko*') has been used.

[8] Kiuasmaa 1962, p. 361.

Söffrinsson Juusten, who was responsible for the artillery, wrote a letter to his brother-in-law, a bailiff in the south of Finland, underlining the importance of making steel bows. 'Bowmen do not need gunpowder or lead, which are so scarce in this Realm and cannot be obtained without great cost.'[9]

King John III (Sw. Johan III) made several efforts to develop saltpetre production and bring it under closer control. He appointed superintendents whose responsibility was to invent equipment and compile reports of production and costs. In 1581 Finland was designated as its own saltpetre manufacturing district. The king ordered every medium-sized farmhouse to deliver to its local saltpetre work five barrels of dirt, two barrels of sheep or goat dung, firewood, straw and ash. This saltpetre tax was a huge burden for the peasants.[10]

King John died in 1593 and was succeeded by his son Sigismund, who was already king of Poland. Sigismund, a Catholic, was challenged by his uncle, Duke Charles (Sw. Hertig Karl), a devout Protestant who was widely considered a potential usurper. Sigismund remained in Poland, and his most loyal servant in the Swedish Realm was a military chief named Klaus Fleming, the commander of Finland. In 1595, the Peace of Teusina ended the long feud between the Swedes and the Russians. However, Fleming was convinced that Duke Charles wanted to overthrow his master and did not want to demobilise the troops in Finland. He was preparing for a civil war.[11]

Saltpetre was a problem for Fleming's armament project. Besides cavalry, footmen, artillery, ships and swords, he needed gunpowder. It was unlikely that Fleming would get it from Sweden, as it was practically ruled by Duke Charles, who naturally opposed Fleming's armament. Bengt Juusten, now steward of Turku Castle

[9] KA, the Lagus Collection, VARIA, 4 Vuorityö (1592–1683), Bengt Juusten to Lydig Henriksson, 10 May 1593.

[10] Seppälä 2009, pp. 223–224.

[11] Lappalainen 2009, pp. 128–166.

and Fleming's loyal servant,[12] was familiar with this problem. In November 1595 he sent similar letters to the bailiffs of Ostrobothnia and southern Finland. The former letter complained that the equipment of the Voitby saltpetre factory in Ostrobothnia was in bad shape, whereas the latter expressed similar complaints about a factory in Perniö on the south-west coast of Finland, where the manager had complained that he and his workmen had not got enough help and food. Otherwise, the letters were almost exact copies of each other.

For Juusten and Fleming, the problem was the Peace of Teusina. Without a declared state of war, it was difficult to motivate anyone to take part in the making of gunpowder. Juusten wrote that, although God had mercifully given them peace, almost all their saltpetre had been used during the long war. Another problem was raw material, as only half of the bailiff's district supplied material for the factory each year.

According to Juusten, about 'ten or twenty thousand *skeppund* saltpeter' should always be stored in the artillery magazines, an absurd amount considering that one *skeppund* is equivalent to 170 kg.[13] Now, however, the magazines were almost empty. It is unclear if he was referring to the artillery magazine in Stockholm or in Turku, but his objective was nevertheless to obtain saltpetre and gunpowder for Fleming's troops in Finland. Juusteen wrote that he had discussed with Fleming about what actions might be necessary in this case – a threatening note, for Claus Fleming was a notoriously ruthless character.[14]

The civil war ended in the victory of Duke Charles. In the autumn of 1599, he conquered southern Finland, imprisoned or executed his opponents, and replaced them with his own loyal men. Curiously enough, his servants, led by Admiral Jochim Scheel, were

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[12] Syrjö 2002.

[13] Svenska Akademins ordbok SAOB [*skeppund*].

[14] KA, the Lagus Collection, VARIA, 4 Vuorityö (1592–1683), Bengt Juusten to Thomas Jörensson, 24 November 1595; Bengt Juusten to Jören Ollsson, 24 November 1595.

faced with the same problem as Bengt Juusteen: there was no saltpetre in the Turku Castle. The duke had ordered them 'both by word of mouth and in writing' to investigate the situation regarding saltpetre manufacturing in Finland. The bailiffs again received letters, this time from the new rulers. In these letters, they were ordered to make sure that the statutes of John III were followed.[15]

In 1604, Duke Charles was crowned and became King Charles IX. He was a hard, suspicious and despotic ruler whose goal was to build a strong and loyal government. However, his ambitions were constantly thwarted by lack of means, information and workforce. His style was to send furious letters to the crown's servants and demand efficiency and loyalty. Still, little was done. The administrative system was primitive, and it was easy to ignore letters from Stockholm.[16]

Naturally, Charles's demands for control extended to saltpetre and its production. On a visit to Finland in the winter of 1602 he had made a declaration on the manufacture of saltpetre in this part of his realm. In the opening chapter, he declared that there had been no regulations at all about the making of potassium nitrate in Finland. According to the (then) duke, this had led to mismanagement and abuse. Saltpetre makers had servants who bullied peasants and demanded too much raw material, building material and firewood. Still, 'just a little or nothing' was eventually produced for the crown's purposes.[17]

Charles IX was accustomed to blame his servants' laziness and lack of loyalty for all his misfortunes, and the production of saltpetre was no exception. According to the king, the low production rates were due to the laziness of the manufacturers, as well as their habit of secretly selling potassium nitrate for their own profit.

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[15] KA, the Lagus Collection, VARIA, 4 Vuorityö (1592–1683), Axel Ryning's, Jochim Scheel's and Tönne Jöransson's letters to Daniel Johansson, Jacob Nilsson and Jöran Bertilsson, 21 February 1600; Lappalainen 2009, pp. 247–249.

[16] Lappalainen 2014, pp. 34–39.

[17] *Ordningh huru med Saltpetter bruken her i Finlandh skall holles*. RA RR, 28 January 1602. Printed in Waaranen II, pp. 238–240.

It is impossible to know whether this actually happened or if it was just a part of the king's rhetoric. The selling of potassium nitrate would have required markets and complicated networks, and someone willing to buy it. European rulers and armies were in constant need of gunpowder, but it is not likely that some producer in a remote Finnish village would have managed to sell it to a foreign agent. Bailiffs and other servants were often accused of selling tax products; however, it was much easier to sell barrels of grain than potassium nitrate, for which the common people had no use. There is one letter, written in 1594, where a man named Sigfrid Olsson talks about the two barrels of saltpetre he was willing to sell for eight barrels of rye. However, this document has been preserved out of its original context, and it is not possible to know what kind of 'deal' it actually was about.[18]

The reign of Charles's son Gustavus Adolphus (Sw. Gustav II Adolf) (1611–1632) was a period of growing warfare and intense state-building. The Swedish Realm was engaged in wars with its archenemies Denmark, Poland and Russia. Eventually, Gustavus Adolphus's troops also took part in the Thirty Years War in Germany. The growing scale of warfare meant an escalating need for weapons, guns and gunpowder. In 1616 Gustavus Adolphus was forced to double the amount of raw materials and firewood peasants had to deliver to saltpetre factories. He ordered Finnish bailiffs to make clear how transport to each factory would be arranged. He also reminded them that saltpetre production – according to the receipts from manufacturers – had to be included in the bailiffs' accounts.[19]

During the reign of Gustavus Adolphus, the crown leased out various sectors and sections of economic life, such as ironworks or the right to collect certain customs or taxes. It was not an ideological privatisation but rather a way to guarantee a steady flow of cash and liberate the crown from laborious and risky

[18] KA, Lagus Collection, VARIA, 4 Vuorityö (1592–1683), Sigfrid Olsson to Jören Ollsson, 19 August 1594.

[19] RA RR 27 February 1616; Waaranen V, p. 109.

responsibilities. The crown also began to lease out saltpetre works, and finally in 1629 a wealthy merchant named Jacob Wolle became the leaseholder of all the saltpetre factories of Finland. He leased the factories up until 1635, when all the saltpetre and gunpowder factories in the whole realm were leased out to a Frenchman named Fermin Mazalet.[20]

These leasing systems had already brought about numerous conflicts and suspicions of misuse in the 1620s.[21] Recurring problems and low productivity were probably the main reasons why the saltpetre tax was soon changed to a money payment.

Organising the Production

Saltpetre factories were fairly large compounds by 16th- and 17th-century Finnish standards. They consisted of several buildings and were sites of constant activity. They had to be located near waterways, both because good delivery routes were necessary, and because the industrial process itself required water. The staff consisted of the factory foreman (Sw. *saltpeter sjundare*), his clerk, and the workmen, the number of whom depended on the size of the factory.[22]

When John III ascended the throne in 1560, there were five saltpetre factories in Finland. During the Russo-Swedish War of 1570–1595, when gunpowder was needed in the eastern and southern borders of the realm, their number rose to 16 or 17. According to Kyösti Kiuasmaa, these 'factories' were mostly very small, and there were breaks and discontinuity in their operations. In the 1580s they produced just 1.5–5 *skeppund* (170 kg) of saltpetre per year, with total production being 18 *skeppund*. By 1592 total production had risen to 55 *skeppund*, and the factories' individual production rates were 4–6 *skeppund*.[23] It would

[20] Kerkkonen 1947, p. 165.
[21] Melender 1896, pp. 419–420; Haggrén 1997, p. 166.
[22] Kiuasmaa 1962, p. 363.
[23] Kiuasmaa 1962, pp. 362–363.

have taken 200–300 years to meet Bengt Juusteen's demand of a 10,000–20,000 *skeppund* saltpetre storage.

Known saltpetre factories were scattered around south and south-west Finland. In the 1590s, the largest factory was at Naantali in the south, with Moisio in the east and Voitby in the north following. During the first decades of the 17th century the number of saltpetre manufacturers plummeted, and production was concentrated in somewhat larger facilities (see Figure 5.1). In 1626, before Jacob Wolle took over saltpetre production in Finland, there were nine factories: Naantali, Ulvila, Perniö (Näse), Sipoo (Löparö), Hollola, Sääksmäki (Voipaala), Rantasalmi, Moisio and Viipuri.[24] For some reason, production at Mustasaari (Voitby) was temporarily halted, but started again later.

Essentially, there were two factors that dictated where factories were established: raw material and access. The amount of soil and organic waste needed was so massive that saltpetre factories had to be close to populated areas. They had to get their supply from their surroundings, without need to transport the raw material from too far. Furthermore, the manufactured saltpetre had to be shipped to wherever it was needed. The first precondition posed a problem, as Finland was a huge, mostly desolated country with long distances between settlements. Factories had therefore to be scattered around the country. Luckily, delivery routes were not a problem, as the long coastline and many lakes and rivers formed an extensive network of water transportation. In wintertime, the country was likewise crisscrossed with icy routes over the frozen, snowy landscape.

Early 17th-century saltpetre factories were all located near good waterways: Hollola, Sääksmäki, Moisio and Rantasalmi by lakes and inland water routes, Ulvila and Voitby by large rivers, and Naantali, Perniö, Sipoo and Viipuri close to the sea. The site of Löparö in Sipoo is a good example of an optimal location: it was on a large island by the shoreline, about 25 km from Helsinki. On the other side of the Gulf of Finland were the city of Tallinn and the fortress of Narva, an important Swedish outpost in wars with Russia and Poland.

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[24] KA Bailiff's accounts, 418:156 (Ledgers for Finland 1626–1627).



Figure 5.1: Saltpetre factories in Finland during the 1620s.
Source: Map drawn by Petri Talvitie.

The process of making saltpetre was slow and labour-intensive. First, the urine-soaked soil, rich in nitrates, was heaped up with rotten grass and hay, slaughter waste, dung, straw and sticks. These piles of soil were left to 'brew up' for two or three years, moistened and turned over at regular intervals. Then, this heap of soil was mixed with ash and laid in wooden tubs upon stacks of straw. Boiling water was added, and after 10–12 hours the mixture was drained from a hole in the tub's bottom. This liquid was now boiled in large, heavy copper bowls called pans. The boiling took several days and was the heart of the process. The ensuing vaporisation resulted in granulated raw saltpetre, which was then dried and eventually purified by heating, dissolving in water, and filtration.[25]

Saltpetre factories consisted of several buildings, because every part of the manufacturing process required its own structure.

[25] Uola 1998, p. 17; Soininen 1954, p. 188.

First, the soil and ash were stored in separate barns. The soil and ash were then diluted with boiling water in an 'ash house', and the slow boiling itself, as well as the drying, were done in separate buildings. In addition to these buildings, there were the normal stables, barns and houses for the workmen, animals and foodstuff.[26]

Löparö in Sipoo, on the southern coast of Finland, is the only saltpetre factory that has been archaeologically investigated. The remains are located on a small hill, and consist of various bare stone constructions, earthen banks, and ditches. There are two large pits that are surrounded by earthworks, and inside them there are remains of three drystack furnaces.[27] In the 16th and early 17th centuries Finland practically all buildings were made of pinewood and did not even have stone foundations. Compared with an ordinary farmhouse, the Löparö factory was in other words very robust.

The factories were in constant need of building material: timber, bricks, mortar and iron. The buildings had to be in relatively good condition and provide shelter from rain, sleet and snow. This was, however, by no means self-evident. In 1603, Duke Charles sent his servant to Finland to make sure that the necessary houses were built in saltpetre factories, so that work could go on 'during winter and in the summer'.[28] This turned out to be easier said than done. In 1623 Carl Carlsson Gyllenhielm, one of the leading Swedish aristocrats, was sent to Finland to inspect the economic situation and military administration. He also took an interest in saltpetre manufacturing. In his report, Gyllenhielm wrote that that many of the saltpetre works' buildings had been 'derelict' and were now being rebuilt. He also wrote that the saltpetre works urgently

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[26] Haggrén 1997, pp. 164–167.

[27] Finnish Heritage Agency, Guide for archaeological cultural heritage: *Salpietarikeittimö*. http://akp.nba.fi/wiki;salpietarikeittim%C3%B6; Register of protected heritage sites: *Löparö*. www.kyppi.fi/to.aspx ?id=112.1000010857.

[28] KA, the Lagus Collection, VARIA, 4 Vuorityö (1592–1683), Carl IX 30 August 1603, signed by Erik Eriksson.

needed new copper 'pans', for they were in general old and in poor repair.[29]

Copper 'pans' (also called tubs) were the most valuable equipment in a saltpetre factory. Owing to their heavy use and the constant heat, the pans often broke and had to be fixed or replaced. Repairing broken pans and acquiring new ones was a constant problem that appears in the records repeatedly. Copper was expensive, and the shaping had to be done by skilled coppersmiths. In 1623 it was reported that a coppersmith in Turku had held onto one of the Naantali factory's pans for a year and a half as a security for his unpaid wages.[30]

Pans were large and weighed several hundred kilograms, which meant that they were hard to move. In 1617 the Sääksmäki factory, then the largest, needed a new pan. It took four men six weeks to prepare.[31] They were often made of miscellaneous confiscated items, such as stills that were used in distilling alcohol.[32] They were also so valuable that at the Sääksmäki factory it was decided that the pans belonged to specific administrative areas (*Satagundz Panna* etc.). In other words, it was the local bailiff's duty to take care that the pan was in good condition.[33]

In order to then make gunpowder, saltpetre had to be mixed and ground up with sulphur and charcoal. This was done in special 'mills'. During the Russo-Swedish War of 1570–1595 these mills

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[29] RA, Archives of the Chamber (*Kammarkollegiet ämnessamlingar*), Bergsbruk 1592–1719, vol 133, Strödda bergverksakter 1620–1719, *Hwad som widare* öffuer *min Instruction effter* (…), undated, circa 1623.

[30] KA, the Lagus Collection, VARIA, 4 Vuorityö (1592–1683), Carl Carlsson Gyllenhielm to Joen Mårtensson, 25 June 1623; about payments to coppersmiths see also KA 3579:31 (Porvoo); 3607:36 (Porvoo); KA 4897:65 (Etelä-Pohjanmaa).

[31] KA, the Lagus Collection, VARIA, 4 Vuorityö (1592–1683), Erik Axelsson's receipt, 17 April 1616.

[32] Uola 1998, p. 17.

[33] KA, the Lagus Collection, VARIA, 4 Vuorityö (1592–1683), Bertil Michilsson 7 July 1597.

were located closer to the front,[34] but during the next century the making of gunpowder was concentrated in factories in Sweden. In general, it was easier to stock and transport potassium nitrate than gunpowder, because the latter had to be carefully protected from damp.[35] Stocking gunpowder was also hazardous: a tiny spark could blow up an entire magazine or even a battleship.

Fragmentary sources show that in the early 17th century saltpetre was delivered to various places, probably where it was most needed at the moment. The logistics of saltpetre transportation were clearly not planned beforehand and seem almost haphazard. It was logical to deliver saltpetre from Naantali to the nearby Turku Castle, as well as from the Viipuri factory to the local castle,[36] but there were also other solutions. In 1609 a man named Jöns Pedersson travelled from Turku Castle to Stockholm 'with the saltpeter'.[37] Two years later, someone named Bastian Melchersson was sent to Finland to visit the factories and 'collect the saltpeter here in Finland to Sweden'.[38]

In the summer of 1613 the saltpetre manufacturer in Korsholm delivered 365.5 kg of saltpetre to the arsenal in Stockholm and circa 340 kg to Turku Castle.[39] In the summer of 1614, 4 *skeppund* (680 kg) of saltpetre was delivered from Korsholm to Viipuri.[40] This is remarkable because of the extreme distance between Korsholm, on the west coast, and the town of Viipuri, in the southeast of Finland by the Russian border. In those days, the Swedish Realm was at war with Russia and intervened in the struggle for the czar's throne. It was thus natural that saltpetre production in

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[34] Kiuasmaa 1962, p. 361.

[35] Uola 1998.

[36] KA Bailiff's accounts, 1706:28 (Masku); 5985:13 (Jääski); 5966:13 (Lappee); 5950:25 (Ranta).

[37] KA Bailiff's accounts, 1710:73 (Turku castle).

[38] KA Bailiff's accounts, 6751:27, 6752:158 (Pien-Savo).

[39] KA Bailiff's accounts, 4879:25 (Korsholma and Etelä-Pohjanmaa).

[40] KA Bailiff's accounts, 4897:64 (Etelä-Pohjanmaa); see also KA 1710:73 (Turku castle and its estates).

the eastern part of Finland did not meet the demands of the geopolitical situation.

Although several of the saltpetre factories were established close to different castles and larger cities, it seems that their product was shipped unsystematically wherever it was needed. To send someone from Sweden to collect saltpetre from the Finnish factories and travel with it to Stockholm does not sound sensible at all because of the excruciatingly long distances. It would have taken weeks or months to complete even a part of this task. In summary, saltpetre distribution reflects the problems of early 17th-century administration in general: the lack of personnel, established administrative practices and reliable information caused enormous difficulties.

Conflicts – Materials, Wages and Local Power

In principle, it was the local bailiff's duty to ensure that the saltpetre works received enough raw materials. The bailiff and his men worked as intermediates between the peasants and the saltpetre works. Sometimes the bailiff and his men took care of collecting and delivering the raw materials, while in other cases it was the duty of the factory workmen.

The factories needed huge amounts of material. For instance, in 1624 the Moisio factory required over 1,446 barrels of dirt and sheep manure and 99 barrels of ash from the district of Pien-Savo. During the same year, 2,131.5 barrels of dirt and sheep manure and over 266 barrels of ash were supplied to Moisio from the larger administrative district of Suur-Savo.[41] In 1620 no fewer than 3,522 barrels of dirt and over 220 barrels of ash were taken to the Löparö factory from the surrounding administrative district of Porvoo. In addition, peasants provided the factories with enormous amounts of firewood, straw and other raw materials. The deliveries made by the peasants were seemingly registered in

[41] KA Bailiff's accounts, 6801:24v (Pien-Savo); KA 6800:17 (Suur-Savo); see also KA 6791:22 (Pien-Savo).

the bailiff's accounts on a random basis; for instance, in 1620 there is no mention of the saltpetre tax in the district of Kymeenkartano beside Porvoo, although it is not possible to know whether the tax was actually not collected or just not registered.[42]

In principle, no one was free from the saltpetre burden. Noblemen's mansions were normally free from taxes, but even they had to provide dirt to the factories. In reality, all sorts of defaults and exceptions were made. This caused disagreements and conflicts, especially after Wolle took over the saltpetre works. He soon noticed that there were people who routinely dodged the payments, and that large districts, such as the Åland archipelago, did not pay any saltpetre tax at all.[43] However, Wolle's complaint is odd, because in the years prior the payments of the saltpetre tax were carefully registered in the bailiff's accounts of Åland.[44]

By today's standards, it seems that saltpetre was made of waste and garbage. In the early modern world, however, things like abattoir waste, muck and urine were valuable. Lack of manure was a life-threatening problem for agriculture in Finland. It was a vicious cycle: meadows did not produce enough fodder, so there were not enough cattle, and in turn not enough dung. Lack of manure made crops susceptible to frost and wet, which in turn caused harvest failures. Peasants were constantly threatened by food shortages and famines.[45]

Although the duties of the peasants were carefully listed in the royal statutes pertaining to saltpetre, it seems that practices and customs varied. The burden was not the same everywhere and depended on the bailiff's activity and the needs of the saltpetre factory in question.

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[42] KA Bailiff's accounts, 3607:40 (Porvoo); KA 3606 (Kymenkartano), 3609 (Kymenkartano).

[43] Haggrén 1997, p. 165; Melender 1896, pp. 414–426.

[44] KA Bailiff's accounts, 2902:14v (Åland); 2904:13 (Åland); 2906:21 (Åland).

[45] Seppälä 2009, p. 224; Lappalainen 2012, pp. 47–55.

The problems with raw material deliveries were foreseeable: insubordination, disobedience and loitering. In 1626 the saltpetre manufacturer of Viipuri went to the local court and demanded the dirt and ash the peasantry should have delivered. It turned out that many were so poor that they were unable to provide the factory with anything.[46] One year later, the factory buildings were in such a derelict condition that they were in danger of collapsing. The local court had to order nearby peasants to fix them.[47] The saltpetre maker was later also charged with hitting and abusing peasants. However, the claims were based on the testimony of only one man, who according to the jury was an old fool and not in his right mind.[48]

The problems in raw material deliveries had a direct effect to the livelihood of the manufacturers. According to the statutes established by Charles IX in 1602, saltpetre manufacturers were paid according to the amount of saltpetre produced, so that the larger factories were paid more than the smaller ones.[49] Wages were marked in the crown's budget,[50] but the manufacturer and his workmen were only paid after they had delivered the saltpetre to wherever it was needed. Records show that this royal order was generally abided by: the manager of the factory was only paid when he could prove that he had delivered the product to wherever it was needed.[51] For example, in 1605 the saltpetre

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[46] KA District court records, Jääski, Ranta and Äyräpää, Jääski and Ruoholahti 9 January 1623, p. 8.

[47] KA District court records, Jääski, Ranta and Äyräpää, Jääski and Ruoholahti 9 January 1624, p. 23.

[48] KA District court records, Jääski, Ranta and Äyräpää, Jääski and Ruoholahti 10 October 1624, pp. 35–36.

[49] RA RR 28 January 1602. Printed in Waaranen I, pp. 238–241.

[50] KA Bailiff's records, 397:57–58v (Payroll for the crown's servants).

[51] KA Bailiff's accounts, 4376:35v (Hollola and Hattula) 5985:13 (Jääski); 5966:13 (Lappee); 5950:25 (Ranta); 6624:29 (Suur-Savo); 6754:18 (Suur-Savo); 1706:27v (Masku); 4897:29v, 64 (Etelä-Pohjanmaa); 358:158 (Kokemäenkartano, Häme, Raasepori, Porvoo and Viipuri); 2900:14v (Åland). Sometimes the amount of saltpetre is not

manufacturer of Rantasalmi could show the bailiff the receipt he had received from the arsenal in Viipuri. He had taken there circa 700 kg of saltpetre, and now the bailiff gave him (and his workmen) 89¼ barrels of grain.[52]

This was not the standard practice in paying the wages of the crown's servants. For example, miners and prospectors were paid their wages whether they found anything or not. Mining was a hazardous activity, where no one could guarantee the results. Saltpetre manufacturing, on the other hand, was in principle controllable. Certain amount of raw materials and firewood meant a certain amount of the product. As a result, the system of tying payments to production linked the factories more closely with their local communities. If the manufacturers did not get enough raw materials, or if the equipment or buildings were in bad shape, the production would halt.

In principle it was the bailiff who was responsible for supplying the raw materials and other needs of the factories. It seems, however, that the saltpetre manufacturers sometimes had to take things in their own hands. In the 1620s the former saltpetre manufacturer of Ulvila was charged with malpractice: he had arbitrarily, without the authorisation of the bailiff, levied peasants for grain, butter and a sheep and was ordered to pay them back. He had also taken a large tub (pan) and had not paid for it.[53]

In the late 1610s the long-time manager of the Löparö factory died. His son and son-in law started to run the factory after him but were faced with a legitimacy problem. They had to prove that they were entitled to get deliveries of raw materials, and specifically according to the king's statute of 1616, which considerably increased the peasants' burden. Another problem was that

registered. From the bailiff's viewpoint it was essential to register what payments he had made from the tax revenues, not what the saltpetre makers had done with their product.

[52] KA Bailiff's accounts, 6709:12v (Pien-Savo).

[53] KA District court records, Ala-Satakunta, Ulvila 11 November 1625, pp. 237, 242v.

the father had died before he had settled accounts with the local bailiff. As a result, the son and the son-in-law were forced to appeal to other authorities and write a kind of proclamation that was then read in all district court sessions in the administrative area.[54]

Saltpetre manufacturers lacked formal authority over the peasant community. They were not as frightening as the crown's bailiffs, who claimed taxes and employed thug-like servants to help them. It was easy to neglect the manufacturer's claims. In order to keep things going, saltpetre manufacturers had to rely on the bailiff and his men. The arbitrary actions of the saltpetre manufacturer of Ulvila can be explained by the fact that he was not on good terms with the local bailiff, and accused him of malpractice; according to the saltpetre maker, the bailiff had not correctly written down the amount of taxes he had paid.[55]

By the late 16th century, the kings had already started to appoint superintendents whose task was to control all the saltpetre works in Finland. Receipts signed by the inspectors indicate that they really travelled around and visited the factories. However, their ability to actually control the production must have been very limited, and the position was abolished in 1621.[56]

When the crown began to lease out saltpetre works, new problems began to arise. It was in the leaseholders' interest to make the production more effective and force the peasants pay their share. According to the contracts, the leaseholders undertook to deliver to the crown a certain amount of saltpetre in a year. It was no longer the bailiff who took care of collecting the raw materials from the peasants but the leaseholder and his men, who could be ruthless and were also accused of collecting too much tax. Some of the leaseholders did not even make any saltpetre: they collected the saltpetre tax in money and bought the saltpetre abroad,

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[54] KA, the Lagus Collection, VARIA, 4 Vuorityö (1592–1683), Sigfred Bengtsson and Mårten Hansson, 12 January 1619.

[55] KA District court records, Ala-Satakunta, Ulvila 11 November 1625, p. 237.

[56] Melender 1896, p. 419.

letting the factories decay. In the 1620s this was not allowed, for the crown still wanted to support domestic production.[57]

Saltpetre factories were industrial ventures situated in otherwise totally agrarian communities. Other than a few small mining ventures, one ironworks (Mustio), the crown's shipyards and the saltpetre factories, there really was no 'industry' in Finland at the time. Later in the 17th and 18th centuries, several mines, ironworks and timber mills were established around the country, but in the late 16th and early 17th centuries such ventures were still largely non-existent. Even tar-burning was small-scale compared with the upcoming decades. In other words, saltpetre factories were oddities. Some two hundred years later Finnish peasants were obliged to make saltpetre themselves, and agents travelled around the country teaching them.[58] In the late 16th and early 17th centuries the peasants were probably not familiar with the process of making gunpowder out of dung. As a part of the war effort, saltpetre manufacturing was much less straightforward and less comprehensible than providing troops with food and accommodation.

Conclusion

In the late 16th and early 17th centuries the crown tried to ensure the supply of Finnish saltpetre by means of strict orders and state-owned saltpetre works. This system replaced the more fragmented network of smaller manufacturers. Peasants were responsible for the delivery of raw materials, the amount of which was in principle clearly defined. The expected output of the saltpetre works was also predetermined. In reality, the situation was much more

[57] The National Archives of Sweden (RA), Archives of the Chamber (*Kammarkollegiet ämnessamlingar*), Bergsbruk 1592–1719, vol 133, Strödda bergverksakter 1620–1719, *Hwad som widare öffuer min Instruction effter* (…), undated, circa 1623; Melender 1896, pp. 418–421.

[58] Uola 1998, pp. 23–24.

uncertain and chaotic – this kind of contradiction was essentially unavoidable in the early 17th century, when logistic as well as administrative structures were still primitive. In 1629 the crown 'solved' the problems by leasing out Finnish saltpetre production.

Saltpetre works were difficult to run, because their output was dependent on the deliveries of raw materials. Peasants hated the 'saltpetre tax' because the raw materials, especially dung, were extremely valuable as manure. To get anything done, the saltpetre manufacturers had to have a good relationship with the local administration, in other words the bailiff and his men. The system was essentially oppressive. Peasants were forced to give up an important part of life-saving manure to feed the endless demands of warfare. Saltpetre works did not benefit them directly in any way. The works did, however, increase economic activity in their areas. Like any industrial venture, they created work, tasks, and logistical connections that that had not existed before. For example, someone had to make and repair the large copper pans the factories needed and was paid for it.

Saltpetre manufacturers were paid according to their output. In order to receive their wages, they had to deliver their product to wherever it was needed. For the crown's part this was almost a genius resolution to the problem of control: it was in the saltpetre manufacturers' interest to ensure that raw materials were delivered and that the buildings and equipment were in good shape. If the system did not work, the saltpetre manufacturers were not paid. This, however, resulted in conflicts with the manufacturers and local communities.

It is easy to overemphasise the failings in this saltpetre manufacturing system. Nevertheless, it worked well enough for decades, during times when the demand for gunpowder was constantly growing. However, more research should be done considering the actual logistics of gunpowder and the role of imported saltpetre in Gustavus Adolphus's army.

Saltpetre works were usually established by waterways in tiny villages, most of them far away from towns. They were the first industrial ventures in otherwise deprived agrarian communities.

The making of saltpetre was in fact a complicated chemical process that was different from all the other 16th- and 17th-century industries, which consisted mostly of processing wood or iron. Commoners might not have liked this prelude to industrialisation, and for them the making of saltpetre was just one of the never-ending burdens of the constant warfare. Nevertheless, saltpetre connected Finnish peasants and craftsmen to the military revolution, and to the great changes occurring in the early modern world.

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CHAPTER 6

The Supply Challenges of the Swedish Army during the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743

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The Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743 is arguably the most disastrous war in Swedish military history. The war was mainly motivated by political reasons instead of military considerations. After the death of the Russian empress Anna in 1740, internal political strife in Russia offered an opportunity for the Swedish Realm to take advantage of the situation and try to restore the territories that had been lost in the Great Northern War (1700–1721). The Swedes decided to support the claimant to the throne, Princess Elizabeth, who was a daughter of Peter the Great. Their aim was, through a declaration of war, to help her into power and pressure Russia to give up areas. This course of action was strongly

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encouraged by France to prevent Russia taking part in the War of Austrian Succession (1740–1748). In addition to political support, France gave the Swedish Realm subsidies that were used to finance the war efforts.[1]

Although the Swedes declared war at the end of July 1741, the Russians crossed the border first. In August, the Swedish army lost the battle of Lappeenranta and one of its two frontier fortresses to Russians. The battle was a significant but not decisive defeat, and the Russians retreated afterwards. The Swedes, however, could not make a counterattack during the following months. It was only in November that relatively few Swedish troops (6,450 men) crossed the border near Säkkijärvi. This was a late season for an offensive operation, and the army could not achieve much before it had to stop due to the muddy roads and maintenance problems. Nevertheless, the pressure helped Elizabeth to carry out a coup d'état in Saint Petersburg. When the new empress offered a truce, the Swedish high command agreed to it without any guarantees of later concessions.

Russia broke the truce in the following year, and the Swedish army retreated continuously until it had to surrender in Helsinki on 24 August 1742. In the aftermath, the Russians conquered the whole of Finland and occupied it until the Treaty of Turku (1743). The Swedish Realm had aimed to reconquer territories, but in the end it had to cede more land to Russia (see Figure 6.1).[2]

The reasons for the outcome of the war have acquired surprisingly little attention in Swedish or Finnish academic research. The most complete studies, based on archival materials, are from the 19th century.[3] Contemporaries blamed the disaster on an incompetent war leadership, and many later scholars have adopted the same view. In addition, Swedish politicians and government have been blamed for irresponsible gambling and risk-taking with

[1] Jägerskiöld 1957, pp. 137–145; Winton 2018, pp. 230, 235–236, 240.
[2] Cederberg 1942, pp. 304–316; Alanen 1963, pp. 232–235, 238–239, 248–257, 276–277.
[3] Tengberg 1857–1860; Lindeqvist 1889; Malmström 1897.



Figure 6.1: Swedish territorial losses in the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743, and the placenames mentioned in the chapter.
Source: Map drawn by Petri Talvitie.

the war. However, many scholars have also noted recurring supply problems that affected both the army and the navy. For example, there are reports that the crown had to give unground grain to the soldiers instead of bread. This is a clear indication that something was critically wrong in the supply system of the Swedish army.[4]

In the early modern period, bread constituted the most important part of the diet of soldiers. Because armies had thousands of mouths to feed, it took a great effort to continuously arrange enough bread for everyone. Large quantities of readily available bread were uncommon in towns or the countryside. Therefore, bread had to be specifically manufactured for the military needs. For a sizeable army, this was a large-scale operation, which required numerous mills and bakeries. When bread was ready, it

[4] Juvelius 1919, pp. 206–207; Cederberg 1942, pp. 299–301, 312; Alanen 1963, pp. 221–226, 237–239, 250–252; Nikula 2011, p. 186; Kaukiainen 2012, pp. 301–305.

had to be transported to the location where soldiers were staying. This was a difficult task. Land transportation was slow and inefficient, while sea transportation was hazardous and depended on sailing season.[5]

In this chapter, I analyse how the Swedish Realm organised the manufacturing of bread and transport for the army during the war preparations and early part of the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743. The study examines some of the main supply problems the Swedish military leadership had to face and the reasons why these difficulties existed. The manufacturing of bread and organising transport involved both officials of the crown and civilians. These challenging undertakings required wide cooperation between different groups of people. Therefore, the chapter will also deal with the essential role of the civilians in the supply organisation of the army.

Earlier research has already demonstrated how difficult it was to provide food supplies for a large military force in Northern Europe. Jan Lindegren has described the numerous supply challenges Charles XII (Sw. Karl XII) had to overcome when the Swedes attacked Norway in 1718. Most of the supplies had to be transported from Sweden, contrary to the principle of utilising local resources, which was common in the early modern warfare.[6] Christer Kuvaja has shown that Russians also had to import a large amount of their supplies when they invaded and occupied Finland in 1713–1721.[7] The Swedish army encountered the same challenges as Russians when fighting took place in Finland. Even at

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[5] Perjés 1970, pp. 5–11; Lynn 1993, pp. 19–21; Lynn 1997, p. 108; Hatakka 2019a, pp. 168, 203–215.

[6] Lindegren 1992, pp. 197–210; Van Creveld 1977, pp. 5–39. Van Creveld has argued that armies mainly gathered their supplies locally instead of transporting them from magazines. Lynn has criticized this argument and has stressed the importance of magazines in the early modern warfare. According to him, in addition to utilising the local resources, armies depended on magazines in general and not just in sieges or in other special conditions. See Lynn 1993, pp. 15–21.

[7] Kuvaja 1999, pp. 276–277.

the time of the Finnish War (1808–1809) the Swedes had not fully resolved these problems, as can be seen from Martin Hårdstedt's in-depth study of the supply conditions of the Swedish army during the war. In addition, both Lindegren and Hårdstedt have emphasised how important the baking of bread and the organising of transport were for the war efforts.[8]

These studies, however, have not fully taken into consideration the significance of crisis preparedness and war preparations in the northern geographical conditions. Research of the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743 gives ample examples of how vital these were for the fate of the whole war. This chapter will also highlight the supply challenges that existed generally whenever wars were fought in the northernmost part of Europe.

The first few months of the war, from August to December 1741, constituted the most critical part of it. It was during this period when the Swedes had an opportunity to take advantage of political turmoil inside Russia by staging a surprise attack. In the following year, Elizabeth had already secured the power to herself, and the Russians were prepared to conclude the war. I will therefore concentrate on these crucial first months of the war. The questions are why the Swedes could not take the initiative in the war, and how the supply problems can explain this inactivity.

Supply Situation at the Beginning of the War

Although the Swedish army suffered from serious supply problems during the war, the Swedish Realm was not entirely unprepared for it. In fact, the war had been planned for many years, ever since the Hat Party, who rallied for military aggression against Russia, had risen to power at the Diet of 1738–1739. For this Diet, General Axel Löwen, who was a commander-in-chief in Finland from 1737 to 1739, made a comprehensive defence and attack plan.

[8] Lindegren 2000, pp. 41–58; Hårdstedt 2002, pp. 21–22, 126–130, 139–146, 337–347.

In his plan, Löwen put a great emphasis on logistics. He argued that it was important to prepare for a war already during peacetime. Experiences of the Great Northern War had shown that, when the conflict took place in Finland, the ability to supply forces was more important than actual fighting. The Swedish army had had serious supply problems even at that time. There had been not enough magazines or foodstuffs stored in them, and the crown could only have provided unground grain for soldiers. Löwen also stated that, when the inhabitants of Finland heard of hostilities, they fled to the forests, and there was nothing anyone could do to force them to support the military forces.[9]

Löwen suggested many improvements to the supply organisation to prevent the misfortunes of the Great Northern War happening again. In the late 1730s, the whole of Finland had only three crown storage magazines (in Hamina, Lappeenranta and Hämeenlinna) and one crown bakery (in Hamina). The situation was even worse regarding the grinding of grain because there were no crown mills. Löwen wanted to establish new magazines in Helsinki, Turku, Savonlinna and Ristiina. All these places should also have mills and bakeries nearby. Löwen also recognised that there had to be an efficient way to transport bread to the troops. Therefore, he recommended acquiring bread carts for the army. These carts were intended to constantly move back and forth between magazines and troops during a war.[10]

Löwen's proposals were considered carefully at the Diet and they were mostly accepted in principle, but in practice the supply organisation did not change much before the war began in 1741. The Secret Committee of the Diet 1738–1739 argued that there were enough mills in Finland for the grinding of grain. Though this claim was later questioned by the Privy Council, new mills were neither built nor acquired. Regarding the baking of bread, the

[9] Defence plan of Löwen, 3 April 1738 (published by Juva 1939, pp. 308–314).

[10] Löwen to the King, 1 December 1737 and Defence plan of Löwen, 3 April 1738 (published by Juva 1939, pp. 200, 308–314).

official aim was to establish as many bakeries as there were magazines. However, in the end, only the magazine of Hämeenlinna got funding for a bakery.[11] Hamina, Lappeenranta and Hämeenlinna remained the only towns with permanent storage magazines (Sw. *förråds magasin*), although four additional magazines were established before the war began. Two of these, the storage magazines of Turku and Savonlinna, were founded at the beginning of the year 1741. In addition to these, field magazines (Sw. *fält magasin*) were formed in Helsinki and Porvoo.[12]

In preparation for the right moment to declare war, 7,600 Swedish soldiers were transported across the Gulf of Bothnia in 1739. These troops had to be fed and supplied in Finland in the midst of a subsistence crisis, which was caused by poor harvests of 1739–1741.[13] For this reason, the magazines were under hard pressure long before the war began. The stores dwindled because thousands of soldiers needed grain, flour and bread, while peasants were given grain as loans.[14] Table 6.1 shows how much grain (rye and barley), flour and bread was stockpiled in storage magazines and field magazines in April 1741, which is the last date when comprehensive storage calculations are available.

Table 6.1 reveals that none of the magazines in Finland had large storages, and that two of the most important ones, in Hamina and Lappeenranta, were almost empty. They were situated nearest the border, and therefore military operations were dependent on them during wartime. Some grain had been bought in Turku, but it was not enough for the needs of a large military force. In addition, this grain had still to be ground into flour and baked into bread, which took a lot of time. Baking had already begun in

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[11] Juvelius 1919, p. 164.

[12] Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Förslag 1741, Calculations of stores in the crown magazines in Finland 1739–1741; Diverse inkommande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Buddenbrock to Supply Commission, 14 April 1741 (No. 304).

[13] Juvelius 1919, pp. 182–185, 206–207; Cederberg 1942, pp. 299–303.

[14] Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Förslag 1741, Calculations of stores in the crown magazines in Finland 1739–1741.

Table 6.1: Rye, barley, flour, and bread in storage and field magazines in April 1741.

Magazine	Rye (barrels)	Barley (barrels)	Flour (*lispund*)[a]	Bread (*lispund*)[b]
Hamina	83	10	576	8,167
Lappeenranta	13	1,889	—	92
Hämeenlinna	464	158	5,484	—
Turku	4,060	70	—	—
Savonlinna	135	—	—	—
Helsinki	—	—	—	22,616
Porvoo	—	—	—	55,470
Total	4,755	2,127	6,060	86,345

1 barrel = 146,5 litres; 1 *lispund* = 8.5 kg

[a] Some of the flour was informed in barrels. These have been converted to weight measurements (1 barrel = 12 *lispund*). On conversion ratio, see Hatakka 2019a, 306.

[b] When a barrel of grain was baked into bread, one could usually get 11 *lispund* dried bread, although the exact amount varied. Hatakka 2019a, 307.

Sources: Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Förslag 1741, Calculations of stores in the crown magazines in Finland 1739–1741; Diverse inkommande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Buddenbrock to Supply Commission 14.4.1741 (No. 304). Table by the author.

Porvoo, Helsinki and Hamina, where altogether 86,000 *lispund* of dried bread was ready and stored. Provision regulation (Sw. *fält stat*) stipulated that one soldier was entitled to have 2.25 *lispund* (19.1 kg) bread in a month. According to this regulation, the gathered amount of bread was enough to feed 10,000 soldiers for roughly four months.[15]

Thus, the supply situation looked bleak just four months before the declaration of war. Thousands of soldiers already commanded

[15] Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Förslag 1741, Proposition for a month's provision to infantry regiment according to regulation (*fält stat*) of 1740.

in Finland needed a continuous supply of food throughout the summer of 1741. More bread was needed but it was not an easy task to acquire it in the conditions that were prevalent in early modern Finland.

Possibilities of Grinding Grain and Baking Bread in Finland

The large-scale manufacturing of bread was always a challenging and laborious undertaking in the early modern period. Most of the available mills were small and inefficient, and thus their capacity was limited. Armies had often difficulties finding enough mills for military needs from the area where they operated. For this reason, G. Perjés has argued that, under normal circumstances, an army could get a satisfactory amount of flour only if it had been manufactured beforehand and stored in magazines. Other options to obtain flour were either to establish mills in the vicinity of the magazines or to form magazines in places with high-capacity mills.

The baking of bread was equally challenging task. For the requirements of a large army, baking was only possible if there were enough ovens available. It took hundreds of bricks to build one oven and the total material requirements could rise to tens of thousands of bricks. Once the bricks and other building materials were ready, they had to be transported to the construction sites. Finally, the bakeries also had to be built.[16]

These challenges concerning grinding and baking were not only similar in Finland but also more pronounced than in many other places. Mills needed water, wind, animals or men as a power source. Watermills were the most efficient ones, but they could only be built in suitable places along rivers. The problem in Finland, however, was that most of the rivers were small, and the majority of the mills could only operate during spring or autumn. During summers most of the rivers did not have enough water,

[16] Perjés 1970, pp. 7–10.

and during winters rivers were frozen. Only a few mills could operate throughout the year.

Finnish mills were also rather simple and outdated. They rarely had more than one or two pairs of millstones, and these stones were without furrows. Furrows, which helped the grinding of grains, were already common in Sweden but not in Finland, where they were not regarded as vital as in the western part of the realm. In Finland, grain was practically always dried in a building called *riihi*, and this made it much easier to grind than moist grain. Even older types of millstones could handle dried grain relatively well. For example, the mills of Vanhakaupunki near the town of Helsinki and Forsby in Pernaja could grind 30 barrels (4,400 l) of dried rye but only 6 barrels (880 l) of undried grain per day.[17]

The inefficiency of Finnish mills was not the only problem that affected grinding. Most of the mills were scattered across the countryside and located in places where they were impractical to use for military purposes. Land transport was particularly burdensome because of long distances, bad or non-existent roads, and scarcity of horses and carriages. The best mills were therefore the ones that were accessible by waterways. In theory, this was an advantage in Finland, the land of a thousand lakes, but in practice most of the large lakes could not be utilised for the transportation that supplying of armies required.

Wars were mainly fought in southern Finland because it was the most populated part of the land. However, the Finnish lake district is situated inland, geographically separated from the southern coastal area by the Salpausselkä ridges (see Figure 6.1). In addition, the southern rivers were not only small but full of rapids, which largely prevented any meaningful transport of goods. Along the coast there were only a few mills accessible by ships, and because they were in private ownership and locally important, the crown could not use them freely. For these reasons, military provisioning was dependent on many small mills in a wide

[17] Hatakka 2019a, pp. 178–179; Hatakka 2019b, pp. 21–23. Regarding the difficulties of grinding moist grain, see also Kaplan 1984, p. 50.

coastal area reaching all the way from Turku to Hamina.[18] Utilising these mills required a lot of ships and workforce. Because these were difficult to obtain during the war in 1741, the crown had to settle for using only the mills closest to the magazines.[19]

Baking was easier to manage than grinding because bakeries did not require specific places to operate, unlike mills. Baking, however, demanded different kinds of resources: ovens and proficient bakers. At the beginning of the war the crown bakery of Hamina had only six small ovens, three of which were reserved for the needs of the garrison. The remaining three ovens could only handle 60–70 barrels (8,800 l–10,300 l) of flour per month. This amount of flour produced around 700 *lispund* (6,000 kg) of dried bread. According to the provision regulation of 1740, this bread would have been enough for the rations of 300 soldiers for a month. Clearly, an army could not rely on the production capacity of the small bakery of Hamina.[20] To supplement the capacity of this bakery, the crown had to utilise the baking obligation of burghers and peasants.

In many parts of Europe, bread for armies was baked in towns because they had proficient bakers and better means to bake bread than in the countryside. Also, the Swedish Realm had a long tradition of utilising the civilian population in baking. For example, during the Great Northern War, the bakers of Stockholm and Tallinn manufactured large amounts of bread for the Swedish army.[21] However, in Finland, baking in towns was inevitably small-scale because the towns were so modest. The population of Helsinki was only 1,500 in the middle of the 18th century. The

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[18] Hatakka 2019a, pp. 175–180, 207–208.

[19] Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Wrede to Supply Commission, 1 October 1741 (No. 389).

[20] Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Buddenbrock to Supply Commission, 19 May 1741 (No. 310). Conversion ratio (flour to bread) is presented in Hatakka 2019a, p. 307.

[21] Korkiakangas 1974, pp. 176–182.

number of burghers was 100–150 and there was only one baker. Still, even with such a small population, Helsinki was one of the larger towns in Finland. Burghers confronted many difficulties when they tried to fill their baking quotas. Some of them did not have the means to transport grain to mills; others did not have ovens suitable for baking. In addition, most of the ovens were so small that they could only produce a small amount of bread.[22]

For the above-mentioned reasons, most of the bread had to be baked in the countryside. In a land with a low population density, this practice was expensive for the crown and cumbersome for the peasants, who had to transport grain, flour and bread long distances between magazines, mills and their homes. Because of the sparse population, many of the peasants lived far away from the towns and the magazines, and thus decentralised baking required a wide area.[23] The officials of the crown had to overcome these problems concerning grinding and baking if they wanted to succeed in provisioning an army.

Attempts to Build Bakeries in Finland

The lack of mills and bakeries in Finland was not immediately evident for the officials who had been assigned to take care of the war preparations. In March 1741, a commission was established in Stockholm to manage war expenditures and to ensure that military forces in Finland got enough supplies.[24] This Supply Commission (Sw. Utrdeningskommissionen) also supervised, together

[22] Hatakka 2019a, 50, pp. 170–171. On the number of burghers in Helsinki, see Granqvist 2016, p. 257.

[23] Hatakka 2019a, pp. 171–174.

[24] Winton 2018, p. 236. Winton has translated Utredningskommissionen to procurement commission, which describes the Commission's main task well: acquiring supplies for the army. However, in the context of this study the term Supply Commission is better because, in addition to procurement, the Commission was also involved with other matters concerning military supply, which included, for example, building bakeries.

with the commander-in-chief, the work of the War Commissariat, which governed the supply organisation locally in Finland. If necessary, the Supply Commission had power to command the War Commissariat to take action.[25]

The War Commissariat was led by Commissary General (Sw. *generalkrigskommissarie*) Fabian Wrede. When he was appointed to this position in April 1741, the Supply Commission asked his thoughts about the situation of mills and bakeries in Finland. At that time, Wrede was still residing in Stockholm, and he could only give vague answers. He told the Commission that there were around 20 pairs of millstones on the coast of the province of Uusimaa. However, he did not know how many of them could be used for grinding. Wrede also presumed that there were crown bakeries available, but he could not give any further information about them.[26] This was the level of the knowledge of the supply situation in Stockholm in spring 1741 when the war preparations began.

Soon it became clear that there were not enough mills or bakeries for the army. The lack of bakeries in particular was a severe problem that was hard to solve during the coming summer and autumn.

Although the war began at the end of July 1741, the commander-in-chief, General Charles Emil Lewenhaupt, arrived in Finland as late as September. While he was in Stockholm, the supreme command was entrusted to General Henrik Magnus von Buddenbrock.[27] Von Buddenbrock was also the Supply Commission's main contact in Finland before Wrede arrived from Sweden and got his instructions.

In May, von Buddenbrock informed Stockholm that, in addition to Hamina, the best places to establish bakeries were Helsinki,

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[25] See, for example, Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Wrede to Supply Commission, 12 April 1741 (No. 302), and 7 September 1741 (No. 377).

[26] Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Wrede to Supply Commission, 12 April 1741 (No. 302).

[27] Cederberg 1942, pp. 297–299.

Turku and Porvoo. However, nothing had yet been done to begin building these bakeries because there were neither bricks nor other building materials available. Only the construction work of the bakery of Hämeenlinna had been started, but the same lack of bricks had prevented finishing it. Furthermore, this bakery was less useful for the war efforts since it was located deep inland, on the other side of the Salpausselkä ridges, and all supplies from there had to be transported by road. All other proposed places were accessible by ships.[28]

The Supply Commission was eager to get the planned bakeries built as soon as possible and tried to pressure the War Commissariat to finish them, but the obstacles caused by the lack of building materials were hard to surpass. Acquiring bricks and lime were the first problems that were tackled. Wrede wrote to the Supply Commission that enough bricks could be acquired only if they were brought from Sweden. Hence, the Commission tried to help the Commissariat by arranging for both bricks and lime to be brought from Stockholm to Finland.

The War Commissariat also tried to obtain bricks locally from Finland, but it was not an easy task. The best situation was in Hämeenlinna, where von Buddenbrock had himself founded a brickworks to ease the construction work. According to him, it was the only way to finish the bakery during the autumn. In other places, the lack of bricks continued throughout the summer. Finally, at the end of August, the Commissariat could inform Stockholm that it had been able to secure with great effort 100,000 bricks and 100 *läst* (245,000 kg) lime.[29]

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[28] Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Buddenbrock to Supply Commission, 19 May 1741 (No. 310 and 311) and 26 May 1741 (No. 312).

[29] Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Wrede to Supply Commission, 9 June 1741 (No. 319), 14 July 1741 (No. 347), 21 July 1741 (No. 409), 24 August 1741 (No. 419), and 27 August 1741 (No. 422), Buddenbrock to Supply Commission, 20 August 1741 (No. 366), and 31 August 1741 (No. 368).

Another problem was the shortage of workers for the construction sites. In an ordinary situation, the crown would have used soldiers as workforce. However, after the war was declared in July, nearly every soldier had been commanded to the front. Remaining soldiers had their hands full with other duties. For example, in Helsinki there were so few soldiers available that even unloading the arriving provision ships was difficult. The Supply Commission also tried to solve this problem by sending workers from Stockholm. In addition, it sent designs for the bakery buildings.[30]

Despite all these efforts, the bakeries could not be built during the autumn 1741. The crucial problem was lack of timber, as unbelievable as it may sound in Finland, a land covered mostly by pristine forests. The War Commissariat already suspected in July that bakeries could not be built during the rest of the year because timber could not be acquired before wintertime. When autumn came and the war had begun, the peasants were overburdened with harvests, autumn sowing and military transport. They had no time to fell trees and transport logs to the building sites. Moreover, transporting goods overland was much easier in Finland during winter, when it was possible to use sleighs, and therefore most of the heavy transport in Finland was carried out during snowy winter months when ice-covered lakes and rivers could be used as winter roads.[31]

There were also other challenges regarding the availability of timber. Wrede tried to explain these in detail to the Supply Commission in late August. The bakery buildings needed special timber, e.g. for sleepers, that had to be ordered one year in advance.

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[30] Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Buddenbrock to Supply Commission, 20 August 1741 (No. 366), Wrede to Supply Commission, 24 August 1741 (No. 419), 27 August 1741 (No. 422), and 21 September 1741 (No. 383).

[31] Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Wrede to Supply Commission, 14 July 1741 (No. 347), 24 August 1741 (No. 419), 31 August 1741 (No. 367), 7 September 1741 (No. 377), and 21 September 1741 (No. 383). For the challenges of transports by road, see Hatakka 2019a, pp. 203–208.

These large timbers could only be transported when the roads were fit for sleighing. The bottom boards also had to be ordered in advance because none of the nearby sawmills manufactured them. Even ordinary timber had to be acquired beforehand since felling trees and hewing timber were time-consuming work.[32]

The Supply Commission was noticeably beginning to lose patience with the War Commissariat. It did not believe the excuses given and doubted that it was impossible to find suitable timber for the bakeries.[33] The Commissariat defended itself by putting the blame on former officials who had not purchased timber when there was still time.[34]

When it was clear that new bakeries were badly delayed, the War Commissariat had no other option than to oblige peasants and burghers to bake bread for the crown. The baking was concentrated in houses that had suitable ovens for the task. To help with the baking efforts, the Commissariat requested that two master bakers should be sent to Helsinki and Porvoo. Consequently, the bakery of Hamina remained the only crown bakery in Finland during the early part of the Russo-Swedish War, although its ovens were considered inapt for large-scale baking. In an effort to increase its productivity, two new ovens were built in the old bakery building. Their construction began as soon as masons had arrived from Stockholm, which happened on 28 September, but they were not finished before late October. The existing stores of bread had to be preserved as long as possible.[35]

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[32] Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Wrede to Supply Commission, 27 August 1741 (No. 422).

[33] Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1741 II, Minutes, 4 September 1741 (pp. 1084–1087).

[34] Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Wrede to Supply Commission, 3 September 1741 (No. 373).

[35] Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Wrede to Supply Commission, 21 July 1741 (No. 409), 24 August 1741 (No. 419), 3 September 1741 (No. 373),

Hence, the deficiency of bread production was one of the main reasons why soldiers were given unground grain instead of bread whenever feasible. This procedure was problematic because, even if soldiers could grind their grain with hand mills, they had still difficulties with baking.[36]

Acquiring Flour and Bread from Sweden

The Supply Commission was worried about production of bread even before it became evident that the building of new bakeries had failed. In a meeting in August, the members of the Commission acknowledged that required bread could not be obtained from Finland. To overcome the problem, the Commission decided to transport flour and bread from Sweden, but there was only limited time for this. When the Gulf of Bothnia and the Gulf of Finland froze, no ship could arrive in Finnish harbours. During the winter, troops in Finland had to survive without help from outside.

The grinding and baking took place in Stockholm, Norrköping, Nyköping and Östanå (mills of Loo). Altogether, the storage magazine of Stockholm delivered 22,800 barrels (3.3 million litres) of rye for grinding and baking during the year 1741. Additional grain was obtained from the magazines of Norrköping and Nyköping. The produced and bought amount of flour and bread is shown in Table 6.2.[37]

Table 6.2 reveals that nearly 190,000 *lispund* (1.6 million kilograms) of bread was manufactured in Stockholm. Practically all the flour acquired from there was used for baking. This achievement was only possible because of the combined efforts of the baker's guild and the crown bakery of Stockholm. The bakers of

21 September 1741 (No. 383), 28 September 1741 (No. 386), and 15 October 1741 (No. 405).

[36] Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Wrede to Supply Commission, 24 August 1741 (No. 419) and 31 August 1741 (No. 371).

[37] Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Protokoll 1741 II, Minutes, 12 August 1741 (pp. 352–359). See also the sources of Table 6.2.

Table 6.2: Flour and bread acquired from Stockholm, Norrköping, Nyköping and Östanå in 1741.

Place	Produced flour (*lispund*)	Bought flour (*lispund*)	Produced bread (*lispund*)
Stockholm	207,053	12,540	189,646
Norrköping	40,777	—	—
Nyköping	23,428	—	—
Östanå (mills of Loo)	10,824[a]	—	—

[a] This is an estimate because there are no accounts from mills of Loo. It is based on the knowledge of amount of used grain (902 barrels) and an approximate conversion ratio (1 rye barrel = 12 *lispund* flour).

Sources: Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Förslag 1741, Accounts from the magazines of Nyköping, Stockholm and Norrköping. Table by the author.

the city took rye from the storage magazine, ground it to flour, and baked it to bread. When the baking took place in the crown bakery, the grinding of grain had to be organised first. The crown gave this task to those burghers of Stockholm who owned watermills. In addition to production of rye flour, barley was ground to hulled barley.[38]

In Nyköping and Norrköping, contrary to the plan of the Supply Commission, no bread was produced in 1741. The reason for this was probably lack of time. Grain was shipped from Stockholm to these towns in August and September, which allowed little time for both grinding and baking. Even in Stockholm, due to the shortage of time, not all bread was ready at the end of the year. Nearly 38,000 *lispund* of the total amount was still to be delivered back to the magazine.[39] Nevertheless, the amount of readily available bread, roughly 150,000 *lispund*, was so sizeable that it would have sufficed for almost seven months for 10,000 soldiers or for over three months for 20,000 soldiers. This meant that there was bread for the army, but the problem was that it was

[38] Sources of Table 6.2.

[39] Sources of Table 6.2.

not in the right place. Bread had to be still transported to Finland before it was any use for the soldiers.

Transport of Grain, Flour and Bread to Finland

According to General Buddenbrock and the War Commissariat, the only locations in Finland where supply transport could be received were Helsinki, Porvoo and Hamina. After the supplies were unloaded from ships in these towns, they could be transported overland wherever soldiers needed them. The crown's intention was to avoid as far as possible this transport by road. Land transport was not only difficult but also expensive, for peasants were paid eight silver öre for a mile as a transport fee. Hamina was, therefore, the best place to unload the supplies during wartime because it was situated nearest the border. One of the main reasons that transport had to be also directed to other towns was that there were not enough storerooms in Hamina.[40]

As favourable as the sea transport was, it also had specific problems. Ships could be destroyed by storms, and warm weather could damage cargos during summer. For example, the crown lost nearly two thousand barrels of rye because of a shipwreck in summer 1741. In time of war there was also a possibility that the enemy could intercept transports. In that regard, it was safest to use sea routes that passed through the widespread archipelago of southern coast of Finland. However, it was not the easiest route because many areas in the archipelago were too shallow for sailing.

When ships arrived in harbours, they had to be unloaded, which required numerous longshoremen or soldiers as a labour force. This especially related to Hamina, where ships could not come to the quay with full cargo. Supplies had to be unloaded from ships

[40] Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Buddenbrock to Supply Commission 12 May 1741 (No. 308), 19 May 1741 (No. 310), 31 August 1741 (No. 370), Wrede to Supply Commission, 6 July 1741 (No. 342) and 21 September 1741 (No. 384).

to small boats off the coast and only then transported to the town. The War Commissariat complained that it had neither boats nor workers for this purpose.[41]

The first ships that brought supplies for the army came from Wismar and Stralsund, which were the last major possessions of the Swedish Realm in northern Germany. These transports were already organised in April, and the ships arrived in Finland from May to June, bringing thousands of barrels of rye and barley with them. Some supplies were also brought from Karlskrona.[42] More transports followed in summer, but they intensified only in July, as can be seen from Table 6.3. Rye and bread were transported from Stockholm, while flour came from Nyköping.

During autumn, shipped supplies constituted increasingly of flour and bread, but the amount of grain also stayed high. Rye and barley were the most important types of cereals for the needs of the army. Rye was baked to dried rye bread, whereas barley was mainly intended to be ground to hulled barley. In addition to these two cereals, mixed grain (5,097 barrels), hulled barley (1,543 barrels) and oats (7,341 barrels) were also transported from Sweden to Finland. Oats were primarily needed for horses. Most of the rye was destined to Turku, while flour and bread were brought to Helsinki, Porvoo and Hamina.[43]

Table 6.3 reveals that the crown could only import to Finland approximately half of the bread that was produced in Sweden in

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[41] Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Buddenbrock to Supply Commission 31 August 1741 (No. 370), Wrede to Supply Commission, 31 August 1741 (No. 371), 14 September 1741 (No. 380), and 28 September 1741 (No. 386). Of the difficulties of sea transport, see also Hatakka 2019a, pp. 212–215, 230–231.

[42] Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Diverse inkommande handlingar 1741 vol. 5, Buddenbrock to Supply Commission 14 April 1741 (No. 303), 24 April 1741 (No. 305), and 26 May 1741 (No. 312), Wrede to Supply Commission, 9 June 1741 (No. 317) and 16 June 1741 (No. 329).

[43] Sources of Table 6.3.

Table 6.3: Transport of rye, barley, flour and bread from Stockholm, Norrköping and Nyköping to Finland in 1741 (from May to December).

Month	Rye (barrels)	Barley (barrels)	Flour (*lispund*)	Bread (*lispund*)
May	—	3,593	—	—
June	400	1,610	4,046	—
July	7,658	—	4,176	40,123
August	6,809	—	—	1,216
September	5,670	509	26,430	17,812
October	5,271	4,231	26,717	16,386
November	—	392	—	24,038
Total	25,808	10,335	61,369	99,575

Sources: Krigsarkivet, Utredningskommissionen 1741, Förslag 1741, Accounts from the magazines of Nyköping, Stockholm and Norrköping. Table by the author.

1741. The reason for this was that there was no time to ship more bread before winter and frozen sea made it impossible to continue transports. In Table 6.3, lack of time is implied by the fact that last ships filled with bread arrived in Finland as late as November. As mentioned in the last section, not all the bread baked in Sweden was ready at the end of the year. Baking was still going on when the last ships sailed to Finland.

If the total amount of transported grain is compared with the total amount of transported flour and bread, one can see that grain was prevalent. In modern weight measurement, 36,000 barrels of grain equals 4,900,000 kg and 161,000 *lispund* of flour and bread equals 1,370,000 kg.[44] This indicates that, although Finland had serious problems with milling and baking, the officials failed to bring enough flour and bread to the army. This was especially true in the early part of the war, when grinding and baking had not

[44] Barrels can be converted to weight measurement, when we know that 1 *lästi* (2,450 kg) is 18 barrels of grain. Hatakka 2019a, p. 306.

yet begun in large scale in Sweden, and when ships were mostly loaded with grain.

Conclusions

Sweden began war against Russia under problematic circumstances in 1741. The logistical situation was difficult because of the poor harvests and the supply needs of thousands of soldiers who were stationed in Finland years before the declaration of war. Stores of grain, gathered in preceding years, were mostly used by the time the hostilities began.

Even if there had been larger stores of grain available, it would have been challenging to use them. There were only a few mills situated in such places where large-scale and efficient grinding of grain was possible. Baking was likewise challenging. Hamina was the only place with a real bakery, but it was both small and inefficient. Therefore, if the crown needed a large amount of bread, it had no other option than to oblige peasants and burghers to bake it. This was not an optimal way to produce bread. Towns in Finland were small, and the countryside was sparsely populated. Developing centralised baking would have been better choice, but it was not an easy task to establish new bakeries because it took time and resources.

The officials of the crown did not realise all these difficulties until it was too late. After the declaration of war, the Supply Commission in Stockholm did everything it could to improve the supply situation. When the War Commissariat in Finland complained about the difficulties of building bakeries, the Commission arranged bricks, lime, workers, and designs for the bakeries. However, this was not enough because suitable timber was not available at short notice. The Commission also organised production of bread in Sweden as soon as it realised that bakeries in Finland would not be ready anytime soon. Although grinding and baking was easier in the Swedish part of the realm, it nonetheless took time to produce large amounts of bread. At the end of the year, the baking operation was still unfinished, and the supply transports to Finnish harbours had to be stopped because of the coming winter. The attempts of the Swedish officials to produce bread can be, therefore, described as a fight against time.

Time is an essential factor to be considered in the context of the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743. The Swedes began the war with high hopes of gaining advantage by attacking Russia in a moment when it was crippled by internal political strife. This required resolute and quick action to pressure Russia into concessions and ceding areas. But the reality was quite different from what had been planned. Instead of attacking, the Swedes tried to figure out how to supply the troops required for the offensive. During the valuable first months of the war, the officials and the military leadership were occupied with getting building materials for bakeries, arranging baking in Sweden, and hurrying with the transports before winter isolated Finland. The war was more about efforts of supplying troops in time than it was about fighting the Russians.

Although the Supply Commission and the War Commissariat were active and did as much as they could, it did not change the fact that a period of a few autumn months was a short time to correct all the neglect of the previous years. For this reason, the failure in war preparations was one of the main reasons why the Swedish army was in such a trouble in the early part of the war. The politicians and military leadership clearly underestimated all the difficulties that were caused by the sparse population and the cold northern climate of Finland.

After the war, in an attempt to strengthen the defence of Finland, the Swedish Realm implemented many of the reforms General Axel Löwen had already suggested in the early 18th century. In the late 1740s and 1750s the crown established new magazines, bakeries and mills on the southern coast of Finland in the towns of Helsinki and Loviisa. These towns were also fortified by building the sea fortresses of Sveaborg and Svartholma, so that they could offer secure bases for both the army and the navy and all their supplies. Politicians and officials frequently referred to experiences and lessons of the past war when they realised these plans and organised the provisioning of the thousands of soldiers who built the fortresses.[45]

[45] Hatakka 2015, pp. 95–110; Hatakka 2019, pp. 42, 71–72, 143, 246–247, 290.

In addition to baking, milling and transportation, there were also many other supply challenges that the Swedes had to overcome in the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743. Thus, the question remains why the upcoming difficulties were not grasped in time. As it stands, further studies are needed to understand the path to the supply disaster of the Swedish army during the war.

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CHAPTER 7

Maintenance of Armies and Its Impact on Rural Everyday Life

Local Experiences 1550–1750

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Gracious Count – these freeholders, liable to taxation, from the village of Hyvinkää, in the parish of Loppi, situated in Häme – are complaining about their misery and poverty, escalated by the proximity of a public road, as the other villages are far, and they are heavily burdened by the troops of His Royal Majesty; in addition, during the latest years, much fields, cattle, corn and other property has been taken away from them, to settle their overdue payments to the Crown, so that they can't afford to pay their taxes, unless they get some relief. – Thus, they present their petition in the hope that you would see and hear their distress and poverty, – May God Almighty reward you; and this I confirm with my seal.[1]

[1] Original in Swedish: '– thesse skattskyldige – bönder aff Hyffingeby Loppis Sockn J Tauasthuss – Nådige Kreff til at beklaga theres Nödh

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In 1585, the freeholders of the village of Hyvinkää, situated in the southern inland of Finland, were appealing to Count Axel Leijonhufvud, governor of the area, to get help in their economic distress. As the heaviest burden, they mentioned the proximity of the main road between the coastal town of Helsinki and the Häme Castle. At the moment that the testimony was written, the Swedish Realm was enjoying the fragile truce after a period of warfare with Russia (1570–1583), a truce that was constantly tested by guerilla warfare and escalated into open war again in 1590–1595.

The tax rolls of the area report of regular visits of troops on their way between the coast and the inland castle, as well as of the dire situation of the rural population. Moreover, the situation was not getting much better over the following decades or centuries. It was seldom that the population of inland in southern Finland witnessed any direct military action; nevertheless, the maintenance of armies and contributions to the economics of war took their toll on rural communities.[2]

In this chapter, I study how the changes on warfare and maintenance arrangements changed the conditions of rural inhabitants in southern Finland between *c.*1550 and 1750. Based on my long-term research on some villages and communities, I give a case

armod och fatigdom som på them ligger, effter tje ähre liggandes vppå stora almmänn: wäghen, och andra byar ähr fierenn iffrå them, och ähre ther mz swårliga betunga… geno: K: M:tz Krigsfolzh, Thesliges ähr och tagit iffrå them j thesse framledne åhr både åker båskap spa:mål och alt annat huad ägha kunde för gamble gelder och restantier i så at the icke kunna förestå Cronones skatt och rettihgz, om the bekommer icke aff edhers nodh noghon hielp – För then skill ähr [sin?] ganska ödmiukelige bön til edhers nodh ar J welen werdigas see och höra theres nödh och armod, – edher Lönn tagand:s aff then alzmectihge gud, till yttermere wisso att så sanningen ähr vnd: mitt Signet' Testimony of the Chapelain of the Nurmijärvi parish, Henrik Göransson, Nurmijärvi 1 November 1585 (erroneusly 'Joosefinpoika', Josefsson, in Tommila I, p. 159). National Archives of Finland, Voudintilit [Bailiff's Records] KA 4239, f. 69.

[2] Lahtinen 2017, pp. 22–23.

study of the impact of war on rural life and economics.[3] These villages were called Hyvinkää or Hyvinkäänkylä and Kytäjärvi, situated on the border of the provinces of Uusimaa (Sw. Nyland) and Häme (Sw. Tavastland). Since the 1550s, they had been part of Nurmijärvi parish in Uusimaa, yet they belonged to the police district of Loppi in Häme until the year 1775.

Using tax records and census rolls, archives of the congregation, court records and private archives, I aim to make visible the long-lasting effects of the various preparations for war, the supplies for war, and the crises brought by the warfare. First, I present the situation in the mid-16th century, when the burden of maintaining the armies mostly meant paying additional taxes or arranging temporary accommodation for troops. Second, I study the effects of conscriptions and other obligations typical of the 17th century, as well as the consequences of land grants. Finally, I discuss the impact and aftermath of the Great Northern War (1700–1721). The analysis ends in the mid-18th century and the recovery after the so-called Great Wrath (the Russian military occupation of Finland, 1713–1721) and Lesser Wrath (the Russo-Swedish War and period of occupation, 1741–1743).[4]

The population of the villages of Hyvinkää and Kytäjärvi was only some hundred people; there were no churches in the villages, and they were administrated by the minister of the Nurmijärvi parish and the police district of Loppi. Even though the sampling is small, I see a long-term local study as a chance to discuss and illustrate the varying impact of warfare on the local level of very

[3] The material for his article has been partly collected as a part of my project on the history of area of the present-day city of Hyvinkää, the main outcomes of which were published in Lahtinen 2017. See also cases studies published in Lahtinen 2018a and Lahtinen 2018b. Previously, history of the whole parish of Nurmijärvi has been best covered in Tommila I; Tommila II; and the history of Kytäjärvi in Lehto 1989, which, despite lack of consequent annotation, is an important guide to many archives and sources.

[4] About the general lines of history see, for example, Maude 1995 and Lavery 2006.

ordinary rural communities. I will pay attention to changes in the conditions of local farmers, in the role of nobility, cavalrymen, local soldier households, and deserters, as well as the troops passing through the rural villages. To give local events a broader context, I will also relate my observations to previous Finnish and Swedish research on maintenance of armies.[5]

Arranging and (Mis)managing the Defence of the Realm, c.1550–1600

Looking at the 16th- and 17th-century tax rolls and census records, one can see evidence of harsh living conditions for rural communities in Finland. In addition to the effects of the so-called Little Ice Age, the period of cooling climate ranging from the 16th to the 19th century, the effective taxation system and the intensified warfare took their toll. The taxation was controlled more consistently than earlier by the central administration of the crown, and the early Vasa period saw intensified warfare, conscriptions, and movements of troops.

Situated some 60 kilometres from the new coastal town of Helsinki, established in 1550, Hyvinkää and Kytäjärvi with their surroundings were affected by the development of the town. King Gustav had high hopes that the merchants of Helsinki would challenge the trading power of the mighty city of Tallinn, situated on the coast of Old Livonia. In reality, Helsinki did not grow very influential trade-wise, although the war on the Livonian side gave it some momentum. Moreover, after the 1560s, Tallinn became part of the Swedish Realm, a turn that made Helsinki less important commercially. Nevertheless, Helsinki now was an important halting-place for troops travelling between the coast and the Häme Castle, which had its effect on villages like Hyvinkää.[6]

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[5] About related previous research, see, for example, Österberg 1971; Lindegren 1980; Kuvaja 1995; Aalto 2012.

[6] About the early phase of Helsinki, see Aalto 2012.

In the mid-16th century, most of the farms were run by freeholders (Sw. *skattebonde*), who had a perfect right to their landed property. The farm was to be inherited by their offspring, as long as they were able to pay the yearly taxes. However, as discussed by Petri Talvitie in this volume, if a freeholder could not pay taxes for several years, the farm was confiscated to the crown. Its farmer was now a farmer of the crown (Sw. *kronobonde*). At least in theory, a farmer of the crown could be turned out from the farm and the landed property transferred to someone else. In practice, however, it was not so common or beneficial to drive old farmers away, and many families continued to live in the same estate. Still, crown farms could easily be donated to nobility, or enfeoffed for a while to someone as compensation for a military contribution, for example.[7]

Looking at the tax rolls from the 1550s to the 1590s, a change for the worse can be seen. In the 1550s there were *c*.50 'bows' or men over 15 years old settled in Hyvinkää and Kytäjärvi. As a bow was a tax measure referring to a man old enough to participate in hunting as an archer, the total amount of inhabitants in the villages, women and children included, might have been around 140. Most of the inhabitants were freeholders, although some estates were in hands of nobility. The overall impression is that the farmers were relatively well-to-do.[8]

In the later part of the 16th century, the prospects grew darker as the Swedish Realm in general and the eastern provinces especially were drawn into lengthy and devastating operations and warfare against Russia.[9] The neighbouring parishes nearer the coast were directly affected by attacks from Russian troops.[10] For Hyvinkää and other villages on the side of the road, passing troops of the

[7] Tommila II, pp. 30–32; Keskitalo 1964, pp. 88–90; Lahtinen 2017, p. 22.
[8] Estimated after Tommila I, pp. 100–102; Lahtinen 2017, pp. 22–23.
[9] Mäkinen 2002.
[10] About villages burnt by the enemies, see *Uudenmaan hopeavero ja hopeaveroluettelo v. 1571*, pp. CIII–CXXXIII; Kuisma 1990, pp. 82–83.

king were the most considerable extra burden.[11] Even the maintenance of bridges caused an extra burden that was resented.[12] There were some efforts to establish a couple of inns on the road between Helsinki and the Häme Castle; however, the local farmers were most often those who had to maintain the troops. From the 1620s a denser network of inns is known, and at this point an inn was also registered in Hyvinkää. It was partly burdened by the obligation to serve the travellers, partly benefited because of its rights to prepare and sell spirits.[13]

The long war against Russia coincided with the crop failures of the 1580s.[14] In the tax records, more and more estates had tax arrears or were marked 'abandoned' (Sw. *öde*). These 'abandoned' estates were not necessarily uninhabited but incapable of paying their taxes. In some cases, the neighbours took the task of paying the back taxes of the poorest farmers.[15] It was in this situation that the freeholders of Hyvinkää resorted to Count Axel Leijonhufvud, asking for help as cited at the beginning of this chapter. Leijonhufvud gave an order that the payments of the villagers should be halved. However, the same persons who had been appealing to Leijonhufvud were even later mentioned in financial difficulties, or totally insolvent, 'wretched by poverty'.[16]

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[11] Tommila I, pp. 98–99, 157–165.

[12] Keskitalo 1964, p. 141.

[13] 'Bolemännens och Fierdingmänners vnderholdh i Finlandh, huarth fougderij för sigh, som bleff revocerat effter K M breff pro Anno 1583…' KB, Finska handlingar 1427–1700 II (1557–1583). Arw. Handl. X p. 199.

[14] Sirkiä 1999, p. 107; Vilkuna 1998, p. 194; KA, Voudintilit 3967, f. 48v. onwards.

[15] KB, Finska handlingar 1427–1700 III (1584–1592 [1604]), 'Register aff Hattula häred pro an:o etc. 85, 86 och 87, Matts Simonssons restantie.'

[16] '*är af fattigdom fördriffuen*' KB, Finska handlingar 1427–1700 III (1584–1592 [1604]), 'Register aff Hattula häred pro an:o etc. 85, 86 och 87, Matts Simonssons restantie'.

Even though the petitions may have put emphasis on hardships to have the hoped-for result, the above-mentioned tax records support the impression of impoverishment. In one of the neighbouring villages, Ridasjärvi, the number of 'bows' went down from 14 in 1539 to only one in 1600, while the number of cattle was halved.[17] At the end of the 16th century, all the farmers in Ridasjärvi and the Arolammi village nearby had given up their freeholder position and become crown farmers.[18] While Eva Österberg has observed only temporary stagnation caused by warfare on the south-west Swedish border in the 1560s[19], in Finland the situation was more severe and one can hardly talk about any recovery.

During the same time period, Kytäjärvi farmers also lost their freeholder position and were transferred under the nobility. The nobility had received established privileges in 1569, and over the later part of the 16th century it took control over many new farms and estates, reducing the access of the taxable freeholders to natural resources. Many farms and villages were enfeoffed to become tenants of the nobility. While in Hyvinkää the change was slower and only some estates were transferred to the nobility, all the farmers of Kytäjärvi disappearred from the tax records by the 1580s. Two smaller groups of farms were turned to tenants, and the third one, Niemi (Fin. for cape), became a manor called Näs (Sw. for cape).[20] From the late 16th century to the mid-18th century, Näs was mostly another distant little estate for its owners, the Tott and then the Fleming families, who had their residences in more central areas of the realm.[21]

While the taxation and direct obligation to maintain troops were the most keenly felt effects of the intensifying warfare, there

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[17] Keskitalo 1964, pp. 59, 126–129.

[18] KB, Finska handlingar 1427–1700 III (1584–1592 [1604]), 'Register aff Hattula häred pro an:o etc. 85, 86 och 87, Matts Simonssons restantie'; Keskitalo 1964, p. 61.

[19] Österberg 1971, pp. 255–269.

[20] Lahtinen 2017, p. 27; Lahtinen 2018b.

[21] Tommila I, p. 414; Tommila II, pp. 83–84.

were even other consequences. The Russo-Swedish War of 1554–1557, short though it was, had made King Gustav Vasa aware of the problems of supporting the troops. He had thus started new projects to arrange the maintenance and finance the warfare more effectively in the future. While studying the possibility of establishing a royal estate in the area, he became very interested in the prospects of starting a mine on the rocky hill called Hyvinkäänvuori (nowadays Hopeavuori, Fin. for 'Silver Mountain'). As Helsinki had newly been established on the coast, the plan was certainly to transport the findings of the mine via Helsinki. The first mining efforts waned after the mid-1550s, but were revived by King Gustavus Adolphus (Sw. Gustav II Adolf) in the 1610s and continued until the late 1620s. One of the reasons for Gustavus Adophus to restart mining was the need to pay the Älvsborg Ransom 1613, as well as to invest in warfare outside the immediate borders of the realm.[22]

The Toll of the Expansion of the Swedish Realm (1600–1700)

If the 16th century had seen the intensification of taxes and demands for temporary maintenance, the 17th century was marked with the shock of conscriptions. Although men had even been conscripted in the 16th century, the campaigns had been irregular.[23] Under the lead of Gustavus Adolphus, the Swedish Realm entered a period of constant warfare, expansion of the Realm and recurrent conscriptions. Adult men were counted and classified to groups of 10, a so-called *ruotu* (Sw. *rote*). From this group of 10 men, one was to face compulsory recruitment to the

[22] KA, Voudintilit 4432, f. 120r, Hollolan ja Hattulan voutikunnan tilikirja 1614; Tommila II, p. 149; Lahtinen 2017, pp. 28–33; an unpublished study on mining efforts in the early Vasa period by Mirkka Lappalainen.

[23] Tommila I, p. 161.

war. Of the farmers under nobility, every twentieth man was to be conscripted.[24]

The shock impact on demography was clearly visible in the tax rolls and registers of population. In the 1570s, the estimated population in the Nurmijärvi parish had been *c.*830 inhabitants.[25] When the census registration was made for the first time in 1634 in its entirety, there were *c.*400 inhabitants over age 15. If the number of minors is estimated to be *c.*40% of the total of the population, Nurmijärvi now had *c.*660 inhabitants. This meant a significant decline in the parish as a whole. In Hyvinkää and Kytäjärvi, the estimated population of adults was 42 and 59 respectively; children included, the total population of the villages might have reached 160 inhabitants, not much more than in the 1550s. In several neighbouring villages in the province of Häme, the population had all but collapsed.[26]

By the year 1634, active warfare had been going on for four years only, but already almost 70% of the strength of the then-conscripted troops had been lost to illnesses and epidemics. There were many soldiers' wives and widows distinctly mentioned, and the ratio of men and women was distorted. After heavy participation to the warfare, in the mid-17th century, almost two-thirds of the population were women.[27] The picture is in many ways similar to that reported by other historians, such as Jan Lindegren in his study on conscriptions in Bygdeå in 1620–1640.[28]

In such small communities, every conscription mattered, and the casualties were not mere numbers but fathers, spouses, sons and brothers, many of whom did not live long enough to see the battlefield.[29] While the war front was far away from the Northern

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[24] Huhtamies 2000, pp. 5–13.

[25] Tommila I, p. 103.

[26] KA, Population records of Häme and Uusimaa 1634, Voudintilit 4528, f. 252v; Tommila II, pp. 236–243, Keskitalo 1964, pp. 49, 63; Lahtinen 2017, pp. 36–37.

[27] Keskitalo 1964, p. 48; Huhtamies 2000, p. 7.

[28] Lindegren 1980.

[29] Huhtamies 2000, p. 7. In comparison, see also Hietaniemi 2019.

Uusimaa, its consequences were thus visible in the population, as well as in the burden of taxation. Päiviö Tommila has estimated that half of the worth of each year's crop went to taxes that in turn were mostly used to finance the warfare.[30] The tax burden, together with what Jan Lindegren has called 'the institutionalised destruction of some of the forces of production' – i.e. premature deaths of countless human beings – certainly required intensified efforts by the remaining workforce in local communities.[31]

In his analysis, Jan Lindegren observes an increase in productivity after conscriptions ended, due to the intensified efforts and coping methods developed by the remaining population in Bygdeå. In this local analysis, similar benefits for Kytäjärvi or Hyvinkää cannot be observed.[32] Overall, in the villages belonging to the Nurmijärvi parish, there were many abandoned farms and even whole villages without any inhabitants, even after the most intense warfare ended.[33] It was no longer a question of fiscally 'abandoned' farms; these were estates that were really left without any person who would have had the resources to rebuild them. Although the forcible recruitments ended in the 1660s – for a while – the population in Kytäjärvi and Hyvinkää does not seem to have recovered. It is possible that some farmers and families had moved to the southern villages of the Nurmijärvi parish, where the soil may have been better.[34]

While the ordinary freeholders could, at best, ease their situation by hiring substitutes for conscriptions or by deserting to forests, some wealthier farmers saw a prospect in equipment of a cavalryman.[35] Cavalry farms (Sw. *rusthåll*) equipped a cavalryman and his horse, and were in return entitled to tax deductions, a benefit that enabled some of the wealthy farmers to become even wealthier.

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30 Tommila II, p. 27.
31 Lindegren 1980, pp. 256–258.
32 Lindegren 1980, pp. 256–258.
33 Tommila II, p. 246.
34 Tommila I, pp. 242–244; Keskitalo 1964, pp. 46–51; Lahtinen 2017, p. 39.
35 Keskitalo 1964, pp. 145–147; Huhtamies 2000, pp. 7–9.

However, many freeholders found the cavalry farm position too expensive to maintain for a longer period, and several better-off cavalry farms of the area belonged to noble persons who were not financially ruined by the loss of one cavalryman.[36]

A new phenomenon, land grants given to Livonian officers, became known for the inhabitants in the 1640s, when Queen Christina of Sweden donated six abandoned farms to Major Jören Berg (1603–1681), a nobleman of Livonian origins.[37] In addition to these land grants, Berg also bought estates in the neighbourhood. His manor Raala (Sw. Råskog, 'a border forest') was in the neighbourhood of Hyvinkää. Later, in 1646–1647, Berg took over four abandoned farms in Hyvinkää and merged them into a cavalry farm that was kept by daughter Anna Berg and her husband, Captain Roms. Yet, two farms in Hyvinkää, Pietilä and Tapola, were turned into auxiliary farms (Sw. *augmentshemman*), which paid their taxes to the cavalry farm.[38] Cavalry farms were larger than crown farms.[39]

There was hardly any previous experience of noble neighbours really living in the village. Most of other manorial estates nearby were taken care by tenants. Jören Berg seems to have caused something of a shock when he took over his estates. For the benefit of all, he spent long periods of time on the battlefield, but when at home he was coarse and violent even to his own tenants and servants.[40] The returns on his estates were not good, so his aggression may have been partly caused by disappointment caused by failing crops. Coming from Livonia, where rural people were serfs bound to the soil, Berg most likely had different expectations about how he could treat his subordinates. Years on the battlefield may also have taught him to resolve problems with violence – which is not

[36] Of Hausjärvi especially see Keskitalo 1964, pp. 43, 63.

[37] Rein 1929, pp. 14–16. Jören Berg is first mentioned as captain, and as a major for the first time in 1657. Keskitalo 1964, p. 63; Eskola 2006, p. 79; Eskola 2014, pp. 119, 125–126.

[38] Tommila II, p. 75.

[39] Ahponen 2019, pp. 14–16.

[40] Tommila, II, pp. 71–72.

to say that violent behaviour was alien to other noble persons of the time.[41]

Be that as it may, Major Berg was constantly at odds with his neighbours and he even let plunder part of the harvest of the parish minister, 'Josephus Canuti, Pastor Nurmoensium'.[42] However, the long-time minister was not easily scared. He had himself been an army chaplain before settling down to the Nurmijärvi parish, where he served from *c*.1605 until 1648, and he resisted the aggression of Berg and initiated many court actions against him.[43] Josephus's solid resistance against Jören Berg illustrates the significant role of the local clergy as a mediator between local communities and authorities when in a dire situation.[44]

Occasionally, hostile relations between Berg and local farmers escalated to violent conflicts. Local villagers took up arms when they were to meet Jören Berg for demarcation of boundaries. Berg was wounded in some confrontations, and buildings of the Raala estate were burned down. The most obvious excesses by Jören Berg resulted in sentences at the local court; however, he also managed to get his will through in many disputes.[45]

From the Disastrous Great Northern War to the Slow Recovery (1700–1775)

The late 17th century saw several decades of relative peace, and also the introduction of the allotment farm system that replaced

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41 Lahtinen 2017, pp. 47–48.

42 Tommila II, pp. 70–71; Eskola 2014, pp. 123–124.

43 RA, Acta Ecclesiastica vol. 88, Nurmijärvi, Josephus Canuti's several letters to the Majesty, complete with the confirmation letter of the lay representants of the Nurmijärvi congregation.

44 Tommila II, pp. 303–304; about the general role of parish ministers and local communities, see Pulma 1999, pp. 162–163.

45 Rein 1929, pp. 17–18; Tommila II, pp. 72–74; Eskola 2014, pp. 122–126. On rural resistance in the 16th century, see Lahtinen 2013; Lahtinen 2018b.

the old conscriptions. Every *ruotu*, a group of farms, was now obliged to equip and maintain one soldier. During peace, the farmers were expected to provide their soldier a piece of land and a little dwelling. Their status of an allotted soldier was equivalent to that of a crofter.[46]

In the organisational reformations made in the 1690s, the Nurmijärvi parish was divided into 26 *ruotu*s, each one of them including three or four farms. In Kytäjärvi and Hyvinkää, the farmers were responsible for providing a total of five soldiers for the infantry regiment of the province of Uusimaa.[47] In addition, the local cavalry farms in Hyvinkää were responsible for providing one cavalryman each. It is not known how successful the villagers were in the maintenance of their first generation of allotted soldiers. The new arrangements took place close to the times of the Great Famine of 1695–1697. In some years, the crop failure was reported to have been all but total. Approximately one-fifth of the local population may have died during the devastating time of famine.[48]

Soon after the Great Famine, the outbreak of hostilities with Russia marked the beginning of what is called the Great Northern War (1700–1721), including the Great Wrath, the military occupation of the area of Finland in 1714–1721. Local allotted soldiers were immediately mobilised in 1700. As was often the case, there was soon need for reinforcements, so first one additional soldier per three *ruotu*s was required, and then one soldier from every *ruotu*. Consequently, at the beginning of the war, most adult sons and farmhands had already been sent to war. The infantry regiment of Uusimaa was taken to fight the Russian troops at the area of historical Livonia. The cavalrymen followed the king to Poltava, and, after the fateful battle – if they lived – to

[46] Tommila II, pp. 222–223.

[47] Tommila II, p. 216.

[48] HyKM, Katri Lehdon lahjoitukset, Loppi winter court sessions 17–18 February 1696, 22–23 February 1697; Tommila II, pp. 244–246; Keskitalo 1964, pp. 50–51.

captivity in Russia. The weakened Finnish troops retreated to the non-occupied area of Sweden; the military expedition to Norway became the end of some soldiers that had been taken from Kytäjärvi and Hyvinkää.[49]

It is not easy to identify the allotted soldiers or their families in the sources. From the last decades of the 17th century, there are surviving church records from the Nurmijärvi parish. In those records, however, the demographic development of 10 years is presented on one page per farm or village. Often, there are only rather unclear omissions and additions, such as undated comments 'gone to the [battle]field' (Sw. *rest till felt*). Nevertheless, there are soldiers' widows mentioned in the documents. As long as the allotted soldier was alive, the *ruotu* was expected to support his wife. However, as there were soon several men taken from each *ruotu*, and several of them were married, there were soon quite many widows and wives with meagre prospects.[50] Once again, the effects of war are obvious in the ratio of men and women: there were 157 adult women in the congregation records, and only 96 men.[51]

Conditions were dire. In addition to the war efforts, a plague had killed tens of inhabitants in southern parts of the parish in 1711. By the next year, almost half of the farms of the Nurmijärvi parish had been marked as abandoned.[52] On the top of this came the military occupation. In the autumn of 1713, Russian troops overtook Helsinki, marching towards the Häme Castle.[53] When the Russian troops invaded southern Finland, Samuel Erici Mechelenius (1676–1723), the parish minister, escaped. According to his own account of the events, he was forced to flee in totally

[49] Tommila II, pp. 220–221; Lehto 1989, pp. 53–54.
[50] Lehto 1989, p. 53.
[51] Tommila II, p. 7.
[52] Records of the dead and buried of the Nurmijärvi Congregation in 1711, Nurmijärvi Congregation.
[53] Keskitalo 1964, p. 178.

unexpected circumstances with his wife and children, through the forests and across the sea.[54]

The records are incomplete during the war years that followed. During the most chaotic years of 1714–1717, much of the property of the Nurmijärvi congregation was robbed. Many inhabitants of the parish escaped to less known forest dwellings or even farther away, to unknown residences, to return again around the year 1720.[55] For some, however, it was enough to move from the restless Hyvinkää to Kytäjärvi, and to return after the war was over. During the military occupation, the closest support for the local communities was offered by the assistant clergyman, Thomas Kelsinius, assisted by a local tenant of Näs Manor of Kytäjärvi: Olaus Wallius, previously a student of the Royal Academy of Turku.[56]

It is illustrative that in comparison, most of the more remote farms of Kytäjärvi survived the military occupation in the hands of the same families, while the farms in Hyvinkää, situated roadside, were abandoned except for the Nikkilä farm, which kept the inn for travellers. From the year 1714 onwards, the road between the coast and the inland was in the use of the Russian troops, and now it was their maintenance that mattered.[57] The stagecoach service was heavy – again explaining why the roadside villages suffered most.[58] In addition, natural resources were taken for the fleet. When the assessor, statistician Ulrik Rudenschöld, travelled through the area some decades later, he noted that the biggest local

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[54] RA, Acta Ecclesiastica vol. 88, Nurmijärvi, Samuel Mechelinius' own account on the events, Stockholm 22.1.1718.

[55] Tommila II, pp. 6–10.

[56] Protocols of Deanery inspection, 4 May 1718, 7 March 1718, Nurmijärvi Congregation; Tommila II, pp. 8, 303–310, 315; Lehto 1989, p. 46; Yrjö Kotivuori, *Ylioppilasmatrikkeli 1640–1852: Olof Wallius*. Database 2005 https://ylioppilasmatrikkeli.helsinki.fi/henkilo.php?id=2937.

[57] Keskitalo 1964, p. 178.

[58] Keskitalo 1964, pp. 180–181.

trees had been hewn for masts during the Russian occupation.[59] There are also some surviving solid stone formations called 'Russian ovens' (Fin. *ryssänuunit*) that may have been used by Russian troops during the occupation.[60]

The Russian fiscal records are not available; however, it is known that the local administration was to certain extent replaced with commissaries – doing tasks that normally would have been taken care of by a local priest, for example – and *starosti*, ordinary freeholders who were to collect the taxes. As has been pointed out by Christer Kuvaja, the flight of civil servants meant that the Russian administration did not get much local help or expertise in arranging the military government (1715–1717) or later civil administration (1717–1721).[61] The taxes were not heavy as such, but as many of the inhabitants had escaped and their farms were desolated; the solvency was not good. There were some economic prospects as well, however: from the 1718 onwards, there are custom entries that record the selling of beer and spirits from the villages to Russian troops stationed in Helsinki.[62]

Finally, in 1721, the Peace Treaty of Uusikaupunki (Sw. Nystad) was agreed on and signed. While the treaty ultimately meant the end of military occupation, there were still questions that had to be settled. The retreated regiments had to be relocated back to the Finnish soil, and there were prisoners of war who could be expected to return to their homes or regiments. The living conditions remained harsh and nourishment had to be sought in emergency food. In January 1731, the allotted soldier Hans Weikman

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[59] Ruuth 1899, p. 165.

[60] Sikopesänmäki, ID 106010003, as reported at Kyppi (Cultural Environment Service Window) of Museovirasto (Finnish Heritage Agency), see https://www.kyppi.fi/to.aspx?id=112.106010003; cf. Suhonen 2007.

[61] Kuvaja 1999, pp. 336–337.

[62] In December 1719, Matts Andersson from Hyvinkää reported 30 pottles (Fin. *kannu,* Sw. *kanna*) of beer, totalling some 80 litres, to Helsinki. KA, Läänintilit 7066, Turun kenraalikuvernementin tilit 1719 f. 493v; Tommila II, pp. 191–192.

from Kytäjärvi went to the forest to collect pine bark for bread, got lost in the whirling snow, fell into water, and was consequently frozen to death under a tree. One farmer from his *ruotu*, Henrik Haratta, paid for the ringing of the bells in his burial.[63]

Because the strength of the returning regiments was low, thousands of Swedish soldiers were added to the troops that were sent to Finland, and many of them remained and were assimilated to the Finnish population as crofters and occasional craftsmen.[64] These soldiers were involved in restoring the Kytäjä manor that had already been subject to property disputes and fallen into decay in the hands of tenants in the late 17th century.[65]

In the year 1740, the estate of Kytäjä was bought by noble Capitain Gustav Wulfcrona (1693–1754), originally a merchant's son from Stockholm, who had started his officer career at an early age.[66] After Wulfcrona had bought the Kytäjä manor, he brought the first crofters to the village – Swedish soldiers who had been previously serving in his company in Häme. The position of these soldiers reflects the above-mentioned similarities in the status of allotted soldiers and crofters. Captain Wulfcrona may have hoped to have Swedish-speaking crofters to ease possible communication problems. The former soldiers also had skills in handicrafts and they seem to have gradually assimilated into the community; however, the marriages between soldiers' sons and daughters in the first generation may implicate that the assimilation to the local families was not straightforward.[67]

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[63] Records of the dead and buried of the Nurmijärvi Congregation, Hans Weikman's death 9 January 1731, buried 7 February 1731; Payment for the church bells after Hans Weikman is recorded in February 1731, on the second last page of the Account Books 1724–1730 of Nurmijärvi congregation.

[64] Vuorimies 2015, pp. 53–70.

[65] Tommila II, p. 85; Lehto 1989, pp. 45–47, 84.

[66] Records of the dead and buried of the Nurmijärvi congregation, Capitain Wulfcrona's death after 10 January and burial 31 January 1754.

[67] Vuorimies 2015, pp. 177, 213, 221–222, 246.

It has been pointed out by Heikki Vuorimies that, in many ways, the Swedish allotted soldiers who settled in the area of Häme – in this case, on the very southern border of Häme – could be seen as a welcomed workforce that helped in restoration and recovery.[68] However, not every soldier settling down was in a good shape or contributed to the prosperity of the community. The soldiers were remarkably often present in court cases, accused of excessive drinking, fighting and promiscuity.

Soldiers fined for illicit intercourse reoccur in the account books of the Nurmijärvi congregation.[69] In Kytäjärvi, one of the troublesome figures of the post-war period was Johan Piquett (Picett, Pikett, Pickett, Biquelt), allotted soldier of Sipilä and three other farms; he featured in many court cases in the 1720s and 1730s and was referred to as an ungodly person by the court records.[70] He fathered an illegitimate daughter with a servant girl in 1728 and there were doubts about bigamy, as Piquett seemed to have a bride in Sweden as well. A death sentence was passed; however, the death took its toll in another form, as Piquett eventually drowned in Kytäjärvi in 1736.[71]

Despite some conflicts of interests, however, the most difficult times were now in the past. Although the Russo-Swedish War (1741–1743) meant yet another mobilisation against Russia, as well as a short period of military occupation known as the Lesser Wrath, the losses were not big or long-lasting.[72] When it came

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[68] Vuorimies 2015.

[69] See, for example, Account books of Nurmijärvi congregation, May–June 1730.

[70] KA II 39, Loppi winter court session 1730, p. 30; Tommila II, pp. 221–222.

[71] Records of the baptized children of Nurmijärvi congregation, 11.2.1728; Records of the dead and buried of Nurmijärvi congregation, 27 August 1736. Ruotu farmer Erik Eriksson of Sipilä paid the ringing of the burial bells; see Account books of Nurmijärvi congregation, September 1736; Lehto 1989, pp. 179–181. About similar suspicions of bigamy in near villages, see Lehto 1989, pp. 187, 189.

[72] Tommila II, pp. 10–11.

to the residents of Kytäjärvi and Hyvinkää, possibly the biggest damage was done to the aforementioned Captain Wulfcrona, and, more precisely, to his reputation. Wulfcrona participated to the disastrous battle in Lappeenranta in 1741 and was later rumoured to have deserted in a cowardly manner. To defend himself and his honour, he started a lawsuit and several petitions that only led to a posthumous compensation in 1755.[73]

Although the actual military campaigns were not very lengthy after the peace treaty in 1721, military readiness was still present in the form of the allotment system that was only dissolved in 1809. The allotted soldiers participated in the building and maintenance of Fortress Sveaborg on the islands off Helsinki shore. Via limestone supplies, Kytäjärvi inhabitants also contributed to the building of the new fortress structures in the Häme Castle.[74] The allotted soldiers even went to the Pomeranian War, fought in 1757–1762, and came home with a plant, potato, that would later on help to support their communities. It has been observed that the cultivation of potatoes emerged most prominently on fields that were allotted to veterans of the Pomeranian War, although the plant was, at first, considered more of a luxury than a primary source of nutrition.[75]

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[73] HyKM, Hyvinkään historiatoimikunnan arkisto, Carl Henrik Wrangel to the court-martial prosecutor Mannerfeldt, 22 May 1742; Records of the Court of Appeal, 19 December 1752, Gustav Wulfcrona's 'humble pro memoria' 4 February 1747 and 27 January 1753, The Royal Order 21 February 1755, as copies from the Kytäjä Manor Archives (copies of originals).

[74] Ruuth 1899, p. 139; Kalkkikallio, ID 1000028558, as reported at Kyppi (Cultural Environment Service Window) of Museovirasto (Finnish Heritage Agency), see https://www.kyppi.fi/to.aspx?id=112.1000028558; Koskinen 2007, pp. 294–305; A field excursion to the limestone quarries of Ridasjärvi and Kytäjä with Seppo Söderholm and the archaeologist Tarja Knuutinen, 29 August 2016.

[75] Tommila II, pp. 126–127, 221–223.

Conclusion

Above, I have presented and discussed the local long-term effects of the Swedish warfare and the obligation to maintain armies. While the studied area is very limited, the local experiences mostly follow the big patterns of the warfare effects. Of the period of *c.*1550–1750, only some three to five years involved the presence of the enemy troops in the studied area; however, the toll of war as well as the military readiness are present at almost any given moment, in the loss of the male workforce, in the growing percentage of insolvency, in the lists of soldier widows, in the dwellings of allotted soldiers.

At first, in the 16th century, there is the growing tax burden and the obligation to maintain the troops of the crown. The great shock, in the form of conscriptions, can be seen in the 1630s, along the lines with new noble landowners disturbing the local power balance. While there was a period of recovery during the late 17th century, the disastrous climate conditions, crop failures and warfare had devastating effects on local communities in the turn of the 18th century. Recovery was often slow, or just did not happen.

Being situated on the roadside posed a threat to a village in troubled times. It is also evident from the point of view of the court records that the return to peace was far from being a peaceful process: the returning soldiers were often prosecuted for restless life that disturbed the villagers. On the other hand, however, there was also assimilation of soldiers originally coming from the area of the present-day Sweden, and the effects or army maintenance had more subtle consequences on an individual level.

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PART III

Cities and the Provisioning of Armies

CHAPTER 8

Army Maintenance Shaping the Local Burgher Community in 18th-Century Helsinki[1]

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The military town was a sub-species of European urban system fathered by the military revolution. Towns had, of course, been affected by the military since time immemorial, but, until the birth of premodern warfare, the peacetime interaction between

[1] The article is based on my doctoral thesis *Helsingin porvaristo Viaporin rakennuskaudella* (*The Helsinki Burgher Community during the Construction of Fortress Sveaborg*), published in 2016 by University of Helsinki. All the statistical information about the composition of Helsinki burgher community presented here is taken from the thesis. However, the concept of 'military town bourgeoisie', which is here used to analyse the material, is new and introduced to the theme in this article.

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the military and urban civilian populations was limited. The medieval castle functioned as much as a storage depot and an office building as it did as a military stronghold, and only had a handful of soldiers in permanent military service. Furthermore, the castle was separated from the town by gates, moats, ramparts and other physical barriers, and thus formed a separate entity.

When the European powers began to recruit standing armies, and warfare was revolutionised by the advancement of artillery, the medieval castle became obsolete and the military town was born. In such a town, the civilian settlement and the military stronghold coalesced, and the large numbers of permanent troops lived in constant interaction with the civilians. In the Vaubanian fortress town, perfected by French military engineer Marquise de Vauban (1633–1707) and held as the ideal all around the continent, the whole town was turned into a fortress by surrounding it with bastions. This kind of fusion of military base and civilian town eased the maintenance of armed forces: the townspeople could be obliged to lodge soldiers in their homes, which freed the army from expensive barrack-building, and the local burghers could sell their services to the army and food and drink to the soldiers.[2]

In the Swedish Realm, the military towns were a late phenomenon, as the predominantly rural kingdom manned its army first by conscriptions and then by the allotment farm system. However, little by little, militarised urban settlements started to appear. Gothenburg, founded in 1621 to be a commercial and military stronghold against the Danes, was designed and built as a fortified garrison town.[3] Karlskrona, founded 60 years later, was first of all a base for the Swedish navy and only secondly a town, and the main function of its burghers was to cater to the maintenance needs of the navy.[4]

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[2] See e.g. Parker 1988, pp. 10–24; Artéus 1988, pp. 25–26.

[3] Andersson 1996, passim.

[4] Bromé 1930, pp. 69–88.

The biggest and most expensive military town project in the early modern Swedish Realm began in 1747, when King Frederick I (Sw. Fredrik I) approved the plan to fortify the islands off the small Finnish town of Helsinki. The realm had lost its easternmost parts to Russia in two consecutive wars (the Great Northern War of 1700–1721 and the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743) and had to rebuild its eastern defence from scratch. The fortress of Helsinki – later named Sveaborg – was to be a large garrison and naval base functioning as the *place d'armes*, or the central fortress, of the whole of Finland. The gigantic project was funded mostly by financial subsides from France, who pursued to curtail the growing power of Russia by bankrolling its enemies.

The construction of Fortress Sveaborg ended in 1791, after the French Revolution had cut off the vital French subsidies. The original plans had been so massive in scale that the fortress was left partly unfinished despite being under construction for over 40 years – apart from a few pauses, the longest in 1757–1763 due to the Seven Years War. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 19th century, Sveaborg was bar none the biggest military base in the Swedish Realm, with its standing troops – infantry, artillery, and army navy – and large civilian population adding up to some 5,000 persons.[5]

In this chapter, I analyse the development of early modern 'military town bourgeoisie', with Fortress Sveaborg as example. I trace the development of the Helsinki burgher community from 1747, the foundation year of the fortress construction, to 1808, when the Finnish War ended Sveaborg's history as a Swedish fortress, arguing that the co-existence with Fortress Sveaborg and its maintenance needs profoundly shaped the burgher community of

[5] The history of Fortress Sveaborg has recently been researched by the Academy of Finland-funded project 'Connections, Associations, Innovations: The Case of Sea Fortress Sveaborg, its Founding, Socio-Economic Impact and Innovative Role ca, 1730–1808' (2010–2013), in which the author also took part. The publications of the project are extensively referenced in this chapter. For the population statistics of Sveaborg, see Hatakka 2012, pp. 103–120.

Helsinki. This shaping was not conscious, nor was it forced from outside. Instead, the natural law of supply and demand was at work. The fortress had specific needs, and the burghers had the opportunity to make money by answering to those needs. Slowly, unconsciously and often through trial and error, the burgher community started to form a shape that was ideal for the maintenance of the fortress.

The 18th century was an era of modest but intent urbanisation in the Swedish Realm: the urban population roughly doubled, with the percentage of town dwellers out of the national population rising from 4% to 7–8%.[6] At the same time, the great legislative reforms and the rough-handed national economic policy, especially during the so-called Swedish Age of Liberty (1719–1772), reshaped the political and economic structure of urban communities. This resulted in certain broad national trends in the evolution of urban communities: the handcrafters were growing in numbers, the merchants increased their wealth and exclusiveness, and the petty-burghers lost their economic ground.[7]

All these variables were also present in Helsinki, but the effect of Fortress Sveaborg shaped them into something new. In some cases, the development of the Helsinki burgher community followed the general national trend; in others, it outdid it; and, in yet others, it completely subverted it. The key factor was whether the general trend was useful for the army maintenance. If it was, it was enhanced – if it was not, it was reversed.

The Difficult First Steps

When the construction work began in the spring of 1748, the army came to Helsinki with a firm intention to utilise the local civil society in its maintenance, as per the European models. The local burghers could, it was thought, deliver the brick, stone, timber, lime and other construction materials, as well as sell food and

[6] Turpeinen 1977, passim.
[7] Granqvist 2016, passim.

drink to the construction workers and soldiers. This would ease the logistical burden considerably, as the army would not have to engage in primary production. All it needed was money – money to buy materials from the burghers, and money to pay the wages and allowances so that workers and soldiers could purchase their own food.

This, however, was a miscalculation. Helsinki was a provincial hamlet with 1,500 inhabitants and some 80 burghers, barely recovered from the Russian occupation during the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743, and unable to cater to the needs of the soldiers and construction workers, whose number was at its highest some 5,000 men during the busiest years of the 1750s.[8]

During the summer of 1748, the right to retail beer, spirits and victuals at the construction site was leased out to two local merchants, brothers Georg Wilhelm Clayhills and Thomas Anton Clayhills. This arrangement did not last long, as officers soon started to complain that there was no food on sale in Sveaborg. The Clayhills brothers, brought before the town council for questioning, had to admit that they were unable to purchase enough victuals for the thousands of fortress builders.

The problem was not a lack of connections, as the brothers had probably the best business network in town: they belonged into an influential family that owned the biggest merchant house in Tallinn, Thomas Clayhills & Son, were sawmill owners and timber exporters, and operated on the credit markets of Amsterdam. Feeding Sveaborg was simply too gigantic and too sudden a task for any local merchant to handle.

The lack of bread proved to be another problem, as Helsinki had no professional bakers – the small-town people baked their own bread. The army demanded that the town council recruit master bakers, so that the soldiers could buy bread with their allowance, but the mayor and the councilmen flatly refused. They argued that the fortress construction was a 'temporary phenomenon' that should not affect the composition of the burgher community.

[8] Granqvist 2016, pp. 40, 61; Nikula 2011, passim.

For the town council, the case was a matter of principle and self-rule: the burgher community did not take new members on the command of the army; it took them when it wanted.

After the contract with the Clayhills brothers was dissolved, the local crown warehouses began to hand out victuals to the soldiers, reducing the prize from their allowances. To solve the bread shortage, the crown built a bakery in Helsinki, and soldiers begin to receive bread as part of their allowance. Purchasing and transporting victuals to the warehouses, and buying and milling grain for the bakery, demanded the time and contribution of numerous military and civilian officials. Thus, the army had to do just what it had hoped to avoid: invest a significant amount of money, resources and working hours into making the food supply system work.[9]

The town council's unwillingness to cooperate caused problems also for the burgher community. When some master bakers eventually settled in Helsinki, lured in by the growing urban population, they had difficulties in earning their living, since the townspeople continued eating self-baked bread and the soldiers got their bread from the crown bakery. Master baker Carl Gustav Krook, who relocated from Norrtälje to Helsinki in 1751, left the town six years later in a state of bankruptcy.[10] Johan Philipsson, who took Krook's place as the only baker in town, lasted about the same time. In 1766, a marginal note in a tax roll stated that Philipsson had 'disappeared from the town'.[11]

These two cases illustrate the two types of problems the army encountered. In some cases, the burgher community was willing to cooperate, but was unable to do so due to the lack of resources. In other cases, it went into self-defence against a perceived threat

[9] In his doctoral thesis, Sampsa Hatakka reconstructed the victual supply system of Fortress Sveaborg during the first construction years (1748–1756). See Hatakka 2019.

[10] HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:63, Helsinki Town Council protocol 17 and 19 December 1757; Granqvist 2016, p. 234.

[11] Granqvist 2016, p. 236.

to its political and economic autonomy. The law guaranteed the burghers the sole right to govern their own town and to do business inside its borders, and these rights were held sacred.

The purchase of construction material faced similar problems, as the quantities of stone, brick, timber and lime the fortress needed were larger than the local burghers could deliver. During the first construction years, the army had to resort to large-scale primary production. The soldiers were used for logging the timber, and the only brickworks in town was rented from its owner and expensively rebuilt to manufacture enough bricks. The situation eased after the first years, and the army was able to give up its own production bit by bit and outsource the purchases. When the lease period of the brickworks ended in 1753, the army decided not to extend the contract – despite all the money spent – and started to buy bricks purely from private entrepreneurs.[12]

All these entrepreneurs were not local burghers, however. In the old tradition of military entrepreneurship, several high officers of the army who had inherited financial capital and business sense had begun to sell materials and services to the fortress. Captain Carl Tersmeden, chief of the army dockyard in Sveaborg, is the most representative and most well-known case. After purchasing the Alberga manor near Sveaborg, he cut down its forests to sell timber and firewood – getting complaints from the local farmers, who accused him of desolating the whole area – and built a brickworks to its premises to manufacture and sell bricks. He also owned several vessels that transported soldiers and cargo to and from Sveaborg.[13] In the 1750s, a larger amount of the materials and

[12] In her doctoral thesis, Sofia Gustafsson reconstructed the construction material supply system of Fortress Sveaborg during the first construction years (1748–1756). See Gustafsson 2015. See also Nikula 2011, pp. 115–117, 146–147.

[13] Carl Tersmeden's private diary, kept from the 1730s to the 1780s and containing over 10,000 handwritten pages, is one of the most unique surviving sources of 18th-century Swedish history. Unfortunately, it has been published only as a greatly abbreviated version, which omits, among other things, nearly all entries considering his

services that the fortress needed was bought from Tersmeden and his officer colleagues than from the burghers of Helsinki.[14]

The main reason for the small share of the local burghers were their small resources. When the army made subcontracting deals with them, be it for delivering victuals for the crown warehouses, grain for the bakery or construction material for the fortress building site, it had to pay partly or totally in advance. A typical example was the contract the crown made with merchant Jacob Johan Tesche in October 1752. Tesche promised to deliver 3,000 barrels of grain for 19,000 silver dalers – a gigantic transaction by the standards of the Helsinki merchant community. Of this sum, 9,500 dalers were to be paid immediately, the other 9,500 when Tesche had purchased – but not necessarily yet delivered – half of the grain. In other words, he made the purchase solely on the crown's money, without investing a daler of his own.[15]

In 18th-century England, France or Germany, big merchants sold material to the army on long-term credit and thus were important financiers of the crown. In small Helsinki, the situation was the reverse – the merchants did not have enough capital to make the purchases unless the crown paid them in advance. This was a problem especially in the 1750s, as several burghers took advance payments for larger deliveries than they could manage, and the crown eventually had to collect its money back from their bankrupt estates.[16]

This was, among many others, the fate of the Clayhills brothers, the top merchants of their generation. After their unsuccessful attempt to keep the fortress construction site in food and drink, they made several large deals for delivering construction material. At first, they were the biggest local under-contractors, but it soon came clear that they had bitten off more than they could chew. In 1754, at the demand of the army, the town court of

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business ventures. Tersmeden's role as under-contractor of Fortress Sveaborg is discussed in Granqvist & Gustafsson 2013, which uses the original manuscript of his diary as source material.

[14] Gustafsson 2015, passim; Nikula 2011, pp. 115–117, 146–147.

[15] About the Tesche case, see Hatakka 2019, pp. 132–133.

[16] See Gustafsson 2015, passim; Hatakka 2019.

Helsinki declared Georg Wilhelm Clayhills bankrupt and confiscated his property to pay off his massive debts to the crown. Thomas Anton Clayhills avoided bankruptcy but spent the rest of his life as a small-time businessman.[17]

The Structure of the Burgher Community

The problems and conflicts that coloured the first fortress construction years were the result of high hopes colliding with harsh reality. The royal decision that turned Helsinki into the largest construction site in the Swedish Realm almost overnight caught the burghers off guard and unprepared. However, the burghers were able to adapt to the situation. Doing small business with the fortress gave them money, the money allowed them to invest, and the investments allowed them to do bigger business with the fortress. Step by step, the military town bourgeoisie began to emerge. To further analyse this development, we must take a closer look on the growth of both the general urban population and different burgher groups.

When the builders of Sveaborg came to town, Helsinki had some 1,500 inhabitants. Sixty years later, at the beginning of the 19th century, the town of Helsinki and the fortress Sveaborg had a combined population of almost 9,000 persons, one-third of whom were soldiers and the rest civilians. The fortress was officially a closed military base, but in practice it had grown together with the town, as large number of the fortress's garrison was lodging in the town and large number of civilian townspeople lived and worked on the fortress islands. Therefore, the 'twin town' of Helsinki–Sveaborg can be counted as one of the largest urban centres in the Swedish Realm.[18]

During the same period, the number of burghers in Helsinki grew from *c.* 70 to a little over 200. This growth, however, did

[17] Aalto, Gustafsson & Granqvist 2020, p. 266.

[18] Excluding the capital, Stockholm, and its more than 60,000 residents, the biggest urban centres in the Swedish Realm, such as Gothenburg, Karlskrona, and Turku, were in the range of 9,000–13,000 inhabitants.

not affect everybody in the same way, as different groups evolved along different patterns.

Out of the four groups in Figure 8.1, the sea captains are not discussed in this chapter. They were newcomers in burgher society, as only the Seaman Act of 1748 had required captains of merchant ships to acquire burgher rights. Almost all of them were employees of the shipowner-merchants and not independent businessmen, and thus they formed a group distinctively different from the three others.[19]



Figure 8.1: The Structure of the Helsinki Burgher Community 1748–1808.[19]

Source: Granqvist 2016. Figure by the author.

[19] See e.g. Granqvist 2016, pp. 86–89.

[20] The figure is based on a database, into which I have compiled curricular information about the burghers of Helsinki from numerous sources (the most important being the Helsinki Town Council protocols and accounts, and the annual poll tax and concession tax rolls), and which is published, together with a complete list

The number of master handcrafters in Swedish and Finnish towns roughly doubled during the 18th century, as the general growth of urban population meant growing clientele. In Helsinki, the handcrafters roughly tripled their numbers during latter half of the 18th century, from *c.* 30 in 1748 to *c.* 100 in 1808. The main explaining factor was the pull of urban growth, with the above-average growth in the number of master handcrafters being the result of the above-average urban growth.

The local craftsmen complained early on that the military population did not benefit them. The soldiers, who got their clothes, accommodation and other necessities from the army, were only interested in buying food and drink, and thus carried all their allowance to taverns and grocery shops.[21] The fortress construction site did not use the local handcrafters as subcontractors either. The army used soldiers for the menial work and employed trained army craftsmen for the more specialised tasks. Furthermore, a large number of enlisted soldiers were former apprentices and thus mastered different handcraft skills. Only a minority of master's apprentices had the opportunity to became masters themselves, and, for apprentices without career

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of sources, as an annex to my doctoral thesis; see Granqvist 2016, pp. 227–256. In the database, I identified a total of seven different internal groups in the Helsinki burgher community: 1) handcrafters, 2) merchants, 3) sea captains, 4) petty-burghers, 5) grocers, 6) restaurateurs and 7) butchers. In this chapter, I have classified everyone who was not a handcrafter, merchant or sea captain as petty-burgher. Although the grocers, restaurateurs and butchers were distinguishable in the community as separate professional groups, they were small in number and their economic and social standing was identical to petty-burghers; therefore, to simplify the analysis, I have counted the practitioners of these professions as petty-burghers in this chapter.

[21] HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:52, Helsinki Town Council protocol 30 November 1748.

prospects, enlisting to the army was a popular way of making a living.[22]

In the few cases where the army did use a civilian craftsman as subcontractor, it needed a special skill that none of its own soldiers could master and that was needed so rarely that hiring a full-time craftsman was not practical. It ordered windowpanes from the local glassblower, kettles and canteens from the local coppersmith, and stove tiles from the local potter. All these were makeshift solutions that were abandoned at the first opportunity; after a soldier who mastered the art of glasswork was found, the army stopped using the services of the town glassblower.[23]

This is not to say the construction of Sveaborg did not affect the handcrafters at all, but rather to argue that the effect was indirect. The fortress lured more civilians to the town, which meant growing clientele to the masters. The high officers of the fortress, many of them wealthy cosmopolitans with refine tastes, also supported a small group of masters making luxury products – a goldsmith, a clockmaker, a pastry maker, a bookseller, a couple of fine tailors, eventually even a portrait painter. But the maintenance needs of the army, be them the soldiers' need for food and drink or the fortress's need for subcontractors, did not affect the craftsmen class as whole and shape its structure in the same way it affected and shaped the merchantry and petty-bourgeoisie. Therefore, the craftsmen of Helsinki are not discussed further in this chapter.

The Enclosing Merchantry

In the Swedish Realm, the 18th century was a golden age for merchants. For the most part of the epoch, the official economic philosophy of the Swedish crown was strict mercantilism. To make the country more self-sufficient, the crown discouraged import

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[22] The soldier handicraft in Nordic military towns is a well-researched phenomenon; see e.g. Ramstad 1996. For soldier handcraft in late 18th-century Helsinki, see Granqvist 2019.

[23] Aalto, Gustafsson & Granqvist 2020, p. 164.

with bans and tariffs and supported domestic production by lavishly handing over economic privileges and subsidies. This benefited the Swedish and Finnish merchants, who were able to engage in new branches of trade and commerce with governmental backing, or monopolise lucrative businesses with the government's blessing.[24]

At the same time, the legislation concerning municipal elections was revised and the traditional *per capita* voting was replaced by proportional elections, where each burgher's tax rate dictated his number of votes. This led to a situation where the merchants, when unanimous, were able to pick the mayor, the councilmen and the local member of parliament without consulting the rest of the burgher community. This allowed them to both run their towns according to their own interests and take part in formulating the national policies, as the Estate of Burghers at the Swedish Parliament openly campaigned for the benefit of big business.[25]

In the Law Code of 1734, the merchants of the Swedish Realm were for the first time required to get formally organised by founding merchant societies. These societies became a tool for them to control their growing wealth and position. The Swedish and Finnish merchantry, which had during the previous centuries continuously got foreign reinforcements especially in the form of German and Baltic-German businessmen, started to turn inwards in the 18th century. The societies had an exclusive recruiting policy, and they openly favoured the sons and trustees of the old members. Total self-sufficiency was impossible with such small recruiting pools, but the effects were nevertheless prominent. The number of new merchants not related to the old plummeted during the 18th century, as did the number of burgher rights awarded to foreign businessmen.[26]

Helsinki rode on the high tide of this phenomenon. In 1748, Helsinki was an economically menial small town with 1,500

[24] Ranta & Åström 1980, pp. 255–265; Heckscher 1985, pp. 217–219.
[25] Mäntylä 1977, pp. 11–17, 34–66; Mäntylä 1981, pp. 27–64.
[26] Karonen 2004, pp. 37–39.

inhabitants and 25 merchants. In 1808, the twin town of Helsinki–Sveaborg was a blooming centre of trade and commerce with 9,000 inhabitants – and 25 merchants. The local merchant society had kept its numbers down despite the urban population growing sixfold and all business activities multiplying.[27]

The balance sheets of the Fortification Department reveal how the local merchants gradually took over the subcontracting deals. In the 1750s, only 40% of construction material was bought from the merchants of Helsinki. In addition to the purchases made from Carl Tersmeden and other army officers, the army bought material from other parts of the Swedish Realm. In the 1760s the share bought from local merchants had risen to 60%, with the share of officers and out-of-town businessmen dropping in proportion. In the 1770s, 80% was bought from local merchants, the remaining 20% containing mostly lime and limestone shipped from Gotland, the leading lime-production centre of the Baltic Sea area. The officers had practically disappeared from the balance sheets, as the old generation had died or moved elsewhere, and the burghers now left no room for new ones.[28]

With the capital made by doing business with the fortress, the merchants were able to expand their trade and spread their networks wider. Helsinki had always exported timber, first in the form of raw timber and later in the form of sawn timber, but it had earlier been shipped abroad by Dutch intermediators, as the lack of capital had prevented Helsinkians to build large merchant ships. During the 1750s and 1760s, the local merchants built a fleet of ocean-worthy frigates and began to export their timber to the Mediterranean themselves. They were also able to invest in pre-industrialisation: in addition to the brickworks mentioned

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[27] Granqvist 2016, pp. 48–50.

[28] The numbers considering the 1750s are taken from Sofia Gustafsson's doctoral thesis (Gustafsson 2015, passim). The numbers considering the 1760s and 1770s are based on the Fortification Department's balance sheets from the years 1766 and 1774: KrA, Fortifikations kassaräkenskaper GI F2: Finland, Sveaborg.

earlier, Helsinki got a sailcloth factory, a porcelain factory, a glassworks and several large breweries during the construction years of Sveaborg.

As Helsinki grew bigger and wealthier, there was no shortage of people seeking to become a merchant there. The local merchant society, however, had multiple means to block their way. It examined all applicants, and, if they were not members of the inner circle, usually found crucial flaws in their commercial expertise. The town council had, in theory, the power to hand out merchant rights against the society's will, but, since the merchants' favourites usually prevailed in councilmen elections, it rarely did so. Some rejected filed a complaint to the National Board of Trade and won their cases, but the majority did not challenge the decision of the merchant society and town council.[29]

The exclusiveness also benefited the army. In the 1750s, its local subcontractors had been poor and untrustworthy. They had demanded payment in advance, and often failed to deliver, so that the crown had to litigate with their bankrupt estates to get its money back. The growing exclusiveness of the local merchant society eased this problem. The wealthier the merchants of Helsinki became and the wider their commercial network spread, the less they needed advance payments, and the more reliably they delivered on time. The situation had created a self-supporting spiral: the more business the merchants did with the fortress, the more capital they had to expand their other commercial ventures, and, consequently, the better under-contractors they were for the fortress.

This development allowed some of the merchants of Helsinki to grow into business tycoons of national class. The most illustrious example is Johan Sederholm, who began his career in the late 1740s by selling material to the fortress construction, cemented his position as the richest man in Helsinki in the 1760s, and kept it until his death in 1805. At the top of his game, Sederholm

[29] See Granqvist 2016, pp. 80–86 for more detailed description of the practice of taking new merchants in Helsinki.

dominated all branches of local big business: shipbuilding, seafaring, sawmills, industry and subcontracting for the fortress. After the fall of the Clayhills brothers in the mid-1750s, he was the biggest under-contractor of Sveaborg as long as the construction works continued.

As his career advanced, the Swedish crown granted Sederholm numerous special favours. The most important of them was the privilege to buy tax-exempt manors (Sw. *säteri*), the ownership of which was by law reserved to the members of nobility. This allowed him to become the largest landowner in the region. Sederholm had, stated the letter of privilege, served the crown so well that he was entitled to rewards. This was a diplomatic way of saying that the crown owed uncomfortably large sums of money to Sederholm after he had sold construction material to Sveaborg on credit. Granting him complimentary favours did not cost the crown anything but diminished the risk that he would demand his money back.[30]

The letter of privilege perfectly illustrates the profound change in the merchantry of Helsinki. In the 1750s, Jacob Johan Tesche, one of the top merchants of the previous generation, had been able to sell grain to the fortress only with the help of 100% advance payments. In the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, Johan Sederholm and his colleagues had turned into important financiers of the army, as per as their British, French or Prussian counterparts.

The Thriving Petty-Bourgeoisie

Petty-burghers, or the 'third class' as they were commonly called, were the poorest and most heterogenous burgher group. They were small businessmen of all sorts – peddlers, vendors, grocers, fishmongers, butchers, innkeepers, drivers, barge skippers. They formed the grassroots level of the burgher community, modest financially but vital for the daily life of the town.

[30] Mäntylä & Mäkelä-Alitalo 1997, passim; Granqvist 2016, pp. 263–264.

In the 18th-century Swedish Realm, the petty-burghers were a species headed towards extinction. As the wealth and might of the merchants grew, they used both their grip over the local policymaking and their influence over the national policymaking to narrow the living space of the lesser burghers. Using privileges and subsidies as their tools, they were able to take over traditionally petty-bourgeoisie branches of business and drive smaller businessmen out of the market. In the local town councils, they lobbied for tighter criteria for accepting new petty-burghers, and even pushed whole trades and professions out of the burgher society, as fewer voters in local elections meant more political power to them.

In some towns, the petty-burghers as a class completely disappeared during the 18th century. In others, they stayed alive, but in smaller numbers and with smaller influence.[31] The only significant exceptions seem to be the military towns. A large soldier population craved just for the kind of grassroots services – most notably, food and drink – the petty-burghers were specialised in.

Helsinki is a textbook example of this phenomenon. When the construction of Sveaborg began in 1748, the town had a dozen petty-burghers. Their number grew more or less steadily until the end of the 1790s, when it was 70 persons at most. The permanent ending of fortress construction works caused the number to drop, but just before the Finnish War there were still 50 petty-burghers in Helsinki. During a period when the class of lesser burghers diminished or disappeared from most towns, their numbers in Helsinki quadrupled.

The most singular branch of the petty-bourgeoisie business was producing and selling alcohol. Military towns were boozer towns everywhere in Europe, and Helsinki was no exception. The annual licence fees all innkeepers paid to the town council provide a fruitful source material to examine this phenomenon. When the

[31] See e.g. Halila 1953, pp. 58–59; Mäntylä 1971, pp. 306–307, 364–368, 400–410; Nikula 1971, p. 287; Petersson 1972, p. 87; Keskinen 2012, pp. 52–53; Granqvist 2016, passim.

construction of Sveaborg started, the number of licence payers jumped almost overnight from 13 to 75. It decreased during the Seven Years War, but started to grow steadily after it, peaking at over 80 at the end of the 1780s. After the fortress construction ended in 1791, the number of taverns stabilised at around 30.[32]

The structure of the alcohol trade is revealed in a town council report made in 1784. The 61 persons who paid the licence that year included 39 petty-burghers or their widows, five sea captains or their widows, three merchants or their widows, one master handcrafter, and five non-burghers keeping tavern with special permission (a broker, a bookkeeper, a fisherman, and two widows of civil servants).[33] In that year, there were 58 petty-burghers in Helsinki. These figures show two things: the class of petty-burghers dominated the alcohol business, and the alcohol business dominated the class of petty-burghers. Two-thirds of them lived on full-time or part-time innkeeping.

Out of all the forms of bourgeoisie enterprise vital for the army maintenance, the production and selling of alcohol was the only one that functioned satisfyingly from the first day onwards. Lack of beer and spirits was never a problem in Sveaborg. A small and short-lived crown brewery, co-managed by the ever-industrious Captain Carl Tersmeden, operated in the fortress from 1753 to 1756; however, it was not founded to fill a shortage of alcohol but rather to improve the quality of it.[34] Carl Fredrik Zandt, the army doctor of the construction site, complained that some of the alcohol the burghers sold was of such poor quality that it made the soldiers sick.[35]

Thanks to the blooming alcohol business that supported the petty-burghers, Helsinki was one of the few towns where the

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[32] Granqvist 2016, p. 114.

[33] '*Förteckning Öfwer Wissa Ämbeten i Helsingfors Stad för Åhr 1784*.' HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:90, Helsinki Town Council protocol 12 January 1784.

[34] Granqvist 2012, passim.

[35] HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:57, Helsinki Town Council protocol 27 January 1752.

lower strata of the burgher community unionised. The craftsmen had had their guilds since the Middle Ages, and the Law Code of 1734 required the merchants to found merchant societies, but neither the tradition nor the law required petty-burghers to do so. The only two known Finnish towns where this happened were Helsinki and its smaller neighbour, Loviisa, the site of the construction of frontier fortress Svartholma.[36]

The unionisation happened in two steps. First, the grocers detached themselves from the rest of the 'third class' and started to appear in front of the town council as the Helsinki Grocer Society in 1774. Exactly a decade later, in 1784, the remaining petty-burghers officially founded the Helsinki Lesser Burgher Society.[37]

Although these new societies closely mimicked the procedures of the merchant society, inspecting persons who pleaded for burgher rights as grocer or petty-burgher and giving statements to the town council, they did not have real opportunities to acquire similar clout or prestige than the merchants' union. In a burgher community, wealth and commercial success equalled political weight, and Johan Sederholm alone paid more taxes than the whole petty-bourgeoisie combined. The town council routinely overruled their statements and took new grocers or lesser burghers in Helsinki against their will.[38]

Nevertheless, the societies proved to be useful tools for the lesser burghers. As they engaged in a war with merchants over the right to manufacture and sell alcohol, it was practical that they had a formal organisation that could prepare statements and hone strategies, and an official spokesman who could represent them in front of the town council. This war raged on for many decades and ultimately proved the power of the petty-burghers.

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[36] Mäntylä 1977, p. 74.

[37] For the first recorded mentions of Grocer Society and Lesser Burgher Society, see Helsinki Town Council protocols 25 August 1774 (HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:80) and 18 October 1784 (HKA Maistraatin arkisto Ca:90).

[38] Granqvist 2016, pp. 90–98.

The Struggle over Alcohol

The rules of alcohol business favoured the petty-burgher. His tavern was a family business in the full sense of the word: it typically operated in his home, with his wife and children serving the drinks in the front room, and the stills and brewing barrels bubbling in the back room. When the clock in the church tower struck nine and the legal serving time ended, the tavern transformed into a private home and the burgher family made their beds in the room that had just a moment earlier been full of merry drinkers. This kind of tavern had no higher profit expectations than to bring food to the table for the burgher and his family.[39]

If a wealthy merchant wanted to participate in the business, he had the opportunity to manufacture alcohol more efficiently than the petty-burgher. According to an investigation conducted by the town council in the 1750s, only a handful of the biggest merchants had 'immured pans' (*inmurade pannor*) – in other words, built-in distillation complexes instead of the freestanding stills.[40] But what the merchant won in manufacturing, he lost in the retail. He had to buy or rent a suitable locale for a tavern – opening a noisy boozer in his own house, next to his family home and business office, was out of the question – and hire external workforce to mind the pans and serve the drinks. Thus, the operational costs easily ate up the minuscule profits.

Since the rules favoured the petty-burghers, the merchants of Helsinki made two ambitious attempts to rewrite those rules. In the 1750s, a dozen of the leading merchants founded the Helsinki Brewing Company and built a stone brewery in the outskirts of the town. At the Diet of 1755–1756, the members of the company applied to the estates. They reported that they had 'with high expense constructed a stone brewery to serve the garrison and the

[39] Of the structure of early modern alcohol retail business in Finnish towns, see e.g. Savolainen 2017, pp. 138–149.

[40] HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:60, Helsinki Town Council protocol 28 September 1754.

construction workforce both here in town and in Sveaborg' and asked for a local monopoly for alcohol manufacturing in return.[41]

The plea was perfectly in line with the mercantilist, monopoly-favouring economic policy of the realm, and the Brewing Company was granted the privilege in 1756. But, when it tried to execute its monopoly, problems arose. Swedish Realm joined the Seven Years War in 1757, and the construction of Sveaborg was halted, as the soldiers were needed in the Prussian battlefields. This temporarily killed the alcohol business in Helsinki, the number of licence-paying taverns dropping from 72 to nine in a few years. Furthermore, the petty-burghers launched an official complaint and made it clear that they were ready to fight hard and long to keep what remained of the business in their own hands.[42]

The merchants backed down. They announced that, regarding the circumstances, they were ready to allow the alcohol business to continue as usual 'for the time being'. The issue was never revisited.[43]

Another attempt was made in 1787, when King Gustav III reformed the national alcohol policy. The right to manufacture alcohol was leased out to private entrepreneurs in each town and parish. In Helsinki, the Brewing Company and the Lesser Burgher Society competed harshly. The former wanted to concentrate all manufacturing of alcohol into the brewery, while the latter wanted to rent the manufacturing rights collectively in the name of all local petty-burghers.

The town council delegated the decision to the Town Elders. They were a representative body of members from different burgher groups, whose advice and opinion were asked in important political

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[41] '*… med nog dryg kåstnad nu låtit upbygga et brygghus af sten, till at therigenom fournera garnizon och arbets manskapet både i staden och på Sveaborg …*' The pleas of the Town of Helsinki to the Diet of 1755, § 3. Published in Nordmann 1908, p. 149.

[42] The complaint itself has not survived, but it is been referenced to in Helsinki Town Council protocol of 27 March 1759 (HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:65).

[43] HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:66, Helsinki Town Council protocol 13 February 1760.

and economic matters – an 'upper house' of sorts. The lesser burghers were under-represented in the Elders, but the craftsmen and also couple of the poorer merchants took their side and chose the proposition of the Lesser Burgher Society. The Brewing Company was the project of the richest and mightiest merchants, and the majority of burghers preferred the old system.[44]

Even though a well-functioning alcohol market was vital for the military maintenance, the army took no official stance in these fights. This was probably a wise choice, as the burghers traditionally had a knee-jerk negative reaction every time the army tried to involve into their business matters. However, it can be read between the lines that the army preferred the existing and time-honoured system over the new one the merchants tried to build. Notably, it was unwilling to cooperate with the Brewing Company in any way when it tried to create its monopoly in the 1750s. The company wanted to build its own taverns in Sveaborg – creating thus a total manufacture–retail monopoly over alcohol – but a representor of the army denied them the right, arguing that there were already enough taverns in the fortress.[45]

The Entrepreneurs of Newtown

The local geography posed its own problems to the burghers selling their services to the army. Fortress Sveaborg was on islands, a quarter Swedish mile (2.5 kilometres) from the town harbour. For the merchants selling construction material, this was no obstacle, as large cargos were easier to transport by sea than on dry land, and the construction work took place in summertime, when the sea was open. For the supply of food and drink, the situation was more complex. As the soldiers were unable to freely visit the town and use its commercial services due to the water between, the grocers and innkeepers had to operate on the fortress islands.

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[44] HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:93, Helsinki Town Council protocol 8 and 9 November 1787.

[45] HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Cb:40, Captain Jacob Gerdes to Helsinki Town Council 26 July 1756.

In the first construction summer 1748, as stated earlier, the army subleased the right to sell food and drink at the construction site to the Clayhills brothers. After it became clear the brothers were unable to fill the contract, the town council declared in the October of the same year that all burghers had the right to operate commercially in the fortress. In only a few years, a whole shanty town referred to commonly as 'Newtown' (Sw. Nystad), full of groceries, haberdasheries, taverns and restaurants, rose to the fortress islands to offer its services to the soldiers.[46]

In the first years, Newtown caused heated exchanges of words and letters between the officials of the fortress and the town. The formers were annoyed that the burghers had settled in the fortress area without the army's consent and operated there without supervision or authorisation. However, they grudgingly tolerated the situation since the system worked. By the mid-1750s only the temporary workforce was still sustained through the crown warehouses, the soldiers of the permanent garrison troops already buying all their food and drink from Newtown.[47] As the manpower of the garrison increased and the number of seasonal workers dropped after the 1750s, Newtown became the main method of feeding the soldiers of Sveaborg.

The final peace treaty in the matter was composed in 1763, when the officers and the burghers made a detailed agreement concerning the business conditions in Sveaborg. The burghers promised officially to see that Newtown had enough grocers, butchers, innkeepers and restaurateurs to meet the needs of the army. Furthermore, every burgher needed the double authorisation of the Helsinki Town Council and the commandant of Sveaborg in order to operate in the fortress. This finely balanced resolution satisfied the army's need for larger control over Newtown without threatening the burghers' economic autonomy.[48]

For several decades, Newtown functioned as intended, housing enough merchants and petty-burghers to keep the soldiers

[46] Granqvist 2015, pp. 79–81.

[47] Hatakka 2019.

[48] HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:69, Helsinki Town Council protocol 8 April 1763.

in fresh meat, groceries and alcoholic beverages, and a relative peace reigned in the relationship between the town and the army. But, after the Russo-Swedish War of 1788–1790, problems arose. As the generation of burghers that had got their authorisation in the 1760s died and retired, very few of their younger colleagues were ready to become their successors. As a result, the mayor and the councilmen began to receive complaints from the fortress commandant about the lack of commercial services.

The burghers' lack of interest in living and operating in Sveaborg rose from two things. The construction work was reduced in 1778 and altogether abandoned in 1791, meaning that the Newtown burghers lost the clientele of seasonal workers. Furthermore, the town of Helsinki had grown and provided more business opportunities for the burghers, making the keeping of a shop or a tavern in Newtown much less attractive in the 1790s than it had been in the 1750s.[49]

The town council had a problem to solve. It was the keeper of the concord between the army and the burghers that was archived in the 1763 agreement. In that agreement, the burghers had committed to provide all the necessary commercial services in Sveaborg. Breaking the contract would have caused a serious riff to the local civil–military relationship. As a makeshift solution, the council started to bend rules and give burgher rights to members of the military who were willing to do business and keep taverns and shops in Sveaborg. Sergeant Carl Teckenberg of the army navy was appointed grocer in 1790, and baker Johan Österberg from the army bakery became merchant in 1792.

The appointment of two men perhaps does not seem a large issue, but the burghers of Helsinki did not think so. By taking in outsiders of the burgher community without any sort of formal qualifications, the town council crossed a line previously uncrossed. Both the merchant society and the grocer society flared up and protested with the strongest terms possible. The council, however, was unflappable in its decision. It stated that 'the Commandants

[49] Granqvist 2016, pp. 183–186.

of Sveaborg have repeatedly complained over the fact that the local burghers do not sell in the fortress enough food, drink and other necessities for the daily benefit of His Royal Majesty's officials and garrison soldiers as well as the other inhabitants of the fortress', and therefore, the appointments of Teckenberg and Österberg were a necessity.[50]

The petty-bourgeoisie, on the other hand, saw no problem in collaborating with these two upstarts. By 1787, the Lesser Burgher Society had already subleased the right to manufacture and sell alcohol in Sveaborg to a company headed by Teckenberg and Österberg. The company built a large brewery in Sveaborg and ran the alcohol market of the fortress up until the breakout of Finnish War in 1808. After spending half a century fighting with the merchants over the control of alcohol market, the lesser burghers rather cooperated with total outsiders than with the richest members of their own community.

Grocer Carl Teckenberg filed bankruptcy in the turn of the century, but Johan Österberg grew to be the merchant-king of Sveaborg. He ran a haberdashery and grocery shop, a bakery and a tavern in Newtown and was the chief owner and operator of the fortress brewery. He sold gunpowder to the army, acting as official military purveyor, and had joint business with several high officers of the fortress, including the commandant of Sveaborg himself, General Nils Mannerskants. In the last years before his death in 1803 he was the second-richest merchant in all of Helsinki–Sveaborg, surpassed in the tax rolls only by the old Johan Sederholm.

Many of Österberg's actions veered on the illegal and generated complaints to the town council. To be able to continue his bakery

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[50] '*… och Klagomål, tid efter annan af wederbörande Befallningshafvare å Sweaborg blifwit theröf:r anförde, at Borgerskapet här i Staden urachlåtit hålla på fästningen til försälgning, förfrisknings och mat-wahror, samt flera förnödenheter, som Kungl. Mai:ts thärwarande Ämbetsman och Garnizons Milice samt fästningens öfriga Innewånare dageligen betarfwa …*' HKA, Maistraatin arkisto Ca:96, Helsinki Town Council protocol 12 April 1790.

business even after becoming merchant – practising handcraft, including baking, was illegal for merchants – Johan Österberg used his younger brother Zacharias as front man. On paper, Zacharias Österberg was the owner and operator of Newtown bakery, even though he did not even live in Helsinki. The other local bakers tried on several occasions to shut down Österberg's bakery, but the town council protected him and systematically dismissed all complaints, even though it was well aware of the illegality of the situation.[51]

For the town council, Johan Österberg was too big to fail. At his peak, the 'King of Newtown' almost singlehandedly kept Sveaborg in groceries, bread, beer and booze. Both his indispensability for the fortress maintenance and his close connections with its highest officers made him untouchable, and the mayor and the councilmen considered it wiser to turn a blind eye to his endeavours.[52]

Conclusions

The latter half of the 18th century saw the birth of a new Nordic military town, as the little town of Helsinki evolved into the blooming fortress town of Helsinki–Sveaborg. At the same time, the local burgher community evolved into a military town bourgeoisie – one fully equipped to serve all the major maintenance needs of the army.

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[51] Österberg's actions did not propel complaints to Helsinki Town Council only. Around the year 1800, an anonymous and undated letter sent to King Gustav IV Adolf described Sveaborg as a nest of corruption and pinpointed Johan Österberg as the most glaring example. According to the letter, Österberg's private vessels were repaired at the army navy dockyard at the crown's expense. When the king had visited Sveaborg, Österberg's barge, which was at the time under repairs, had been hidden by the dockyard workers in order to avoid awkward questions. The letter is referenced in Odelberg 1954, pp. 304–305.

[52] Granqvist 2015, pp. 83–86; Granqvist 2016, pp. 187–189.

The start was rocky. In the 1750s, the actions and interest of the army collided frequently with those of the burghers. The army had come to the town with the intention of adopting the European models of military maintenance, only to discover that their functionality in Helsinki was questionable at best. The local burgher community was not the resourceful and obedient pool of helpers the army had hoped for. In many cases, they were too poor and too few to take care of the army's needs; in others, they bluntly refused to cooperate for fear of losing their autonomy.

Half a century of co-existence shaped both parties. On the one hand, the burgher community grew larger and wealthier, and thus was better equipped to fill the maintenance needs. The members of the exclusive Helsinki Merchant Society became more resourceful subcontractors, and the biggest of them even started to act as army financiers, European style. The local petty-bourgeoisie, in turn, grew and prospered, because the grassroots services they offered – most importantly, alcohol – were vital for the military community.

On the other hand, the army became more resilient and ready to accept ad hoc solutions for the maintenance problems, even though those broke official rules and established conventions. The most important of these was the spontaneous growth of Newtown in the fortress islands. After a period of protest on the army's part, commandants of Sveaborg became official patrons of Newtown and its burghers. Illegal as it might have been, the solution worked, as Newtown solved the problem of soldiers' food and drink, and acceptance was wisdom.

Also, the readiness of the town council to meet the army halfway improved. In the 1750s the councilmen reacted with almost knee-jerk opposition when the army suggested appointing more burghers in the town. In 1763, it was already willing to share its authority over Newtown with the commandant of the fortress. Finally, in the early 1790s, the council was ready to go so far as to appoint army employees as burghers in order to keep up the good relations, despite fiery protests from its own community. Defensive approach had mellowed into pragmatism.

By the beginning of the 19th century, the burgher community of Helsinki had acquired a shape ideal for army maintenance. It included a closed circle of wealthy merchants who acted as financers and subcontractors, a large group of petty-burghers who took care of the grassroots services, and a handful of men specialised in catering to the needs of the fortress islands. What orders and ultimatums from the army had not managed to do, the simple law of supply and demand had.

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CHAPTER 9

Billeted Soldiers and Local Civilians in 1750s Helsinki

Sofia Gustafsson

The year 1748 saw the beginning of one of the biggest construction projects that took place in the early modern Swedish Realm – the building of the sea fortress Sveaborg (later renamed Suomenlinna in Finnish) outside Helsinki. The Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743 had once more pushed the eastern border westwards and the old defence line was lost. A new central fortress along the southern coast of Finland had to be constructed. After much debate, the plan to fortify Helsinki and the island outside the town was finally approved by the Diet in 1747.

During the following years, all Finnish soldiers and several Swedish regiments were sent to Helsinki for the construction works, alongside plenty of craftsmen and experts. The small town of Helsinki, with around 1,300 inhabitants in 1747, grew

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rapidly.[1] The military population soon outnumbered the local civilians. According to the original plan, the fortress should have been ready within five years, but it was never fully completed despite the construction works lasting for nearly 60 years. However, the most intense phase of the construction works was over by 1756, when most of the islands were in defendable condition.

The fortress construction brought two different kinds of soldiers to Helsinki: allotted regiments commanded for construction work, and enlisted regiments commanded for garrison duties. Most of the former stayed in the town only temporarily, since the construction works mainly took place between May and September, whereas the latter settled permanently in Sveaborg. All the soldiers had to be accommodated somewhere, but, as building barracks was a slow process, the crown had to resort in large scale to the billeting system.

The lack of military infrastructure had already, during the medieval period, created a system where the locals had to accommodate and transport both military and civil staff on behalf of the state. Burghers had already been obliged to billet soldiers in their homes in the 16th century, when the system was used, for example, in Stockholm and Helsinki.[2] The accommodation and transportation duties often resulted in complaints from the local inhabitants, and on several occasions the state sought to regulate the system.[3]

The allotment system, where soldiers of provincial regiments were provided with a piece of land, was introduced in the Swedish Realm from the late 17th century onwards. The system turned soldiers to crofters taking care of their own subsistence, making it possible for the state to sustain a standing army in peacetime. However, this system did not remove the problem of how to sustain the enlisted garrison troops in urban areas, and the state

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[1] Turpeinen 1977, p. 125.

[2] Gidlöf 1976, p. 721; Jansson 1991, p. 209; Aalto 2012, pp. 89–94, 135–144, 214–216, 220–224.

[3] Holm 2009, pp. 66–69.

continued to use the billeting system in towns if garrisons were not available. Especially for temporary needs, the billeting system was cheaper, faster and more flexible.

In the 17th century, when the Swedish Realm was as its biggest, the garrison cities were mainly in the Baltic states and far in the east, but after the Great Northern War (1700–1721) garrisons reappeared in Finnish towns. In the 1720s, billeting was used in the towns of Hamina and Lappeenranta, which were fortified to defend the new eastern border.[4] After these two towns had been lost in the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743, new fortresses were built in Helsinki and Loviisa, and along came also the billeting system.[5]

The billeting question was hotly debated at the Diet in the 1760s. The burghers wanted the option to pay for accommodation in cash, while the nobility still wanted it to be the right to a living space. In 1766, when a new regulation was finally passed, the burghers got the right to perform their duty in money, while other houseowners in the cities also became obliged to participate. However, houseowners belonging to the nobility or the clergy remained exempted from the accommodation duty.[6]

The question of accommodating soldiers was by no means just a Swedish problem. All over Europe, early modern states were dealing with the same issue: how to sustain permanent armies without making costly investments in infrastructure. A very similar system was in force for example in 17th- and 18th-century Denmark, where soldiers were billeted among the civilians.[7] And, in France and the Netherlands, billeting soldiers was the last resort if garrisons were not available.[8]

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[4] Ahonen 1991, pp. 34–42.

[5] Lappalainen 1993, pp. 11–12.

[6] Gidlöf 1976, p. 723.

[7] Bjerg 1994, p. 51.

[8] Guignet 2006, pp. 10–11; Kappelhof 2006, pp. 295; Lamarre 2006, pp. 309–310; Vermeesch 2006, pp. 277–280.

The billeting of soldiers in the Swedish Realm has been studied, for the main part, as it relates to its biggest cities, Stockholm and Gothenburg, which were most deeply and chronically affected by it. In his article about the Svea Life Guards in Stockholm, Leif Gidlöf (1976) focuses not only on the accommodation but also on the soldiers' economic activities. Pär Frohnert (1985) has also written about the soldiers' accommodation in Stockholm, mainly about the debate in the 1760s. The enlisted soldiers' involvement in crafts and their work in manufacturing in western Sweden have been studied by Thomas Magnusson (2005), and Gothenburg has also been studied by Bertil Andersson (1997). Also, the soldiers' wives' economic activities have been studied, e.g. by AnnaSara Hammar (2017) and Marie Lennersand (2017). In Finland, the 18th-century garrison cities have been studied by, e.g., Voitto Ahonen (1991), Ulla-Riitta Kauppi (1993) and Jussi T. Lappalainen (1993). For Helsinki, the soldiers' craft works have been studied by Juha-Matti Granqvist (2018) and the soldiers' criminality by Petri Talvitie (2014).

In the 1750s, Helsinki was turned into a huge military camp. The billeting also lasted for years, not week or months, and caused long-lasting tension between the military and the local civil authorities. How did the accommodation of the soldiers and other military staff take place? How did the billeting system work in a small town under these extreme circumstances? What were the relations between the army staff and the civilians? How and in which ways did they interact economically and socially?

The main sources used for this study are Helsinki Town Council protocols and court records from the local treasurer's court, the inferior town court that dealt with minor offences but also conducted a first examination of more serious crimes. I have also used different church records from both civil and military congregations in southern Finland, mainly in the form of the genealogists' database for church records called Historiakirjat (HisKi).

The Billeting System in Helsinki in the 1750s

Officially, the burghers' obligation to billet soldiers applied only to the enlisted regiments doing garrison duty, and not to the allotted

regiments used as construction workforce. However, there was a large grey area. Enlisted regiments were occasionally sent for construction works, and the burghers had to negotiate with the army about their lodging arrangements.[9] Another question was whether the civilian craftsmen and experts working for the army were entitled to accommodation or not.

The first troops to be billeted in Helsinki arrived already before the fortress construction started. The enlisted Finnish Artillery Battalion, which had retreated to Stockholm during the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743, began returning to Finland after the war with reinforcements. The first artillerist arrived at Helsinki in 1744, and, by the time the construction of Sveaborg began in 1748, the town had four artillery companies.[10]

At the beginning of the 1750s, enlisted infantry troops from Sweden commanded for garrison duty in the fortress came to town. In 1751 approximately 450 men from the Lantingshausen Regiment and approximately 450 men from the Hamilton Regiment arrived, which meant half of both these regiments. In 1753, more units from these two regiments arrived.[11] For a short period, eight companies from also a third enlisted regiment, the Crown Prince's Regiment, stayed in

[9] Jansson 1991, p. 210.

[10] Hedberg 1964, pp. 29–31.

[11] Hirn 1970, p. 13; Screen 2010, pp. 14–15. The regiments were usually named after their commander and, when the commander changed, the regiment's name was changed too. One and the same regiments was known as Lantingshausen's Regiment 1749–1752, Cronhielm's Regiment 1752–1762, Björnberg's Regiment 1762–1772, von Saltza's Regiment 1773, Skytte's Regiment 1773–1777, Fleming's Regiment 1777–1788, Stackelberg's Regiment 1788–1801 and finally Jägerhorn's Regiment 1801–1808 (Hirn 1970, p. 30). In 1759, Hamilton's Regiment turned into Liljesvärd's Regiment, in 1761 to von Liewen's Regiment, in 1762 to Prince Fredrik Adolf's Regiment, in 1771 to Manteuffel's Regiment and finally in 1772 to the Queen Dowager's Life Regiment (Screen 2010, pp. 13–17).

Helsinki.[12] However, they left in summer 1753 for garrison duty in Loviisa instead.[13]

It is impossible to determine exactly how many soldiers the burghers had to accommodate in their homes and for how long, as the town council protocols mention exact numbers only occasionally. One of these occasions happened in May 1751, when the first Swedish enlisted troops started to arrive in Helsinki. According to the town council, in total one general, one colonel, two lieutenant colonels, one major, one artillery scribe, 11 captains, 32 lieutenants and ensigns, 35 NCOs and 522 common soldiers were billeted in Helsinki at the moment. The general, the colonel, four captains and 10 other officers belonged to the Swedish regiments; a lieutenant colonel, one captain and three other officers belonged to the fortification; and four lower officers belonged to Finnish infantry regiments. All the other 24 officers were artillerists, as were all the common soldiers.[14] The numbers only include the soldiers, and nothing was said about their families.

The cost of the accommodation was estimated to be nearly 40,000 copper dalers. However, this estimate was based on the sums the burghers would have had to pay in cash to the officers in the event they did not accommodate them in their homes. Thus, it had nothing to do with the burghers' real costs for the accommodation, or with their losses for the alternative use of their living spaces.[15]

Fortunately, not all the soldiers in garrison duty had to be billeted by the burghers. When the artillerists had started to arrive in 1744, the burghers and the crown had constructed together the so-called Gyllenborg's Barrack, named after the local governor, with room for 200 soldiers.[16] In 1748, constructions works for

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[12] KA, Läänintilit, Uudenmaan ja Hämeen läänin tilejä, Henkikirjat 1751–1756, Helsingin kaupungin henkikirjat 1751–1756.

[13] Roos 1960, p. 13.

[14] HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:55, Helsingin maistraatin talousasioiden pöytäkirja 25.5.1751; Hornborg 1950, p. 297.

[15] Hornborg 1950, p. 297.

[16] Hedberg 1964, p. 72.

another two large barracks to the outskirts of the town was initiated, and yet another smaller barrack was built in 1766. According to Jonas Hedberg's calculations, these four barracks were able to house 1,300 soldiers.[17] As the construction works of Fortress Sveaborg proceeded, more and more living quarters for officers and soldiers were also completed on the fortress islands.

At least Cronhielm's Regiment (formerly known as Lantingshausen's Regiment) was mainly lodging in barracks, either in the town or on the fortress islands.[18] Likely the same applied to Hamilton's Regiment, since the town council protocols are mainly talking about artillerists. As the construction of Sveaborg proceeded, the townspeople eventually got rid of even some of the artillery companies, for in 1754 at least two companies had already moved out to the fortress islands. But still, in June 1755, Councilman Nils Larsson Burtz complained that the soldiers' families were still living in Helsinki.[19]

The workforce on the construction site mainly consisted of soldiers from allotted regiments. The first of them arrived in town in autumn 1747 and winter 1748. In the beginning, the workforce was quite small, since only preparational work could be made in wintertime, and the real construction season only started in May. The first regiments to arrive also came from neighbouring areas, and the soldiers could walk home during leaves. During the following years, the numbers of soldiers increased rapidly, involving regiments from more and more remote areas. However, the local burghers were not obliged to accommodate any other than the garrison troops if it could be avoided, and they were very persistent in interpreting their billeting duty as narrowly as possible. In only two known occasions, the governor of Uusimaa and Häme Province, Gustaf Samuel Gyllenborg, requested the burghers to accommodate allotted soldiers.

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[17] Hedberg 1964, p. 73.

[18] Hirn 1970, p. 160.

[19] HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:61, Helsingin maistraatin pöytäkirja 26.9.1755.

In March 1755, the governor asked for quarters for 280 soldiers from the Häme Regiment on their way to Sveaborg. Since there was not immediately available living space for them on the fortress, the governor asked the burghers to accommodate the soldiers for two weeks. The local authorities claimed that it was impossible to accommodate more than 180 soldiers, since the weather was far too cold so early in spring and soldiers therefore could not sleep in outhouses.[20] But the town council still agreed to the governor's request, likely because it simply was impossible to transport the soldiers to the fortress, as the ice was too thin for walking and too strong for boating.

In May during the same year, a new request arrived about lodgements for the same regiment for two or three weeks. This time the town council did not consider the burghers able to accommodate the soldiers comfortably, since they were already burdened with the artillerists. The councilmen asked for an exemption from the accommodation and hoped that the soldiers could be transported elsewhere to be accommodated in barracks and tents.[21] Unfortunately the protocols provide no answer to whether their request was granted or not.

The remark about accommodating soldiers in outhouses tells that the burghers' persistence was not only a matter of principle. Since parts of the artillery already were accommodated in the homes of the townspeople, their houses were quite crowded. Colonel Augustin Ehrensvärd, head of the Finnish fortification works, commented in as early as 1748 that soldiers had to be accommodated in saunas, sheds and other outhouses, and it was nearly impossible to provide even one more soldier with a roof over his head, let alone getting him any bedclothes.[22]

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[20] HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:61, Helsingin maistraatin pöytäkirja 27.3.1755.

[21] HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:61, Helsingin maistraatin pöytäkirja 25.5.1755.

[22] Ericsson 1937–1939, p. 146.

Even disregarding the lack of space, it was not in the army's interest to accommodate allotted soldiers in the town. The fortress construction site was on the islands outside the town, and the preparational works such as logging timber took place outside town. This meant plenty of time wasted on marches and boat rides, as soldiers were transported to and from their workplaces.[23] Time and transport possibilities being scarce, the most reasonable thing was to accommodate the soldiers as close to their working post as possible. In 1748, before the work on the fortress walls had even started, Augustin Ehrensvärd had already initiated the work on building makeshift wooden barracks both on the islands and on the mainland. It is also likely that the army used tent accommodation in summertime.[24] Unfortunately, the locals still had to accommodate some of the officers from the allotted regiments, a heavy burden since they were entitled to more space than the common soldiers.[25]

The accommodation duty was definitely a considerable social and economic problem, but the burghers' complaints should still be taken with a grain of salt, as other hidden motivations were often in play. In 1753, the crown transferred the town of Helsinki to a higher category on the taxation scale, which meant that the burghers' tax burden increased. The local taxation board protested wildly, and among other arguments referred to the townsmen's heavy burden of accommodation. In a letter to the king in 1755 the burghers complained of the difficult accommodation, claiming it cost them several thousand silver dalers every year. The aim of the complaint was to obtain concessions and considerable tax reliefs for Helsinki.

From 1749 onwards, the National Population Statistics Bureau (Sw. Tabellverket) obliged priests to compile yearly population statistics from their congregations. The statistics from 1750s Helsinki are not a complete series, but some years have been preserved.

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[23] Ericsson 1937–1939, p. 147.

[24] Nikula 2010, p. 110; Ericsson 1937–1939, p. 147.

[25] Hornborg 1950, p. 298.

Table 9.1: Civil population and civil households in Helsinki 1750–1757.

Year	Civil inhabitants	Number of households[a]
1750	1,520	249
1751	1,648	256
1754	1,887	336
1757	2,072	348

[a] Excluding poor and precarious households exempt from taxes.

Source: KA, Helsingin ruotsalais-suomalainen seurakunta, II Dc: 1 Väkilukutaulukot, Väkilukutaulukot 1750–1801. Table by the author.

They provide insight in the size of the civil population in Helsinki (the number also includes children) and, more importantly, the number of households. The latter is not complete, since poor and precarious households were excluded. However, the poorest households were also excluded from the billeting of soldiers since the accommodation was distributed according to the tax records.

The military population is much more difficult to calculate since no similar statistics have been preserved. It also must be remembered that only part of the soldiers lived in the town, with the rest lodging out on the fortress islands or in the neighbouring parishes. However, with so many regiments in town, the military population likely outnumbered the civil population by far. If we divide the number of billeted soldiers from 1751 by the number of households at the same year, we get 2.37 billeted soldiers per household. With the arrival of more enlisted regiments from Sweden later the same year, this number might have risen substantially. And these numbers include only the soldiers itself, not the servants of the officers, nor the wives and children that might have following the soldiers.

The burghers were not the only ones burdened with accommodation, although certainly the ones who complained about it the most loudly. Peasants on the surrounding countryside were burdened at least as much. Many soldiers from allotted regiments worked in the neighbouring parishes, cutting timber or chopping wood for the brickworks and lime burning. The lime quarry was

also situated outside town, but barracks were swiftly constructed there. But, for the mobile forest works, taking place on different places every year, barracks could not be constructed. These soldiers could in summertime be accommodated in tents, but during the winter months they had to be accommodated in the homes of the local peasants.

During the first years, the workforce was composed of Finnish allotted soldiers, who could be sent home for the winter. But, when allotted regiments from central Sweden were sent to construction works in 1751–1754, it became necessary to arrange winter quarters for them in the countryside around Helsinki.[26] The winter accommodation started in October or November and lasted until April or May; for sick soldiers it could even last over the summer. The sources often state just that the soldiers were lodging in 'the countryside', without mentioning the parishes. However, we know that soldiers were accommodated in peasant homes at least in the parishes of Espoo, Sipoo, Porvoo, Kirkkonummi and Helsinge. At least at the beginning of the 1750s, enlisted soldiers on garrison duty were also sometimes accommodated in wintertime in the countryside.[27]

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[26] Hornborg 1950, p. 208. KrA, Helsingfors fästningsarkiv, vol. 18, Kassakontrarulla vid fortifikationskassan i Helsingfors 1752; KrA, Helsingfors fästningsarkiv, vol. 3, Månadskontroller över fortifikationsarbetsmanskapet i Helsingfors 1751; KrA, Helsingfors fästningsarkiv, vol. 4, Månadskontroller över fortifikationsarbetsmanskapet i Helsingfors 1752; KrA, Helsingfors fästningsarkiv, vol. 19, Kassakontrarulla vid fortifikationskassan i Helsingfors 1753; KrA, Helsingfors fästningsarkiv, vol. 4, Månadskontroller över fortifikationsarbetsmanskapet i Helsingfors 1752; KrA, Helsingfors fästningsarkiv, vol. 5, Månadskontroller över fortifikationsarbetsmanskapet i Helsingfors 1753; KrA, Helsingfors fästningsarkiv, vol. 20, Kassakontrarulla vid fortifikationskassan i Helsingfors 1754; KrA, Helsingfors fästningsarkiv, vol. 5, Månadskontroller över fortifikationsarbetsmanskapet i Helsingfors 1753; KrA, Helsingfors fästningsarkiv, vol. 6, Månadskontroller över fortifikationsarbetsmanskapet i Helsingfors 1754.

[27] Hirn 1970, p. 158; Screen 2010, p. 15.

The burden of accommodating soldiers gradually diminished in the later part of the 1750s. In September 1757, Governor Gustaf Samuel Gyllenborg promised that the billeting in Helsinki would stop as soon as all soldiers could be lodged in barracks. This provided to be a slow process, and it is uncertain when the last soldiers really moved out from the local burghers' homes. Nevertheless, during the following decades, the crown used large-scale billeting of soldiers in Helsinki only temporarily for shorter periods, e.g. when troops returned after the Pomeranian War (1757–1762) and after a fire in the Siltavuori barracks in 1771.[28] However, the problem re-emerged in the 1790s during and after the Russo-Swedish War of 1788–1790.[29]

The Practices for Billeting Soldiers

The burghers could provide accommodation for the soldiers either in living space or in cash. Each burgher received an officer or some soldiers as houseguests and had to provide them lodgings.[30] The alternative was to pay them an agreed sum of money, which they then used to rent lodgings on their own and thus became normal tenants in the townsmen's houses. The burghers could not choose which method to use, as the army had the right to decide whether the accommodation could be paid in cash or not.[31] But, if it was impossible to accommodate officers properly, the army likely accepted the cash.

According to the accommodation prescript of 1720, as it was interpreted in Helsinki, a general or a colonel was entitled to one large and one smaller room, a kitchen, a cellar, a room for his servants, a stable for four horses, one good and two poorer beds. For lieutenant colonels and majors, the requirements were one big and one smaller room, a kitchen, one good bed and one poorer

[28] Hornborg 1950, p. 301.
[29] Hornborg 1950, pp. 408–410.
[30] Frohnert 1985, p. 21.
[31] Magnusson 2005, p. 198.

bed, lodgements for the servants, and a stable for two horses. Captains were entitled to one room, one good bed and one poorer bed, and lodgings for one male servant; lieutenants and ensigns got the same, albeit with a smaller room than the captains. NCOs had to be content with a bed lodging with their hosts. All these gentlemen were also entitled to receive firewood and light. For simple soldiers, a bed and heat with the host was enough.[32]

However, it is highly unlikely that these requirements were always met in the crowded town. Several complaints from the 1750s show that it was not always easy for the soldiers to get the kind of lodgings they were entitled to. As the chronic lack of space was common knowledge, most of the complaints regarded other things than the number of rooms. Officers complained often that they did not receive enough light or firewood, while the common soldiers lacked bedclothes.[33] There were also problems fulfilling the standards during the Russo-Swedish War of 1788–1790, and the town council had to allow several officers to be accommodated in the same room, even though they should have been entitled to a room of their own.[34]

In the 1750s, organising the billeting system was the responsibility of Councilman Carl Hasselgren. He likely got help from the municipal officials, but it was still a tremendous task for one man to handle. During the war of 1788–1790 the town council opted for a different solution. In autumn 1789, the council appointed an official Billeting Board, consisting of four merchants, five craftsmen, five petty-burghers, and one representative for the artillery. Later it was also joined by two representatives for homeowners in the town without burghers' rights.[35]

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[32] HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:55, Helsingin maistraatin talousasioiden pöytäkirja 25.5.1751.

[33] See for example Helsingin maistraatin pöytäkirjat 9.6.1750, 25.6.1750 and 15.9.1750, Ca:53, HSA.

[34] HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:95, Helsingin maistraatin pöytäkirja 16.11.1789.

[35] Hornborg 1950, pp. 455–456.

The accommodation was distributed among the burghers in proportion to their taxation. The more tax a burgher paid, the more soldiers he had to take in. The taxation was not progressive in a strict meaning of the word, but every year a local taxation board decided how to distribute the town's tax burden between the locals. They had good knowledge of everyone's capability of paying and tried to adjust the shares fairly. However, to decide what was fair was not always easy. Merchant Anders Lindberg complained in 1753 to Governor Gyllenborg that he had been burdened with too heavy an accommodation requirement, but the town council quickly replied that the billeting had been done in proportion to the general taxation. It was not wise to complain. In Lindberg's case, the town council eventually discovered that he should have been receiving one soldier more.[36]

Until 1766 only the burghers were obliged by law to billet soldiers, but after that all houseowners in garrison towns had to participate.[37] However, the statutes of 1720 had already given the town council a loophole, as in extraordinary situations, when there were more soldiers than usual to billet, it could ask all houseowners in the town to participate.[38] It is possible that the local authorities in Helsinki used this option, although it is often difficult to say if soldiers were billeted to a household or simply lived there as paying lodgers. For example, in March 1750, Ensign Kyhl handed in a bill to the town for accommodating officers in his house. This seems to indicate that the ensign was not obliged to billet soldiers, but, on the other hand, having to accommodate two high-ranking officers for months was huge task, and it is possible that Kyhl was paid compensation.[39]

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[36] HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:59, Helsingin maistraatin talousasioiden pöytäkirja 27.10.1753.

[37] Magnusson 2005, p. 169.

[38] Utdrag utur alle ifrån den 7. Decemb. 1718 utkomne Publique Handlingar, Placater, Förordningar, Resolutioner och Publicationer … 1742, p. 255.

[39] HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:53, Helsingin maistraatin pöytäkirja 3.3.1750.

The local authorities were fully aware of the fact that it was impossible to distribute accommodation completely evenly and fairly. Some burghers simply did not have enough space in their homes for the accommodation that they, according to the taxes they paid, should have been obliged to arrange. Other burghers had to help out more than they should have because they happened to live in larger houses.[40]

The town council protocol of 1 August 1753 notes that Commander of the Artillery Fredrik Ehrensvärd will be moving from the fortress to the town. He was billeted to Councilman Carl Telleqvist. However, Councilman Jakob Johan Tesche, who was at the time not burdened with any accommodation at all, was ordered to pay Telleqvist a compensation of 15 copper dalers. Accommodating such a high-ranking officer was a big expense, and it was thought not to be fair for Telleqvist to cover all on his own.[41] A monetary payment was a more practical solution than to force a high-ranking officer to move around all the time just to distribute the burden evenly between his hosts.

The town council protocols show that the billeting system was not popular among the locals, and that many burghers tried different tricks to escape their duties. An honest way to do so was to rent rooms from somebody else's house for the soldiers, or to persuade relatives with more space to take them in. No one stated that the burgher had to accommodate the soldiers in his own house; he just had to arrange the accommodation at his own expense.[42] Passive resistance was also popular. In October 1750, Jöran Wervelin was accused in town court of not repairing his house, which was seen as an attempt to avoid billeting duties.[43] Wervelin was not a

[40] HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:55, Helsingin maistraatin talousasioiden pöytäkirja 25.5.1751.

[41] HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:59, Helsingin maistraatin talousasioiden pöytäkirja 1.8.1753.

[42] See e.g. HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:53, Helsingin maistraatin pöytäkirja 15.1.1750 and 30.6.1750.

[43] HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:53, Helsingin maistraatin talousasioiden pöytäkirja 19.10.1750.

burgher but a low-ranking civil servant, which indicates that the town council had to include also non-burgher townspeople to the billeting system.

Sometimes the reluctance to billet an officer could take a quite humoristic turn, as Colonel Cronhielm experienced upon his arrival in Helsinki. As the commander of a garrison regiment, he should have been entitled to accommodation in town. However, in August 1753, Cronhielm complained to the town council that he had not been received quarters. The council refused to accommodate the commander, with the explanation that he was also the acting commandant of the Sveaborg fortress. No commandant had ever been billeted in Helsinki, and therefore it was necessary to first ask for instructions from the authorities in Stockholm. Cronhielm replied that in such a case he was obliged to use his powers as commandant and find himself quarters where it best suited him.[44]

The army was aware how reluctantly the townspeople accommodated soldiers, and in 1750 they came up with a system that granted a bonus for all who fulfilled their billeting duties without complaints. Lieutenant Ribbing from the Artillery suggested that the accommodated soldiers should be relocated between the burghers, so that good hosts would get the good-natured and modest soldiers, while burghers failing to follow the rules would get the troublemakers. The town council had no objections to this plan, as long as no one would get more soldiers than before to accommodate.[45] It is doubtful if this plan was ever implemented, but maybe just the threat was enough to scare disobedient burghers.

The billeting system did not apply only to soldiers but also to some civilians working for the army. At least master smith Anders Wikström, employed by the Fortification, demanded accommodation in 1753 and seems to have got his will, although the town

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[44] HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:59, Helsingin maistraatin talousasioiden pöytäkirja 18.8.1753.

[45] HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:53, Helsingin maistraatin pöytäkirja 4.6.1750.

council protocol does not give details about the arrangement.[46] But not all craftsmen were entitled to accommodation in the burghers' houses, as the fortress accounts note several cases where craftsmen were reimbursed for paid rents.[47]

The duty to accommodate officers and soldiers also included their wives and children. Even if the soldiers were temporarily commanded elsewhere, the families had the right to stay. Leave for private reasons did not automatically deprive the soldier of his right to accommodation, and he still had the right to quarters for himself and his family.[48] This right could also extend to after the soldier himself had moved into an army barrack. After the artillery regiment moved from the town to the fortress islands in 1754, many families stayed behind in town and in June 1755 Councilman Nils Larsson Burtz complained that the soldiers' families were still living in Helsinki.[49]

For the common soldiers' wives, it might have been more convenient to stay in town. Most of them had to work and gain an income, since the enlisted soldiers' salary was far too low to sustain the family. The town might have offered more economic opportunities for the women, who usually earned money by washing, sewing, nursing and cooking. Many of them also sold food and beverages, either in small stands or circulating on the streets.[50]

Both the allotted and the enlisted soldiers in the Swedish Realm were often married – not only the officers but also the common soldiers. The enlisted soldiers' wives often followed their husbands to the deployment, while the allotted soldiers' wives usually stayed

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[46] HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:59, Helsingin maistraatin talousasioiden pöytäkirja 27.10.1753.

[47] KrA, Helsingfors fästningsarkiv, vol. 18, Kassakontrarulla vid fortifikationskassan i Helsingfors 1752, KrA.

[48] Magnusson 2005, p. 200.

[49] HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:61, Helsingin maistraatin pöytäkirja 26.9.1755.

[50] Lennersand et al. 2017, pp. 187–192; Lennersand 2017, pp. 165–169; Hammar 2017, pp. 145–146. About the situation in Europe see for example Hearl-Eamon 2008.

at home, taking care of the croft. However, this was not always the case, as occasionally wives of allotted soldiers could also follow their husbands to Helsinki, and sometimes they also visited their husbands or fiancés during deployments.[51]

The facts that civilians could also be accommodated, and that soldiers could live on rent if they received accommodation in cash, blurs the limits of the billeting system. All these factors make it difficult to say if individual soldiers staying with the civilians were billeted or just tenants. But in both cases the results were the same: the soldiers lived close to the civilians and formed social and economic relations with them. They were not staying in closed barrack areas out on the fortress island but constantly interacting with the local society.

Social Interaction between Soldiers and Locals

Helsinki was crowded and it was difficult and expensive to find somewhere to live. Many houses, buildings and even rooms were shared by different social groups, and military staff and civilians mingled extensively. All local households probably encountered the army staff, voluntarily or involuntarily, as it would have been extremely difficult to avoid the soldiers and their families, and these encounters resulted in different kinds of social or economic relations. This mixture of different population groups in their shared living space is difficult to detect in the sources, but sometimes court records can reveal details of the different ways of living.

It would be interesting to know exactly which soldier stayed with which burgher, but no lists have been preserved, and there are not many descriptions in the town council protocols about the actual living arrangements in the crowded town. Complaints were common, but expensive paper was not wasted on details. However, some exceptions can be found. In a murder case from 1761, the living arrangements of the accused soldier Martin Gutatis were described in detail. Gutatis was an enlisted soldier,

[51] Gustafsson 2018, p. 186.

currently on leave, which was nothing unusual for enlisted soldiers. He had been lodging with Anna Catharina Björklund, the wife of an artillery employee. Anna Catharina Björklund, in her turn, was a tenant of Walborg Henriksdotter Hallberg; she was a married woman, but there is no mention of her husband. All three had been living in one and the same room, until Walborg Henriksdotter had evicted the others because it was too crowded. Walborg Henriksdotter also ran a tavern, but it is not mentioned if she ran her business in the same room or somewhere else.[52]

A later court case from 1789 features a detailed description of the local living arrangements during the Russo-Swedish War of 1788–1790. The situation during the war closely resembled the 1750s, as soldiers in too large numbers had again to be accommodated in the burghers' homes in Helsinki. In November 1789, merchant Carl Etholén complained about the improper behaviour of two captains and the damage they had caused to his house, and at the same time also complained about the number of soldiers he had to accommodate.

Before the two captains arrived, Etholén had already been assigned to billet two other officers with their servants, as well as three NCOs. His house was not big. On the ground floor was his shop, a room for his bookkeeper and apprentices, and a small chamber he used himself. The upper floor consisted of a drawing room – impossible to keep warm in wintertime – and two small chambers occupied by his wife, children, sister-in-law and female servants. Since his family already filled up the house, Etholén had rented a room from his uncle's widow's house for the two officers. The officer's servants and the three NCOs lived in Etholén's servant's quarters in his outhouse.

Despite this, the two captains had been billeted to his upper floor and they were determined to get in there. While the family had been away to a wedding, the captains had broken the door and carried their belongings in. Later at night, while the household was sound asleep, they arrived themselves, forcing the Etholén

[52] KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 4.6.1761.

family to escape from their own home to their neighbours. The town council agreed that Etholén could not possibly accommodate any more officers, and that the captains would have to stay in the vicarage until other quarters could be found. The captains also had to pay Etholén for the damage they had caused to his doors.[53]

The use of court records as sources easily gives the impression that the relations between the soldier and the civilians were bad. However, usually the soldiers did not cause this much destruction. Cases where civilians sued soldiers for threats, violence, or damages to property are quite rare in Helsinki in the 1750s.[54] In 1753, innkeeper Gustaf Wetter accused Lieutenant Stjernvall and NCO Schiönström for arriving to his house in the middle of the night, shouting, yelling, and kicking his door when they required accommodation. The material damages were insignificant, and the burgher was mainly upset about the disturbance of his sleep.[55]

In 1757 another case of intruding officers can be found, where two NCOs were accused of having forced a lock and broken a door to get in merchant Aron Peron's shop. This case, however, did not relate to billeting, but to another common problem, namely debts. Merchant Peron owed the soldiers money, but he was unfortunately bankrupt and could not pay. Therefore, the NCOs were planning to take goods from his shop instead of payment. However, they changed their mind after entering and did not take anything.[56]

The only known case from Helsinki where soldiers systematically and constantly pestered a local civilian is from 1755, when the poor brickwork owner Anders Ernst Mosberg claimed that soldiers were defaming him, singing nasty songs about him, shouting at him, threatening him, and throwing stones at his house. The court never really got to the bottom of this story, but

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[53] HKA, Helsingin maistraatti, Ca:95 Helsingin maistraatin pöytäkirja 23.11.1789.

[54] Talvitie 2014.

[55] KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 3.4.1753.

[56] KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 19.3.1757.

Mosberg also accused his neighbour, merchant Erik Grönberg, for having something to do with all this.[57] Mosberg had also been litigating against his former business partner, Johan Lillgren, in court for years. Lillgren ran a tavern in Mosberg's neighbourhood, where the soldiers usually were sitting drinking, which might have been a coincidence or not. Mosberg died in December 1755, which probably explains why the case was never resolved and just disappeared suddenly from the court records. In Mosberg's case the soldier's animosity might very well have been fuelled by local civilians and originated in old conflicts between neighbours.

The court records reveal that civilians ended up in court for attacking soldiers more often than the other way around. Between 1752 and 1755, the town court handled seven cases were soldiers or their wives accused civilians for manhandling them and only three cases were civilians accused soldiers.[58] The local butcher Gudmund Mether often got himself into trouble, sometimes also with the army staff. In May 1756 he was accused of beating soldier's wife Anna Maria Sjöberg. She and her husband had been billeted to Mether's house together with their children. When one of the children had cried, the mother had tried to silence him with threats of corporal punishment. Mether had tried to calm her down, but she had slandered the butcher, who had retorted by hitting her.[59]

Different behavioural and cultural codes could sometimes lead to conflicts, and women could get violent too. In 1754, carrier's wife Annika Carlsdotter Palin was accused of slandering and beating NCO Jacob Drossel's lover, Madame Holthausen, who had been baking bread at Palin's home.[60] Men could also fall victim to local civilians' anger, as did the enlisted soldier Jacob

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[57] KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 3.10; 10.10; 14.10; 17.10; 21.10; 25.10; 31.10. and 5.11.1755.

[58] KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 1752–1755.

[59] KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 11.5 and 12.5.1756.

[60] KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 22.4 and 5.5.1755.

Östman, who in 1755 accused a local custom inspector and his wife of attacking him both verbally and physically.[61]

Considering the size of the military population, including women and children, the few court cases of violence represent a minuscule part of the encounters between the army and the civil population. It can of course be argued that the soldiers' possible attacks upon civilians might not have been dealt with in in the town court but instead in courts martial. The complex court system in Helsinki has been thoroughly described by Petri Talvitie (2014) in his study of soldiers' criminality.[62] However, Talvitie's research does not indicate that the soldiers were violent, as he found only two fights between soldiers and civilians in the military court records. There are also very few cases where soldiers attacked each other, and in the 1750s not a single homicide involving the military population has been found. Talvitie's conclusion is that the townspeople were more inclined to violence than the military staff.[63]

The court records also reveal that trade and other economic interaction went on to a large extent between the civil and military populations. In the period 1752–1755, nearly 36% of all civil court cases where army staff or their families acted as plaintiffs or accused concerned debts or other economic transactions.[64] The soldiers could act as both debtors and creditors, buyers and sellers, or employers and employees. For example, in 1754, soldier Henrik Nymalm demanded payment for a cow from butcher Gabriel Wikström,[65] while soldier Johan Hortenius was arguing with carrier Palin about the sale of a horse.[66] The court records also show that the soldiers did all sorts of works for the locals, who sometimes refused to pay up. For example, in 1755, enlisted

[61] KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 9.5.1755.
[62] Talvitie 2014, pp. 49–52.
[63] Talvitie 2014, pp. 56–57.
[64] KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 1752–1755.
[65] KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 14.6.1754.
[66] KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 2.5.1754, 14.6.1754 and 2.8.1754.

soldier Anders Selling complained that he had not received his salary from one of the highest-ranking civil servants in town, Provincial Treasurer Anders Hellenius, who had employed the soldier to paint his house red.[67]

A common type of court case where the soldiers were mentioned, but usually not accused, was trials of single mothers who had given birth out of wedlock. In the years 1752–1755, the records of the Helsinki town court contain 30 trials regarding pre-marital sexual relations involving soldiers. Pre-marital sex, or sex between any persons not being married, was a criminal offence and punishable by 18th-century Swedish law. The courts of Helsinki, however, quite often seem to have taken these trials quite lightly, as the processes were formulaic and the penalties not too harsh.

The Helsinki town court did not deal with the fathers, only with the mothers, since they did not have jurisdiction over the soldiers. In some cases, the fathers were also claimed to be 'unknown soldiers'. This might have been true in some cases, but blaming deceased or departed soldiers and sailors was also a way to protect local married men. In one case this became evident: in 1752, maidservant Anna Jacobsdotter claimed that her former master, merchant Fredrik Myhrberg, had paid soldier Christopher Bruce to accept the paternity of her child, although the real father was the merchant himself.[68]

It would be easy to assume that soldiers who had sexual relations with local women left them in trouble after an unwanted pregnancy. However, by contrast with the situation in many other European countries, the Swedish army actively encouraged soldiers to marry, so they often did marry their local sweethearts.[69]

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[67] KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 29.8.1755 and 5.9.1755.

[68] KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 17.11.1752.

[69] About Swedish soldiers' marriages in general and also their marriages with local women, see e.g. Lennersand et al. 2017, pp. 188–191.

Marrying a local woman provided the soldiers not only with economic support but also with local social networks.[70]

Many soldiers were already married upon arrival, but between the arrival of Hamilton's Regiment to Helsinki in 1751 and the end of 1757 there were 36 soldiers from the regiment getting married according to the regiment's church records. In only eight cases are there indications of the bride's origin. Three of them were mentioned to have been from Helsinki, and one from Fortress Sveaborg. In addition, two brides came from countryside parishes near Helsinki, Kirkkonummi and Inkoo. However, in three more cases a profession and an employer are mentioned, showing that these women had prior to their marriage been working as servants in town. In one case the father of the bride is mentioned, showing that also this woman was of local origin.[71]

However, not all soldiers' marriages were registered in the regimental church records. Many soldiers married women from neighbouring civil parishes, and their marriages were inscribed in the civil parish records.[72] One unusual case went to court in Helsinki in 1754: enlisted soldier Johan Lilliegren accused his former fiancée, maidservant Johanna Eliedotter, of breaking her promise to marry him without any reason. Men could also be abandoned by their sweethearts, but they rarely decided to bring the matter to court.[73]

Soldiers from allotted Swedish regiments also married local women during their deployment in Finland. At least three soldiers from the Calmar Regiment got married in Inkoo and Siuntio, rural parishes near Helsinki, in 1753–1754. It is likely they had been billeted over the winter among the local farmsteads there. Also, one soldier from Närke Regiment married in Vihti in 1753. In addition to common soldiers, officers, NCOs and other

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[70] Lennersand 2017, pp. 160–169.

[71] HisKi, Sotilasseurakunnat, Hamiltonin rykmentti, vihityt 1751–1757.

[72] HisKi, Uusimaa, vihityt 1751–1757.

[73] KA, Renovoidut tuomiokirjat, Helsingin kämnärioikeus 14.6, 3.9.1754 and 23.9.1754.

military staff from enlisted regiments also sometimes married local women.[74]

Another way of mapping the relations between civilians and soldiers is looking at the godparents of children born in the Helsinki town congregation in 1750–1757.[75] The results are inconclusive, as godparents often lack titles, and women are often called just 'wife'. However, common soldiers very rarely appeared as godfathers for common townsmen's children in the 1750s. For the higher social groups, the situation is different: wealthy merchants, high-ranking civil servants and other members of the local elite could sometimes include high-ranking officers and important army staff among the godparents for their children. In some cases, it is clear that the father of the child had ample business transactions with the army. For example, the local pharmacist Johan Magnus Tingelund often sold medicaments, colours and ink to the army, and it is hardly surprising that many of his children had military staff among their godparents. Also, many of the local merchants that were big suppliers of materiel to the army, e.g. Johan Sederholm, strengthened his bonds with the army by including officers among his children's godparents.

In the 1750s, many locals might still have regarded the soldiers as temporary visitors in their hometown, and thus felt no need to form long-lasting social bonds and commitment to the army. But, as the garrison regiments during the following decades became permanent residents in town, the military and civil society started to merge to a larger extent, especially among the social elites. In the late 18th century, marriages between soldiers and civil women became much more common, many daughters of wealthy merchants started to marry officers, and their sons might even marry daughters of officers. Not only was this phenomenon due to closer and more long-lasting relations between military staff and

[74] HisKi, Uusimaa, vihityt 1751–1757.

[75] KA, Helsingin ruotsalais-suomalainen seurakunta, I C:2 Syntyneiden ja kastettujen luettelot 1750–1764.

civilians but it also reflects a profound social transformation in Sweden, where a new middle class started to emerge.

Conclusions

The burden of billeting soldiers among local inhabitants peaked in Helsinki in the early and mid-1750s owing to the construction works of the sea fortress Sveaborg and the arrival of garrison regiments. The accommodation of thousands and thousands of soldiers for months or years was a tremendous task. The town council tried to distribute the billeted soldiers fairly among the burghers, but that was an impossible task. Complaints were inevitable, but the tensions and complaints rarely resulted in violent rows, although they sometimes did end up in the local court.

Helsinki appears strangely calm and the local inhabitants obviously quite easily adapted to the military invasion of their living spaces. The reason for the Helsinkians' quite relaxed approach under these extreme circumstances might be found in the town's history. The early modern Swedish Realm was a highly militarised society, and Helsinki, owing to its strategic situation and excellent harbour, had always had importance for the military. The inhabitants had likely got used to having soldiers around, and after two Russian occupations during the previous 50 years they might also have felt more secure with so many Swedish soldiers in town. Many of the local inhabitants were refugees from areas that had been conquered by Russia in the Great Northern War or in the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743.

The court records also show frequent economic interaction between the army staff and civilians. Many civilians did their best to gain profit from the soldiers. Helsinki had suffered economically from the wars and occupations during the first half of the 18th century, and the fortress and the soldiers offered a waste range of economic opportunities, both for merchants selling construction materials and petty-burghers and poor widows (and rich merchants) selling beer and spirit. For most local inhabitants there was the possibility to profit economically from the army

in one way or the other – the more soldiers, the more clients.[76] Local historian Henrik Forsius warned that in 1757 the town was already getting economically dependent on the soldiers, and that too many locals were engaged in the lucrative tavern business and neglected their own livelihoods.[77] Many locals thus had a strong economic incitement to stay on friendly terms with the army.

Peaceful social interaction is always much more difficult to detect than quarrels, since only problems and fights end up in the court records. However, the church records offer proof of sexual relations and marriages between soldiers and civil women. However, only the absolute socio-economic elite in Helsinki included high-ranking officers among their children's godparents in the 1750s. At that time, the soldiers might still have been perceived as temporary guests, and the locals were not so keen in forming life-long relations with them, as they were mainly interested in short-term business relations. Maybe the local civilians' calm and collected approach to the army's invasion of their homes could best be summarised in the old proverb: do not bite the hand that feeds you.

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[76] Aalto, Gustafsson & Granqvist 2020, passim.
[77] Forsius 1906, pp. 116–117.

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Epilogue

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The general objective of this anthology has been to discuss the role of non-state actors in the military supply systems in the early modern Swedish Realm. This includes entrepreneurial officers in the army, burghers in the towns, and peasants in the countryside. Officers are here included with non-state actors alongside burghers and peasants because during the 16th and 17th centuries they more closely resembled private entrepreneurs than public servants. The two main questions are: in what ways did the Swedish government engage civilians in supply operations, and what kind of special supply challenges did the northern, vast and sparsely populated realm have compared to other European powers?

This is not the first book to argue that civilians had an important role to play in military supply systems. However, most of the studies on military history in Sweden and Finland have focused on wartime operations, especially on the challenges the armies encountered when trying to acquire the victuals or the horse

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fodder they needed from the local population. Moreover, plenty of attention has been paid to conscriptions and recruitments, which were arguably the biggest military burdens for civil society. The purpose of this collection is to complement the overall picture by bringing to the discussion new actors, such as small-town burghers, and by also including peacetime operations to the analysis. In this way, the book seeks to enhance our understanding of the total costs and benefits of the militarisation of the early modern Swedish Realm.

According to Charles Tilly's well-known theory, early modern governments had three ways to mobilise private resources: coercion, markets or a combination of the two. As regards coercion, Tilly refers principally to taxation and conscriptions, but coercive methods were also used in actual supply operations. As shown in the chapters of this anthology, the Swedish crown utilised all three of these models, with varying effects and results.

The production of saltpetre is a good example of coercion. The saltpetre factories were owned by the state, but the acquisition of raw materials (dung, ash, firewood, straw etc.) was based on forced deliveries. As Mirkka Lappalainen writes in her chapter, the crown forced peasants to give up an important part of their life-saving manure to feed the endless demands of warfare. The oppressive nature of the system made it susceptible to insubordination, disobedience and loitering. The same conclusion applies to the billeting of soldiers, as the burghers did not house garrison soldiers because it was profitable but because it was their duty. According to Sofia Gustafsson, the billeting obligation was a constant source of complaints and tensions in Helsinki during the 1750s, when local burghers had to share their houses with hundreds of soldiers from all over the country.

Inland, the peasants were forced to maintain bridges and roads for the use of the troops of the crown, as well as to provide them and their horses with shelter and nutrition, as Anu Lahtinen discusses in her chapter. For some of the peasants, the troop movements also offered opportunities to make small profits by selling spirits to the soldiers, but the overall burden grew constantly at

the turn of the 17th century, increasing tax arrears. The crown also resorted to coercion-based resource mobilisation during the Great Northern War, when it tried to press the peasants to buy crown farms against their own intention, and in the early phases of the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743, when peasants and burghers had to bake bread for the army because there were not enough crown bakeries in Finland.

At first sight, the use of coercion might create an image of a strong state, capable of forcing its subjects to serve their ruler's military ambitions. To some extent, this conception might be true, but there was another side to this coin. The Swedish crown resorted to forcing not just because of its superior administrative capabilities but because it did not have any other option. Towns were small in Finland, resources were limited, and the infrastructure was underdeveloped. It is revealing that during the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743 the crown had to buy bread from the baker's guild of Stockholm, as the bakers in Finland did not have enough ovens. Likewise, there was almost no one to sell bricks and lime in Finland, when the crown began to construct bakeries during the early phases of the campaign, and consequently the construction materials had to transported from Stockholm.

Both the proponents and opponents of the military revolution theory have presented the Swedish Realm as a model case of an effective bureaucratic state – the former treating it as a European norm, the latter as a European anomaly. However, as several chapters in this anthology suggest, its effectiveness had its limits. The administration excelled in its core tasks like collecting taxes for the king or rounding up men for the wars but was often in trouble in front of more complex or unexpected missions when there was a lack of reliable information.

This is not to say, however, that supply markets were non-existent. Quite the contrary. The chapters of this book suggest that, in certain situations, markets had an important albeit relatively unexplored role in wartime and peacetime operations. The merchants were often more flexible than the public administration in organising the supply, and also better connected to the European

finance markets. During the Great Northern War (1700–1721), the burghers of Nyen provided the army with victuals and other necessities, and in the spring of 1713 the supply of the army and navy units in Finland was practically privatised to one person, Johan Henrik Frisius. A single merchant – and a refugee from his destroyed hometown, for that matter – had better credit standing on international markets than the Swedish crown itself.

The Ingrian War (1609–1617) is another interesting example. According to Jaakko Björklund, the Swedish crown would probably have lost the campaign without the private credit offered by several high-ranking officers. The commanders used their personal connections and resources to pay soldiers' salaries and to buy victuals and clothes for them, and they acted as necessary intermediaries by raising funds from the private sector to the ruler they served at any given time.

Some cases even indicate that Swedish decision makers, at times, relied too much on the possibility of utilising markets and civilian actors in supply. The construction period of sea fortress Sveaborg is a prime example of this. When the construction began in 1748, the army came to Helsinki with the intention of outsourcing both the maintenance of the construction site and the accommodation of the workers and soldiers to the local burghers. However, the burghers were too few in numbers and too afraid of the loss of their autonomy to take full advantage of all the possibilities, and the army had to resort to its own production. The soldier billeting system faced similar problems, as the burghers were unable to lodge the soldiers along the official accommodation prescripts and the crown had to both bend the regulations and resort to barrack-building.

Overall, David Parrott is probably right when arguing that the officers, burghers and other civilians engaged in supply operations extended the central government's administrative power, and for that reason the outsourcing was an efficient means of mobilising military resources. However, the use of markets was possible only if there were profits to be made. Otherwise, the cooperation began to resemble coercion.

The case of Nyen is illustrative in that respect. As Kasper Kepsu writes in his chapter, the crown had difficulties getting credit from wealthy merchants in Swedish cities during the Great Northern War because normal trade yielded a much greater profit than the government was able to offer. The situation was different in Finland, near the operational area. The small-town burghers were willing to do business with the army and navy, because they did not have better alternatives. Military operations disrupted normal trade, and consequently it was better for the merchants to use their connections to provision the troops than to fall into poverty.

As regards the 17th-century officers, also they were motivated by prospective profits. The high-ranking officers were willing to finance the Ingrian War from their own pockets because they were confident that their king would reward them sometime in the future – if not in money, then in land grants or high positions in the crown administration. Had the king not done so, he would have risked the loyalty of his officers. Moreover, military campaigns offered always other sources of revenues than just earned income such as supply trade or looting. Officers who allowed their units to disintegrate would lose these revenues.

According to Jaakko Björklund, the Swedish crown was highly dependent on the services of foreign aristocrats during the Ingrian War. Some of them joined the war to gain experience in command, and they were not willing to use their own funding to wage the war. However, there were also military migrants who wanted to make a career in the Swedish army, and they were more eager to invest their own resources. These cases affirm Jan Glete's argument that private actors preferred to cooperate with strong rulers capable of actually ruling their territories, although Glete did not develop his theory to analyse military enterprising. He was more interested in foreign trade and state–merchant relationships.

The Swedish kings preferred to acquire the maintenance for their army from civilians, either by coercion or cooperation, but the preconditions of their northern realm set serious limits on their attempts to act like their counterparts in Western and Central Europe. Although the privatised maintenance was in many

cases surprisingly effective, the crown could never fully count on it. The Ingrian War of 1610–1617 and the Russo-Swedish War of 1741–1743 offer a fruitful parallel: in the former, private entrepreneurs turned the war into a military victory, whereas in the latter the lack of private entrepreneurs turned the war into a military disaster. This uncertainty forced the Swedish Realm to maintain a strong governmental machine. The stronger the state, the better chances it had of using private resources in military supply.

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During the early modern centuries, gunpowder and artillery revolutionized warfare, and armies grew rapidly. To sustain their new military machines, the European rulers turned increasingly to their civilian subjects, making all levels of civil society serve the needs of the military.

This volume examines civil-military interaction in the multinational Swedish Realm in 1550–1800, with a focus on its eastern part, present-day Finland, which was an important supply region and battlefield bordered by Russia. Sweden was one of the frontrunners of the Military Revolution in the 16th and 17th centuries. The crown was eager to adapt European models, but its attempts to outsource military supply to civilians in a realm lacking people, capital, and resources were not always successful.

This book aims at explaining how the army utilized civilians – burghers, peasants, entrepreneurs – to provision itself, and how the civil population managed to benefit from the cooperation. The chapters of the book illustrate the different ways in which Finnish civilians took part in supplying war efforts, e.g. how the army made deals with businessmen to finance its military campaigns and how town and country people were obliged to lodge and feed soldiers.

The European armies' dependence on civilian maintenance has received growing scholarly attention in recent years, and *Civilians and Military Supply in Early Modern Finland* brings a Nordic perspective to the debate.

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